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The book investigates how the United Nations, governments, and aid 
agencies mobilise and instrumentalise migration policies and programmes 
through a discourse of safe migration.
Since the early 2000s, numerous non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), UN agencies, and governments have warmed to the concept of safe 
migration, often within a context of anti-trafficking interventions. Yet, both 
the policy-enthusiasm for safety, as well as how safe migration comes into 
being through policies and programmes remain unexplored. Based on seven 
years of ethnographic fieldwork in the Mekong region, this is the first book 
that traces the emergence of safe migration, why certain aid actors gravitate 
towards the concept, as well as how safe migration policies and programmes 
unfold through aid agencies and government bodies. The book argues that 
safe migration is best understood as brokered safety. Although safe migra-
tion policy interventions attempt to formalize pre-emptive and protective 
measures to enhance labour migrants’ well-being, the book shows through 
vivid ethnographic details how formal migration assistance in itself depends 
on – and produces – informal and mediated practices.
The book offers unprecedented insights into what safe migration policies 
look like in practice. It is an innovate contribution to contemporary theoris-
ing of contemporary forms of migration governance and will be of interest 
to sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists, and human geographers 
working within the fields of Migration Studies, Development Studies, as 
well as Southeast Asian and Global Studies.
Sverre Molland is a senior lecturer in Anthropology at the Australian National 
University, Australia. His research examines the intersections between migra-
tion, development and security in a comparative perspective, with specific 
focus on governance regimes and intervention modalities in mainland South-
east Asia.
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The “global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration” will seek 
to enhance international cooperation in governing migration and focus 
attention on migrants, the people they leave behind and the communi-
ties they join. It will aim to protect the vulnerable; leverage the many 
benefits migrants bring to their host and home countries; and tackle the 
drivers of irregular and forced migration.
(António Guterres, Secretary General, 
The United Nations (2017))
The schoolyard buzzes with students passing time whilst waiting for their 
classes. Some of them sit chatting while others read their textbooks. Many 
are preoccupied with their smartphones, which have become a ubiquitous 
accessory amongst the students. Others help themselves with food in the 
canteen. There must be at least a few hundred students in the schoolyard 
area. For a passer-by, the school could be mistaken for an ordinary Thai 
school; yet, Myanmar Migration School is entirely made up of young adult 
labour migrants from the greater Bangkok area. Despite the school’s lack 
of official credentialisation, the Sunday school emulates the formal Thai 
education system including compulsory school uniforms which includes the 
school’s name and logo. As such, Myanmar Migrant School is highly public.
While I walk towards the canteen area, I notice a video screen displaying 
old speeches by Aung Sang, the revered Burmese National Independence 
Leader. By chance, today is “Burmese Martyrs’ day,” an auspicious occa-
sion on Myanmar’s official calendar. The School Director, U Ba Sein, whom 
I have met several times before, spots me and comes over. He explains to 
me how the school operates. He tells me that language training is cen-
tral, not only for students to master Thai but also to “build national and 
labour discipline.” Our conversation is brief as the next sessions of classes 
begin in a few minutes. U Ba Sein grabs a microphone and gives a short 
speech in remembrance of Aung San, the great independence leader of 
Myanmar. The students stand up in silence whilst U Ba Sein speaks. The 
address ends. Chatter refills the schoolyard. Classes in the rooms upstairs 
recommence.
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U Ba Sein takes me around to some of the classrooms to introduce me 
and my “safe migration” research to the students. Rather than any conver-
sation about labour migration assistance, he continues the theme from the 
schoolyard downstairs. After a short monologue regarding the importance 
of national unity and democracy in Myanmar, he asks the students “who are 
the famous leaders of the Shan, who are the famous leaders of the Karen?.” 
He then explains to the students that I was a researcher interested in “safe 
migration” and wanted to learn about students’ migration and work condi-
tions. Later on, outside the classroom, U Ba Sein tells me that it is important 
to build national and political identity of the students. “In order to have 
national solidarity” he says, “you must have labour solidarity.” As I would 
learn over time, for U Ba Sein, the welfare and work conditions of labour 
migrants were inseparable from Myanmar politics; a disposition which 
made sense given U Ba Sein’s long-term residence in Thailand as a political 
refugee in the aftermath of Myanmar’s 1988 student protests. As several 
other Myanmar political exiles in Thailand, the fate of labour migrants had 
become an additional topic of concern over the years.
His preoccupation with national and labour solidarity may seem discon-
nected from “safe migration.” Yet, his school was an extended arm of a large 
“safe migration” programme, funded by international aid. With the school’s 
relatively large enrolment of nearly a thousand predominately Myanmar 
students (and a handful of Khmer and Lao labour migrants), the school 
had potential as a conduit for aid programmes that target labour migrants. 
Through donor funding, the school had a status as a “migrant resource 
centre” (MRC).
MRCs have become a common ingredient amongst several aid organi-
sations that implement safe migration interventions and other forms of 
migrant assistance. Nominally, an MRC serves as a focal point where labour 
migrants can seek advice relating to migration status (passport and work 
permit policies) and assistance with lodging complaints relating to under-
payment, work accidents, and abuse. Although the language school’s formal 
role appeared to be an odd fit, the classrooms served as an entry point for 
awareness raising for labour migrants. The school’s potential as a conduit 
to labour migrants was also significantly amplified by the ubiquitous use of 
social media amongst the students. Despite the school being highly local-
ised (in spatial terms – a school), its social and spatial reach straddled well 
beyond the schoolyard through Facebook and other social media platforms. 
The school’s own Facebook account had more than 12,000 followers (as 
later chapters will show this is a tiny following compared to other migrant 
assistance groups) where a range of migration-related media content could 
be shared (such as information on new visa regulations, etc.). Furthermore, 
language training made sense as a safe migration intervention given the 
importance of language acquisition in order to obtain better employment 
thereby pre-empting poor work conditions, and – importantly – equipping 
migrants with skills to seek help if needed. The Migration School is one 
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out of numerous examples of safe migration initiatives scattered throughout 
Thailand and its neighbouring countries.
Brokered safety
This book examines safe migration – migrant assistance that comprises 
pre-emptive and protective measures to enhance labour migrants’ work 
conditions and well-being – which has become an emergent aid modality 
in the Mekong region and elsewhere. The school visit I describe foreshad-
ows the multifaceted ways in which safe migration interventions unfold. 
The language school serves as a central component within a supply chain 
of international aid assistance, glossed in policy terms as safe migration 
interventions. At the same time, the school indicates how “safe migration” 
goes beyond a narrow focus on “legal” and regulated migration. Ultimately, 
language training is more important than training on labour rights at the 
Myanmar Migrant School. As U Ba Sein himself told me, “you may be legal 
but still not happy,” hinting at the commonality of underpayment and abuse 
in his students’ workplaces regardless of their legal status.
At the same time, the school denotes how aid interventions become (re)
appropriated and altered through implementation. Despite the school serv-
ing as an MRC under the auspices of a “safe migration” intervention, any 
programme jargon is overshadowed by a Burmese-specific discourse that 
marries labour migration with Burmese political futures and pan-ethnic 
solidarity. This is not to say that the school ignored its role as an MRC. 
Language training was after all recognised by the donor as the main activ-
ity that took place. The classrooms were often used as a social space where 
students’ migration-related problems could be expressed. Yet, it was evi-
dent from conversations with both U Ba Sein and several of his students 
that despite a specific focus on labour rights and migrants’ well-being, there 
were obvious limitations to how the school and students alike could affect 
meaningful change. For example, the same day of my visit I spoke to Ma Ni, 
who is one of the students at Myanmar Migrant School. She had left her 
employer due to underpayment, she told me, but as Thai law required the 
employer’s written consent to let her change jobs, it had put her in an impos-
sible limbo regarding her migration status. Other students faced the same 
problem in spatial form: students possessing “pink cards” – a semi-formal 
work permit that is commonplace in the Thai labour economy – were techni-
cally in breach of their visa condition when crossing provincial boundaries. 
Ironically, although the school was part of a safe migration programme, 
some students exposed themselves to risk when attending training sessions 
on safety as their place of employment and residence were located else-
where. U Ba Sein told me on a later occasion that he had several cases over 
the years where students had been arrested due to these legal arrangements.
Yet, it was precisely document status and labour rights empowerment 
where donors wanted to see more work done. But, this was problematic for 
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the school. Pushing students can backfire, U Ba Sein alleged, pointing to 
how other migrant groups had encouraged pseudo-union activism amongst 
migrants which only resulted in the migrants getting in trouble with the 
authorities. As one of the teachers told me, the main value of the school for 
the students was how it helped them indirectly with changing employers 
which allowed better pay and conditions, despite the aforementioned impli-
cations this had for legal status. Rather than training on labour rights, it 
was the mere fact of obtaining better language skills that was meaningful 
for students, the teacher alleged.
The tension between the school and its international funder reflected dif-
ferent perspectives on how safe migration is achieved. Whereas the school 
favoured language training, the international agency held mixed views. 
From the point of view of an aid evaluation, language training under the 
auspices of a safe migration intervention can be both applauded and cri-
tiqued. Teaching Thai (and English) made sense as it constituted a proactive 
form of assistance: language skills empower migrants to avoid exploitation 
in the first place. As such, it produces “safety.” Indeed, unpublished stud-
ies pointed to the fact that students ended up with better paid jobs after 
attending the school, which was echoed in my own interviews with several 
students.
Yet, such results may just as well reflect students social disposition 
acquired over time in Thailand. As one expatriate aid official familiar with 
the project pointed out to me: “language is not really the point.” From an 
aid programme’s perspective, how can you attribute causational linkage 
between improved language skills and better labour outcomes? These con-
cerns make good sense within an aid monitoring and evaluation habitus. As 
mentioned above, language training had limited direct effect on the various 
structural problems’ students faced relating to work permits and visa status. 
Furthermore, most students had already been in Thailand for several years 
before enrolment and could hardly be considered representative of inexpe-
rienced, vulnerable labour migrants. In this sense, the school arguably man-
ufactured “success” as the students are pre-dispositioned to succeed given 
their accumulated migration experience (a phenomenon that we will return 
to throughout the book, see also Huijsmans 2012a).
Still, my ethnographic sensibilities made me curious why some aid offi-
cials questioned language training as a “successful” safe migration initia-
tive. To my knowledge, the school was the only activity under the auspices 
of safe migration where beneficiaries paid – through tuition fees – to access 
the service. The simple fact that poor labour migrants, by their own voli-
tion, chose to spend the only day they have time off to attend a language 
school indicated that – at least from the point of view of the students – the 
school certainly had value for them. With enrolments fluctuating between 
800 and 1200 students, and the school being in its 10th year of operation it 
seemed curious how the intervention received less attention from the safe 
migration sector. In contrast, some safe migration programmes lauded 
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other MRCs that worked directly on compensation claims for migrants as 
a “success” (ILO 2012), despite the fact that practitioners were well aware 
that a court-ruling did by no means guarantee enforcement of a compensa-
tion claim. Hence, the school foreshadows the importance of ethnographic 
attention to how safe migration outcomes are both contested and mobilised 
along different scales of aid delivery, a theme that will be examined through-
out the chapters.
The book’s ethnographic focus also means adopting a sideway glance 
(Hannerz 2003), that is, embracing an astute interest in the wider context 
of the social milieu one observes. What falls outside an aid programme’s 
vision and formal practice becomes crucial. During fieldwork, important 
side effects of the school’s operation became apparent which was to my 
knowledge invisible in aid reports and possibly to several aid workers within 
the safe migration aid sector in Thailand. The awareness raising which took 
place in the classroom produced its own counter-intentional effects. U Ba 
Sein was quite open with me that awareness raising on legal and safe migra-
tion “also provides opportunities for brokering practices.” Several students 
took on the role as informal brokers due to their newfound knowledge on 
visa processing, Thai labour law and other handy tips for labour migrants. 
“Work permits,” U Ba Sein said, “brokers can eat from that one!” Although a 
central tenet of safe migration discourse proclaims that informing migrants 
on legal migration pathways contributes to eradicating migrant brokers, the 
school’s safe migration activities had multiplex effects: while the awareness 
raising benefitted students in navigating their migration, the school was at 
the same time – even according to their own director – a broker-incubator. 
This may seem both self-defeating and tragicomic yet point to a broader 
claim this book makes: what appears as mutually exclusive oppositional 
principles, practices, and actors within formal safe migration aid delivery 
are intertwined and co-dependent in practice. Assistance and harm, safety 
and risk, the legal and extra-legal, and eradication and production are not 
opposites but part of the same configuration.
As our introductory ethnographic vignette demonstrates, the school is 
riddled with paradoxes where opposites are brought together: the school’s 
simultaneous overt and covertness (despite operating publicly with a license 
and school uniforms, many students nonetheless must tacitly navigate pre-
carious migration status to access the school); the local and immediate ver-
sus the distant and abstract (how programme implementation appropriates 
its own local style in contrast with the aid discourse which funds it); frictions 
between formal assistance and informal needs and values (what is valuable 
for recipients is questioned within a monitoring and evaluation aid frame-
work); and, finally, how safe migration interventions end up producing one 
of the very phenomena it seeks to eliminate: brokers. Hence, this book is an 
ethnography of how safe migration comes into being through various prac-
tices by governments, United Nations (UN) agencies, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), and local community-based initiatives – such as the 
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Myanmar Migrant School. The book traces the emergence of safe migra-
tion, why certain aid actors gravitate towards the concept, as well as how 
the concept moves from the discursive and abstract (how it is verbalised) 
to the social and material (how it is practiced). More specifically, the book 
argues that:
1 Despite a nominal adherence to procedural rule-bound migration gov-
ernance, safe migration instrumentalisation depends on, and produces 
informal practices. Just as the school’s formal safe migration interven-
tions piggybacks on localised Myanmar-specific idioms of national 
identity, formal awareness raising produce (as opposed to eliminate) 
informal brokers – a phenomenon which official safe migration dis-
course wishes to eliminate.
2 Yet, such informal practices are not extrinsic to governmental structures 
but constitutive of them. Hence, safe migration brings together oppo-
sitional actors into a range of forms of co-dependency, either through 
patron-client relationships or brokering practices. Government bodies, 
NGOs, brokers and other safe migration actors co-opt and become 
co-opted through these relations.
3 Just as actors are both oppositional and co-dependent, safe migra-
tion interventions furnish divergent outcomes where assistance, help, 
exploitation, and abuse are co-produced. As following chapters will 
show, although safe migration assistance in the form of migrant hot-
lines, pre-departure training to formal documentation of workers 
is tremendously useful for migrants, they are also central to creating 
new forms of social control, either through deportations, or forms of 
bondage. Rather than safety, freedom, empowerment, exploitation, and 
abuse being opposites, they are co-produced.
Hence, safe migration in the Mekong region, the book argues, is best 
understood as brokered safety. Furthermore, the ways in which formal safe 
migration interventions depend on oppositional yet co-dependent informal 
practices cannot be understood without careful attention to their tempo-
ral and spatial significance. Safe migration interventions relativise social 
space and connectivity: informal practices, despite being highly localised, 
have larger spatial reach compared with “high tech” abstracted approaches 
(such as donor-driven mobile phone apps). At the same time, safe migration 
interventions produce spatial and temporal reversals. As coming chapters 
will delineate, safe migration outcomes often precede intervention, or are 
premised on spatial “U-turns” (e.g. pre-departure training taking place sub-
sequent to arrival in the destination country). Throughout the book, the 
theoretical implications of this dimension of spatio-temporal governance 
will be fleshed out.
The Mekong region is an ideal place to investigate safe migration, not 
only due to its enormous labour migration pool but also how safety and 
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risk are central to the region’s migration and development trajectories and 
rationales:
The ethos of entrepreneurialism relies on people taking a chance, on 
people taking risks. This premise is fundamental to the sensibilities 
sweeping through the region. Yet at the same time, millions of devel-
opment dollars go into supposedly mitigating unwanted consequences, 
based on a pre-emptive logic of “measure, avoid and/or compensate.” 
There is a very basic tension here. On the one hand, people are encour-
aged to try their hand in market engagement in freeform ways one can-
not anticipate and, on the other hand, we work with a logic that suggests 
we can anticipate and take care of undesired consequences before they 
happen despite the fact that aspirational endeavours are premised on 
their unpredictability.
(Lyttleton 2014, 9–10)
As such, a belief in socially engineered safety goes to the heart of policy 
thinking relating to both labour migration and development in the region. 
To be clear, the book’s central concern is not what aid organisations and 
policy officials intuitively ask (does safe migration work?) but rather how 
it works (see Mosse 2005b). Within UN agencies and NGOs, their inter-
nal institutional logic shapes knowledge production. They see the social 
milieu in which they operate through the eyes of their prescribed objec-
tives and mandates that are geared towards orchestrated change. This pre-
disposes aid actors to easily confuse prescription (how things ought to be) 
with description (Neumann 2017). As such, aid documents and evaluation 
reports tell us more about the implementers and less about the social reality 
they seek to transform. In order to appreciate how the policy concept safe 
migration mobilises institutional practices, it is necessary to move beyond 
the formal self-definition of policy. As will become evident throughout 
this book, social practices that operate beneath the surface of formal pol-
icy implementation are central in order to grasp how safe migration comes 
into being, hence the need for an ethnographic approach. Before expanding 
on the book’s methodological approaches, it is necessary to introduce the 
concept itself.
Safe migration: The concept
“What is safe migration?” Nick, a senior expatriate aid official within a 
large aid organisation, repeats to himself the question I just asked. “Well, 
it is migration that is safe.” Throughout my research, I would often hear 
responses like this. The concept seems so simple yet ends up as a tautology 
which renders it devoid of meaning. As later chapters will show, aid officials 
who work for safe migration programmes often struggle immensely with 
even explaining the concept to themselves. Yet, when pressed, practitioners 
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will commonly allude to four central characteristics which can be summa-
rised as follows.
First, safe migration includes programmes and policies which seek to 
legalise labour migration. Enabling migrant workers to obtain passport, 
necessary visas, work permits, and associated formalised entitlements 
(such as health insurance) are considered a central pillar within safe 
migration. As such, safe migration is nothing new, given several dec-
ades of various guest worker and circular migrations schemes worldwide 
(Feldman 2011a; Skeldon 2012). Yet, as many practitioners are quick to 
point out, legal migration status does not necessarily equate with safety 
for migrants as employers may subjugate migrant workers by withholding 
their passports or subject them to other abusive practices (de Genova 2007; 
Suravoranon et al. 2017). Furthermore, it is notable that despite a seem-
ing state-centrism given its focus on legal documents, safe migration has 
had considerable input from humanitarian and development actors with 
a “pro-migration” philosophy. Hence, safe migration embraces and cri-
tiques legal migration.
Second, safe migration includes what may be referred to as progres-
sive awareness raising. Whereas early anti-trafficking programmes (to be 
explored in the next chapter) could at times take on a strong anti-immigration 
tone where “staying where you are” (Thatun and Marshall 2005, 46–63) 
became an extended form of border control and migration prevention, safe 
migration turns this on its head. I witnessed this change myself when I 
worked on anti-trafficking programmes for the UN in the early 2000s where 
the UN theme group on human trafficking in Laos gradually moved from 
a focus on “don’t’ go” to “go safely.” Hence, realising that villagers will 
migrate no matter what governments and UN agencies may say or do, it is 
more feasible to support this process.
Beyond focusing on travel documents, implementers of safe migration 
awareness raising commonly emphasise the kinds of relationships that 
are central for migration outcomes, exemplified in safe migration training 
manuals:
Do you know anyone who lives in the town to which you are going? 
Do you have that person’s phone number?.. Are you travelling with 
friends?… Do you know anyone who has been hired through this per-
son or a recruiter before?… Do you know an organisation or person to 
contact in the other town/country – if something goes wrong and you 
need help and safety?
(World Vision 2014, 11–14)
Such questions come to the fore within pre-migration interventions, which 
in effect expands migration facilitation beyond the legal material (travel 
documents and work permits) to the social: interrelations become the key 
to migration safety. Hence, in addition to legal documents and awareness 
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raising, calibrating the right kind of social capital is a third important ele-
ment in safe migration discourse.
Finally, safe migration also takes the shape of a counter network: as 
migrants move through space, a range of support services within source 
communities, during transit and in destination points, are meant to act as 
focal points where migrants can seek assistance. As later chapters will show, 
this may take the form of hotlines, outreach services, social media or – as 
alluded to at the beginning – in the form of MRCs.
All these elements are usually framed in terms of vague notions of a 
well-regulated migration system, which is why safe migration is commonly 
mentioned alongside kin phrases, such as “well-managed,” “ordered,” or 
“regular” migration. As will be delineated in the next chapter, despite less 
media attention compared with global anxieties relating to human traffick-
ing and modern slavery, safe migration has emerged as a central migration 
governance discourse in recent years. As foreshadowed by the epigraph at 
the beginning of this chapter, the UN accentuates safety as a central policy 
focus through its Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration 
(GCM) (United Nations 2018). Relatedly, the UN underscores the impor-
tance of safe migration through its Sustainable Development Goals which 
includes “[facilitating] orderly, safe, regular, and responsible migration and 
mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and 
well- managed migration policies.” (United Nations 2015, 27)
As alluded to above, important temporal (progressive awareness raising 
before departure) and spatial connotations (assisting migrants as they move 
through space) are central to safe migration governance. The theoretical sig-
nificance of them is worth spelling out.
Safe migration: Theoretical deliberations
At first glance, safe migration is grounded in migrants’ lifeworlds. However, 
the term’s main impetus is rather different. Safe migration emanates from 
NGOs and UN agencies, many of them being anti-trafficking programmes, 
which work on migration assistance. Hence, safe migration points to instru-
mentalisation. Just as humanitarianism constitutes a discourse of how one 
may act upon human suffering (as opposed to human suffering in itself, see 
Fassin 2011a), a starting point for any exposition of safe migration must 
recognise it as a discourse of orchestrated change. The concern is not in 
what ways “safe migration” may reflect migrant practices as such; rather, 
how a range of agencies may operationalise safe migration through pro-
grammes and practices. Hence, the concept primarily exists as a techno-
cratic discourse within aid agencies that work with migrant labourers. 
Theoretically, this takes us to a broader question regarding the relation-
ship between epistemology (how knowledge is produced) and governance 
(strategies and techniques for subjection and objectification). Two theoreti-
cal strands have particular relevance in this regard: the mobilities turn and 
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post-panopticism, which both have important spatio-temporal implications 
for how we understand safe migration interventions.
In recent years, social scientists have given increasing attention to mobil-
ity. Although a range of mobile phenomena, such as migration, are not new, 
there are important changes in the way mobility is theorised. One of the 
most prominent scholars in this field is John Urry. In his book Mobilities 
(Urry 2007), he argues that not only is there empirical evidence of increas-
ing mobility in the world (such as the intensity of travel); mobility is also 
about epistemological and ontological change. Traditional social science, 
Urry argues, is premised on “container models,” where social phenomena 
are construed as taking part within territorial units. This has resulted in 
mobility being treated as a “black box” (Urry 2007, 12) and thereby received 
less analytical attention. Moving beyond static and sedentary modes of the-
orising, the mobilities turn takes mobility as a point of departure for aca-
demic inquiry. As such, mobility is not merely an empirical object which 
ought to be given more attention, it transforms the social sciences. Mobility 
invites us to revisit epistemological foundations of knowledge production.
Bœrenholdt usefully extends this line of inquiry by considering how mobil-
ity is linked to governmentality. Whereas Urry invites us to consider mobil-
ity as subject – and not merely object – of knowledge, Bœrenholdt argues 
that mobility in today’s world extends beyond being an object to become an 
instrument of governance. In other words, “government and governmen-
tality do not only deal and cope with mobility; they work through mobil-
ity.” (Bærenholdt 2013, 27). Travel documents (such as passports) are prime 
examples of this governing principle, neatly recapitulated by Keshavarz:
Another factor that makes passports special compared to other mate-
rial techniques of border control is their actual mobility due to their 
configuration. Compared to the majority of border techniques, which 
are technically fixed and bound to the geographical location of the bor-
der, passports are conceived to be mobile, to be carried. (2011, 7)
In short, mobilities enable us to think about mobility and migration as 
subject of politics and knowledge. In this context, is it useful to consider 
another theoretical line of inquiry: post-panopticism.
Post-panopticism stems from Foucault’s influential work on disciplinary 
power. This body of work has been explicated ad nauseum and does not 
need to be repeated here. Panopticism applicability to contemporaneous 
societies has been subject to considerable debate amongst several scholars 
(Boyne 2000; Gane 2012; Lyon et al. 2012). Contemporary societies, some 
argue, are not premised on a disciplinary power as discussed in Foucault’s 
seminal Discipline and Punish (1977). Ranging from the works of Zygmund 
Bauman on Liquid Modernity (Bauman 2000) to Deleuze and Guattari 
exposition of assemblages (Deleuze and Guattari 1988), governance, they 
argue (in different ways), is not premised on hierarchical, diagrammatic 
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modes of surveillance (as implied by the panoptical model) but polymor-
phous networks, or seduction rather than discipline. We have, it is argued, 
entered an era of post-panopticism.
Post-panopticism has taken several different lines of inquiry. However, 
there are two inter-related areas of analysis that are of particular relevance 
to this book. First, post-panopticism implies a critique of static, sedentary 
ways of both theorising and governing, pointing to a territorial understand-
ing of power where discipline becomes a function of demarcated config-
uration of space. Similarly, to mobilities scholarship, post-panopticism 
attempts to break away from social theorising premising on “container 
models.” Second, post-panopticism denotes a move away from discipline to 
control and security. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari (1988) 
point to how government resembles rhizomatic, de-territorialised networks. 
Rather than social control of bodies through discipline, mass media and 
information technology become the basis for modulation. Deleuze expli-
cates the distinction thus:
The different internments or spaces of enclosure through which the 
individual passes are independent variables: each time one is supposed 
to start from zero, and although a common language for all these 
places exists, it is analogical. On the other hand, the different control 
mechanisms are inseparable variations, forming a system of variable 
geometry the language of which is numerical (which doesn’t necessarily 
mean binary). Enclosures are moulds, distinct castings, but controls are 
a modulation, like a self-deforming cast that will continuously change 
from one moment to the other, or like a sieve whose mesh will transmute 
from point to point.
(Deleuze 2006, 4)
In this sense, control replaces territorialised, disciplinary surveillance with 
modulation that can be thought of as a system of coding and sorting. This 
departure from territorialised disciplinary power is also evident within 
the later writings of Foucault. In Security, Territory, Population (Foucault 
2007), he expands on his former analyses of sovereign and disciplinary 
power. Security, Foucault argues, becomes evident from the 18th Century 
onwards in part due to increasing complexity of town life. Rather than gov-
ernment being premised on enclosure, circulation becomes a new mode of 
organising social space. In contrast with discipline, which is premised on 
surveillance of elements within a territorial unit, security is open-ended. 
Here, it is worth quoting Foucault at some length:
… the town will not be conceived or planned according to a static per-
ception that would ensure the perfection of the function there and then, 
but will open onto a future that is not exactly controllable, not precisely 
measured or measurable, and a good town plan takes into account 
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precisely what might happen. In short, I think we can speak here of 
a technique that is basically organised by reference to the problem of 
security, that is to say, at bottom, to the problem of the series. An indef-
inite series of mobile elements: circulation, x number of carts, x number 
of passers-by, x number of thieves, x number of miasmas, and so on. 
An indefinite series of events that will occur: so many boats will berth, 
so many carts will arrive, and so on. And equally an indefinite series of 
accumulating units: how many inhabitants, how many houses, and so 
on. I think the management of these series that, because they are open 
series can only be controlled by an estimate of probabilities, is pretty 
much the essential characteristic of the mechanism of security.
(Foucault 2007, 35)
The temporal dimension is significant. Whereas disciplinary power pro-
duces subjects through its effects within an enclosed territorial unit, secu-
rity produces subjectivities in advance. It is important to note that this is 
not new. Both medicine (diagnosis, disease control) and insurance (risk) are 
examples of how anticipation becomes the premise for assessing regimes of 
intervention (Boyne 2000; Lakoff 2010). We may call this technologies of the 
probable. Several post-structuralist scholars, such as Jean Baudrillard, have 
shown how such technologies often take the form of simulation. David Lyon 
neatly encapsulates Baudrillard’s position thus:
In the disciplinary machine, verification precedes judgment. Although 
it aims to produce automatic obedience, panoptic surveillance nonethe-
less reacts to events—it notices, identifies and categorizes them before 
passing this information on to authorities that determine its ultimate 
significance. In control societies, however, judgment is far more pro-
active. The simulation model structures the event’s production and 
meaning, and passes judgment in advance. Surveillance is relegated to 
a secondary function and is only there to monitor the performance of 
the model.
(Lyon et al. 2012, 7)
As later chapters reveal, safe migration interventions – such as pre-departure 
training – embody both simulation (which sometimes includes role-play) and 
coding (work and travel documents become a labelling system for calibrat-
ing migration outcomes). Hence, safe migration constitutes an important 
empirical case study which dovetails several of the characteristics which 
both the mobilities turn and post-panopticism allude to. As safe migration 
is about enabling safety in migration (as opposed to anchoring it), the pol-
icy task becomes how to govern migrants as they move through space as 
opposed to being confined by it.
In later chapters, we will explore hotlines and the use of social media 
(alluded at the beginning of this chapter) as central components of 
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migrant assistance. Clearly, this points de-territorial modes of governance. 
Furthermore, as safety is premised on pre-emption, interventions need to 
precede action. The aforementioned language training and awareness rais-
ing are examples of this form of intervention, and we will explore several 
other safe migration interventions premised on a pre-emptive temporal 
logic in coming chapters.
This is not to say that anticipatory modes of governance necessarily 
replace disciplinary, territorialised power. As will become evident, the two 
governmental logics can operate in tandem, such as pre-departure training 
which both attempts to “mould” a particular migrant subjectivity (often 
within the territorial, bounded space of a training centre) and forestall risk 
in migration (which can even include simulation in the form of role play). 
Yet, programme objectives and intent are geared towards enabling mobility 
as opposed to domesticate migration. It is precisely the intersection between 
the static and de-territorial which becomes both analytically and empirically 
important for analysis. Whereas the aforementioned examples are premised 
on an expectational logic (i.e. social engineering takes place in advance), 
safe migration responses are also gauged in terms of counter-networks of 
protection. De-territorial interventions – such as hotlines – are meant to 
assist migrants once they experience various types of difficulties during 
their labour migration. Here, safety is construed post hoc; they are reac-
tive responses to events which have already occurred. Yet, as will become 
evident, ability to react is intimately tied up with what has preceded and 
what actors have been connected.
This connects to a broader analytical point regarding safety itself. The 
concept has become an omnipresent concern in contemporaneous socie-
ties, ranging from regulation of the workplace (occupational health and 
safety), child raising practices (ranging from manufacturing standards of 
toys to crime prevention), transport (e.g. accreditation, insurance, and legal 
liabilities), and even warfare (minimising casualties of armed personnel). 
Yet, analytical attention to safety is largely neglected in the social sciences, 
perhaps in part due to the simple fact that “safety is defined and measured 
more by its absence than by its presence” (Silbey 2009, 368). In the modern 
era, safety has emerged as a central concern in the context of the advent of 
industrialisation and the nation state, where the regulation of labour and 
capital (industry, workplace regulations) and large-scale industrial disasters 
(e.g. Chernobyl) have been central catalysts. In this context, two analytical 
points can be made. First, concerns with safety are frequently instrumental-
ist and reductionist. As Silbey argues:
Although invocation of safety culture seems to recognize and acknowl-
edge systemic processes and effects, it is often conceptualized to be 
measurable and malleable in terms of the attitudes and behaviours of 
individual actors.
(Silbey 2009, 343)
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As later chapters will show there are important political stakes in how safe 
migration practice attempts to navigate between inducing systemic safe-
guards and neoliberal notions of (individuated) responsibility in labour 
migration. Second, safety underscores the aforementioned temporal signif-
icance of migration governance: safety can only be engendered in advance. 
Its organising logic is premised on expectancy. As such, this book contrib-
utes to filling a crucial gap in explicating how safety makes and is made of 
policy practices. Furthermore, safe migration as a contemporaneous policy 
formation raises important questions of how governance relates to tempo-
rality and space. Yet, how governance materialises in specific contexts can-
not merely be deduced from policy logics but must be subject to careful 
empirical investigation. As this book will demonstrate, the spatio-temporal 
logics of migration governance must be understood in light of a myriad of 
mediated practices which straddle different actors and policy domains.
Such mediated practices take us in turn to our final theoretical construct: 
brokers and brokering. In the following chapters, a lot will be said about 
this, both empirically and analytically. For now, I will merely foreshadow 
how brokers (Burmese: boisa; Thai and Lao: nai na) are central to connect-
ing and mediating separate social realms, which may include spatial (such 
as transporting migrants across international borders), institutional (con-
necting migrants with authorities in order to obtain documents, or submit 
a work accident claim), or moral realms (how both material and symbolic 
profit ensues from brokering practices). It is precisely these qualities which 
make brokerage a central problematisation within safe migration discourse 
(e.g. the morally dubious status of brokers as possible risk for migrants), yet 
helps explain why safe migration programmes themselves become depended 
on (and even produce) both brokers and brokering practices, often without 
safe migration programmes themselves being aware of it.
The research
The book is based on ongoing fieldwork in Thailand, Laos, and Myanmar 
over an seven-year time period (2013–2019), which is part of one of the world’s 
largest hubs for precarious, low-skilled labour migration (Martin, Erni, and 
Yue 2019). The research sprung out of my earlier research on anti-trafficking 
interventions along the Lao-Thai border (Molland 2012b). Over the years, I 
noticed how several individuals and organisations within the antitrafficking 
community in the Mekong region would appropriate and utilise the term 
“safe migration” in their work. My exposure to safe migration predates my 
academic work on migration in the Mekong region, when I worked as an 
advisor for one of the Mekong region’s first regional UN trafficking projects. 
Alongside “human trafficking” and “modern slavery,” safe migration was 
emerging as yet another “buzzword” in the aid sector. Whereas scholarly 
attention has generated considerable mileage in relation to trafficking and 
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modern slavery (Gallagher 2017; Kempadoo et al. 2015; Kotiswaran 2017; 
O’Connell Davidson 2015; Stoyanova 2017), academic interrogation of safe 
migration is to this day nearly non-existent (for exceptions, see Bylander 
2019; Huijsmans 2014; Kiss and Zimmerman 2019; Molland 2012a). Safe 
migration was to me low-hanging fruit which was waiting to be studied. The 
harvest is this book.
Methodologically, my fieldwork has been based on what I have elsewhere 
labelled “tandem ethnography” (Molland 2013), that is oscillating method-
ology between the domain of policy one seeks to investigate and the social 
world which the policy domain attempts to objectify. This involves interro-
gating the discursive characteristics of safe migration, coupled with tracing 
how it becomes operationalised through practices. As such, the research 
follows multi-sited ethnographic research, which has by now become a 
conventional way of conducing ethnographic research. The exact locales 
I ended up investigating dependent on where various organisations imple-
mented their activities. As will become evident, parts of the research itself 
are not primarily defined by geographical specificity as some interventions 
have de-territorial qualities (such as the use of social media). The large bulk 
of this research was carried out in the greater Bangkok region but with sev-
eral trips to both many parts of the Lao-Thai border, as well as several vis-
its to Myanmar and Laos. This includes accompanying aid programmes’ 
safe migration awareness raising within migrant source communities and 
safe migration interventions at border checkpoints; examining migrant 
hotlines and the virtual world of migration assistance; and shadowing how 
NGOs process work compensation claims and employment disputes. It also 
encompasses visiting the numerous language training centres and outreach 
services provided by MRCs; investigating the regulatory environment and 
conduct of recruitment agencies; as well as in-depth interviews with ubiqui-
tous brokers along supply chains of migration assistance. As such, this book 
is in methodological terms just as much a study of institutional practices – 
by “studying through” their operational logics (Wedel et al. 2005, 40) – as 
an investigation of migration and aid.
In initial stages, my fieldwork centred on Lao migration to Thailand, 
given my pre-existing research focus on these two countries. Yet, over time, 
it became clear that despite several organisations claiming to include a focus 
on Lao migrants in their programmes, actual programme implementation 
amongst the Lao was either limited or non-existent. In effect, studying Lao-
based safe migration activities became a study of nothingness (a conundrum 
we will consider in later chapters). In contrast, through my hunt for Lao 
safe migration activities, it became clear that migration assistance relating 
to Myanmar migrants was ubiquitous. In glaring contrast to Lao project 
activities, there are numerous organisations working amongst Myanmar 
migrants, a reality that was simply too dominant to ignore. A generous 
grant from the Australian Research Council (awarded in 2015) allowed me 
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to considerably expand my research to include a focus on both Lao and 
Myanmar migrants. Indeed, contrasting these two groups comparably is 
crucial in order to understand how safe migration is mobilised, a topic to 
be explored in the next chapters. Why not studying the Khmer – the third 
main labour migration group in Thailand – one may ask? The answer is 
simple and pragmatic: given the intensity of ethnographic approaches add-
ing a focus on Khmer-related safe migration would spread the research too 
thin. Although the research did engage with some Khmer-related migration 
assistance, I simply have not had scope to include a Khmer-specific focus 
in this study.
The multi-sited nature of the research has necessitated the deployment 
of several research assistants. As such, my approach echoes Fredrik Barth’s 
seminal multi-sited ethnography on Bali sociality where one “[can] not rely 
on data from one or a few locales only, as it [is] precisely the transfera-
bility of understandings from one situation to another” (Barth 1993, 22) 
that is central to examining variation across scale. Although I speak some 
Lao and Thai, research assistants were needed in order to cover the multi-
lingual environment I was operating in (Lao, Thai, Burmese, Mon, Pa’O, 
Shan). Throughout my research, I collaborated with two trilingual research 
assistants in Thailand (with Thai, Lao English and Thai, Burmese, English 
language capacities.) I also collaborated with research assistants during 
visits to Laos and Myanmar. All research assistants had a combination 
of postgraduate training in the social sciences or considerable experience 
with applied research and programme implementation relating to migra-
tion assistance. My two research assistants in Thailand also carried out 
directed data collection during my absence during teaching semesters at 
my University.
During fieldwork, we spoke with, interviewed, observed, and interacted 
with numerous actors relating to safe migration and migration assistance, 
including donors, government agencies, international and local NGOs, 
migrant self-help groups, brokers, and migrants. More specifically this 
includes five UN agencies, more than a dozen government bodies, and more 
than thirty NGOs and migrant assistance groups. More than eighty individ-
uals from these bodies have been interviewed with different levels of inten-
sity. Several of them allowed me to also accompany and observe activities 
during implementation. In addition, more than a hundred migrants were 
involved in interviews or informal conversations relating to their migration 
experiences. Throughout this book, pseudonyms are used for both individ-
uals and organisations, except in cases where their identities are on the pub-
lic record. In some cases, I have also provided pseudonyms of places and 
altered details pertaining to certain events.
Readers familiar with the Mekong region may notice that although I 
have a great deal to say regarding the contrasts between Lao and Myanmar 
migrants (see Chapter 3), I only peripherally detail the multi-ethnic 
dimensions of Lao and Myanmar migrants. Although ethnicity may have 
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important bearings on the social organisation of migrants in Thailand 
(in part due to political and armed conflict in Myanmar), I was unable 
to penetrate this level of granular detail throughout fieldwork. Although 
some of the migrant assistance groups I have studied were based on eth-
nicity, many other groups were pan-ethnic and based on other organis-
ing principles (e.g. migrants joining associations based on dormitory 
residence proximity). Hence, throughout the book, I refer to nationality 
(i.e. Myanmar and Lao migrants) as opposed to ethnic identity, except a 
few cases where this is pertinent to the analysis. Throughout the book, I 
interchangeably refer to both Myanmar and Burma as there is no estab-
lished consensus on proper usage of the country’s name. Hence, referring 
to “Burmese migrants” implies nationality as opposed to the ethnic label 
Bamar, unless specified.
Although the research did engage migrants, it is important to point 
out that this book is not a study of labour migrants per se. As such, the 
book builds on current anthropological work on migration in that it 
places focus on migration infrastructure. What is of concern is not why 
migrants move but what actors (and non-actors) move migrants (Lin et al. 
2017). Extending this line of inquiry, a study of safe migration manage-
ment then does not ask what makes migrants safe but how safe migration 
makes migrants.
The book
The book comprises three parts. Part 1 Situating Safety in Migration exam-
ines the ascendancy of safe migration and the various reasons why donors, 
UN agencies, NGOs and other actors have warmed to the concept. In addi-
tion to situating safe migration amongst related discourses, such as mod-
ern slavery and anti-trafficking interventions, Part 1 also demonstrates the 
importance of the geographical, cultural, and social context of the study. 
Such contextualisation includes detailing important comparative differences 
between how Myanmar and Lao migrants are integrated into Thai society, 
which is crucial for appreciating how safe migration activities unfold.
Part 2, Modalities of Intervention, documents ethnographically how aid 
agencies operationalise safe migration through policy frameworks, ranging 
from policy interventions premised on behaviouralist discourses and antic-
ipatory logics (such as pre-departure training of migrants), state-centric 
safety provision in the form of legal migration pathways (passports, work 
permits), and the regulation of migration infrastructure (recruitment agen-
cies) to various safety net mechanisms (hotlines and outreach services). As 
will become evident, all these interventions relativise spatial and temporal 
dimensions of policy which furnish mediating practices that are often coun-
ter-intentional to formal policy.
Part 3, Safety Mediated, explicates how the various modalities of 
interventions discussed in Part 2 intersect with a range of local practices 
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and contexts. The importance of brokers as mediators of assistance must 
be understood in light of how different humanitarian registers works dif-
ferently across different institutions (such as health services compared 
with labour dispute resolution cases). At the same time, Part 3 demon-
strates through meticulous ethnographic detail how brokerage and 
migration assistance are part of the same configuration, and how bro-
kerage is situated within a range of informal practices including both 
old (reciprocity, moral economies) and new forms of connectivity (social 
media) which helps explain how safe migration is ultimately underpinned 
by brokered safety.
Part I 
Situating safety in migration
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2 From traffic to safety
The allure of safe migration
The Anti-trafficking candle is burning down
(Robert, Senior Official for an international 
development agency)
SVERRE: what is safe migration?
ROBERT: Safe migration? It doesn’t work. Its bullshit!
Struck by Robert’s blatant rebuttal of the very concept that underpins his 
work, I ask him to elaborate.
It’s a bit like smoking. You have all these laws and campaigns, but at the 
end of the day people carry on smoking. People [migrants] go anyway; 
they know it’s risky, but don’t have much choice. Safe migration is reg-
ular migration. This involves passports, hotlines, connections between 
employer and sending country. The Philippines is a bit like this. But lots 
of this does not work because information is not actionable. A classic 
example is hotline numbers not resulting in help but deportations.
Robert is a senior manager within a large UN agency that works on safe 
migration. He has extensive experience in anti-trafficking and migration 
work in the Mekong region. As with many other aid officials within this 
sector, he earlier worked for anti-trafficking programmes but was now 
working for a programme with a wider focus on safe migration. My con-
versation with Robert is one of the numerous exchanges I had with aid offi-
cials, donors, and practitioners who work on safe migration. Yet, Robert 
is different to many other officials I know within the migration sector. His 
brazen honesty and self-criticism make him different to many other aid 
officials. Not that other officials would not be critical or reflexive about 
their own work (as later pages will show, they are), but Robert is particu-
larly sharp in his indignation. Despite working for one of the larger inter-
national agencies which formally advocates for safe migration as a policy 
strategy, he does not mince his words about his misgivings of safe migra-
tion interventions. “Impact is a concern” Robert continued. “How do we 
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know there is change in behaviour?” His exasperation with safe migration 
was curious.
At the time of the interview, the UN was in the drafting stages of its 
global migration strategy – the Global Compact for Migration – which ele-
vated safe migration as an overarching focus, and the recently promulgated 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) similarly comprised a specific objec-
tive to “facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration” as part of 
its global aid architecture (United Nations 2015, 23). Yet, Robert appeared 
to be wanting to abandon the very concept which was now enjoying global 
momentum within aid and migration policy circles. Robert suggested that 
a more sensible approach would be to return to what anti-trafficking pro-
grammes did in the early 2000s: addressing migration vulnerability through 
livelihood and poverty reduction approaches, despite the fact that many 
Mekong-based aid agencies, including his own agency, were moving away 
from trafficking-specific interventions (see Molland 2012b). This is not to 
say that Robert was an advocate for anti-trafficking. He was even harsher in 
his critique of trafficking programmes and well-aware of the donor fatigue 
that was evolving. “The anti-trafficking candle,” Robert said, “is burning 
down.”
In contrast to many other aid workers, Robert is explicit in his critiques of 
other aid officials’ separation from field realities. “if you do safe migration 
you have to do it bottom up,” he says. “We rarely ask migrants what they 
think.” Referring to some of his earlier work in Cambodia, he says local 
Khmer are sick and tired of westerners coming in telling them what they 
should and should not do. “Don’t patronise us,” the migrants think, Robert 
exclaims. During our conversation, Robert repeatedly points to how infor-
mal networks amongst migrants themselves are central to successful safe 
migration. Yet, at the same time Robert evokes a highly abstract economis-
tic language in how he describes safe migration interventions, something 
I was familiar with from my earlier research on anti-trafficking (Molland 
2012b):
We want to have an accurate market where you have various things 
such like governance, rule of law and the like. Governments need to get 
a handle on this. Migration is inevitable. We have a market of free flow 
of services and goods but not people. It’s a natural phenomenon. Safe 
migration is about managing this phenomenon.
Despite Robert’s insistence on local perspectives on migration, he ulti-
mately expresses safe migration through an abstract language of market 
imperfections that requires regulation. As such, Robert evokes a central 
notion within safe migration discourse: how both the state and the indi-
vidual are instruments for policy. At the same time, Robert highlights dif-
ficulties with evidence (“how do we know safe migration interventions are 
working?”) and the tensions between past and present discourses – the move 
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from trafficking to safe migration. Robert’s blunt reflections on safe migra-
tion also reflect the discrepancy between formal aid policies and the tacit 
informal reflections of social actors who both produce and are produced by 
this discourse. Despite his critique of safe migration, he also reifies it.
This brings us to a broader question. If safe migration is – in Robert’s 
own words, “bullshit” – how can we come to terms with why aid agencies, 
and the UN global migration strategy, gravitate towards to concept? How 
does it become a “mobilising metaphor” (Shore and Wright 1997, 3) that 
generates momentum (and funding) within assemblages of development aid 
where “safe, orderly and regular migration” presents the UN’ overarching 
international cooperation framework on migration? This chapter explores 
the ascendance of safe migration in the Mekong region and the reasons why 
various actors – NGOs, UN agencies, Government, and donors – gravitate 
towards the concept. As alluded to earlier, several safe migration initiatives 
emanate from anti-trafficking interventions. Hence, the chapter explores the 
move from anti-trafficking to safe migration within the Mekong aid sector. 
A central claim this chapter makes is that the ascendance of safe migration 
cannot easily be read off in light of substantive advances in policy terms. 
Rather, the ascendance of safe migration must be understood in light of 
changing aid architectures and how safe migration enables a discursive elas-
ticity which makes it possible for divergent actors (NGOs, UN agencies, 
donors, and governments) to mobilise around this nomenclature. Rather 
than attempting to reveal a positivist truth regarding safe migration’s defi-
nitional characteristics and policy efficacy, we are concerned with what aid 
actors “do in the name of [safe migration] policy” (Wedel et al. 2005, 35). 
To appreciate this point, it is also important to consider aid actors emic 
understandings of safe migration discourse as this helps contextualise later 
chapters that explores how safe migration becomes instrumentalised.
From anti-trafficking to safe migration
For a casual observer, safe migration may not be the first phrase that springs 
to mind when considering contemporary, global migration challenges pre-
occupied with building walls to combat “people smuggling,” and “illegal 
migration.” Visceral humanitarian discourses that seem sympathetic to 
migrants – such as “human trafficking” and “modern slavery” – are stronger 
headline-grabbers compared to the more bureaucratically laden nomencla-
ture of safe migration. Yet, the currencies of these discourse (as with any 
policy discourse) do not stand still. As the following pages will show, safe 
migration has largely sprung out of anti-trafficking interventions. In fact, 
as will become evident, anti-trafficking interventions in the Mekong region 
have lost considerable momentum in recent years. And this loss of momen-
tum helps explain agencies’ gravitation towards alternative discourses. In 
what follows, I will not explicate human trafficking and anti-trafficking 
interventions per se (a large body of literature delineates trafficking 
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discourse, see Anderson and O’Connell Davidson 2004; Doezema 2010; 
Gallagher 2001; Kempadoo et al. 2015), but limit myself to consider how 
safe migration emerges within an aid sector which has been preoccupied 
with anti-trafficking.
Anti-trafficking in the Mekong region was big (for elaboration, see 
Huijsmans 2012b; Molland 2012b). Throughout the 2000s, governments, 
aid agencies, and media gave human trafficking considerable attention. All 
Mekong countries ascended the then newly promulgated UN’ human traf-
ficking protocol, coupled with national plan of actions against human traf-
ficking. An endless stream of NGOs set up trafficking projects, and media 
outlets frequently reported on trafficking. No less than six UN agencies 
implemented regional trafficking-specific programmes. The focus on traf-
ficking was reinforced by the George W. Bush administration’s Trafficking 
in Persons Report which reviewed anti-trafficking efforts worldwide, with 
possible sanctions. The fact that Mekong countries frequently rated as poor 
performers ensured an annual cycle of intense media scrutiny on trafficking 
in the Mekong region.
This focus has not disappeared. In Europe, border control policies and 
public discourse place continued focus on human trafficking. International 
and local news outlets, like the Guardian and Bangkok post, continue to 
report on trafficking in the Mekong region (see Thailand hit by a record num-
ber of human trafficking cases 2020; Trafficked migrants rescued in South 
2020). Both the United States and the Australian governments commit large 
amounts of money to anti-trafficking in the Mekong region (though many 
other donors seem to have reduced their support for trafficking interven-
tions). Several NGOs continue to either implement activities under the aus-
pices of a trafficking banner, and governments in the Mekong region (and 
elsewhere) still respond to political pressure, such as the annual trafficking 
in persons’ report. And aid programmes often use human trafficking, safe 
migration, and kin nomenclature (such as modern slavery) interchangeably 
which includes advocating for similar programme interventions. For exam-
ple, migrant hotlines, to be discussed in Chapter 6, are implemented under 
the auspices of both safe migration and anti-trafficking interventions. And 
several anti-trafficking programmes have for years included safe migration 
activities within their remit, typically employed, in the words of Nick (whom 
I introduced in the previous chapter), “as an umbrella term for prevention” 
(typically under the auspices of awareness raising).
Yet, in the Mekong region, anti-trafficking has lost ground. These shifts 
are particularly evident in light of policy and programme activities. Writing 
in 2021, all the aforementioned regional anti-trafficking programmes have 
ceased to operate. Currently, only one UN agency maintains a specific 
anti-trafficking focus on a regional level (United Nations Development 
Programmes’ UN Action for Cooperation against Trafficking in Persons). 
Laos, where I previously worked as a project advisor for the United Nations 
inter-agency Project on Human Trafficking in the Greater Mekong sub-region 
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(UNIAP), had more than 12 anti-trafficking programmes by various UN 
agencies and NGOs in the early 2000s. Towards the end of my fieldwork for 
this research project in 2019, the number of programmes had reduced to less 
than half.
Research reports show a similar trend, toning down a specific traffick-
ing focus compared with copious trafficking-specific research in the 2000s. 
For example, whereas the largest nationwide study on Lao migration in the 
2000s focused specifically on human trafficking (Ministry of Labour and 
Social Welfare and UNICEF 2004), the most recent large-scale study on Lao 
migration to Thailand makes no mention of human trafficking at all (IOM 
2016).1 Instead, it places strong focus on income levels, work conditions, 
and remittance flows, concluding that “[t]he Governments of Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic and Thailand should continue dialogue to implement 
a streamlined, efficient and cost-effective regular migration channel under 
the MOU [to be discussed in chapter 5], in order to promote more orderly, 
regular and safe migration of Laotian migrants to Thailand” (IOM 2016, 
50 emphasis added).
UN agencies have reoriented themselves away from anti-trafficking 
towards safe migration. For example, the UN’s International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) closed its multi-million-dollar Mekong Sub-regional 
Project to Combat Trafficking in Children and Women in October 2008, 
replacing it in June 2010 with its Tripartite Action to Protect Migrants within 
and from the GMS from Labour Exploitation (TRIANGLE Project), which 
focuses specifically on legal and safe migration, as opposed to traffick-
ing. International Organisation for Migration (IOM) has similarly moved 
towards a broader safe migration focus through a range of projects, includ-
ing its ‘Poverty Reduction through Safe Migration, Skills Development and 
Enhanced Job Placement project’ (PROMISE). Whereas human trafficking 
used to be one of the IOM’s key focus areas in the early 2000s, today traf-
ficking is presented as a sub-theme under the auspices of safe and regular 
migration. UNICEF, which used to run large multimillion-dollar traffick-
ing project in the early 2000s, has ceased implementing regional, specific 
anti-trafficking projects. Instead, human trafficking has become a sub-topic 
under the auspices of child protection.
A similar shift is evident amongst other aid actors in the Mekong region. 
Organisations, such as Save the Children and Terre de Hommes, gradu-
ally moved away from a specific trafficking focus towards safe migration, 
witnessed by their “children on the move” campaigns. Other parts of the 
aid sector followed the same trend. Safe migration has also been “main-
streamed” within large infrastructural projects, including social impact 
assessments by institutions such as the Asian Development Bank (2013). 
The fact that Mekong governments have signed bilateral Memorandum 
of Understandings (MOUs) in order to facilitate regulation of migrant 
labour has provided further impetus for the reorientation towards safe 
migration. During my fieldwork, I carried out a social network mapping 
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exercise (see Figure 2.1) which clearly shows that safe migration is a dom-
inant discourse amongst aid actors. Out of 64 different organisations that 
work on migration assistance, 65% of them associate with safe migration 
activities.
The ascendancy of safe migration is not merely Mekong-specific. As we 
learned in the previous chapter, safe migration has become part of the SDGs, 
and the UN cooperation framework for migration – the Global Compact 
for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration – makes safe migration central to 
Figure 2.1  Network map of safe migration and aid programmes (a coloured version 
of the map is available in the open access online version of this chapter). 
The network map is based on interviews with informants (aid officials) 
who were asked (a) which organisations they are aware of who work on 
migration assistance (green arrows), (b) which organisations they have 
collaborated with in the two last years (blue arrows), (c) which organisa-
tions they know of that use the safe migration concept (dark pink arrows), 
and (d) which organisations they have collaborated with in the two last 
years and use the safe migration concept (brown arrows). Organisations 
are indicated with the coloured nodes as follows: International agencies 
(blue nodes), international and local NGOs (green nodes) and informal 
migrant associations (red nodes). The map has a certain Bangkok-bias as 
it is based on interviews with informants located in the greater Bangkok 
region. It does not reflect the full complexity of migration assistance (e.g. 
node 2 connects to many dozen other migrant groups).
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global policy thinking. Notably, human trafficking merely appears as one 
of the 23 sub-objectives within the policy framework (United Nations 2018). 
Both anti-trafficking’s diminished momentum and the ascendance of safe 
migration require explanation.
Explaining anti anti-trafficking
Throughout the 2000s, both academics and practitioners voiced increasing 
criticisms of anti-trafficking interventions. Perhaps the best-known inter-
vention emanated from within the anti-trafficking sector itself. In 2007, 
GAATW launched their report “Collateral Damage” which pointed to 
widespread negative effects of anti-trafficking efforts (Pollock and Global 
Alliance against Traffic in Women 2007). Aid reports and academic studies 
pointed to unintended harm to the very people anti-trafficking programmes 
alleged to assist (Bearup 2016; Kempadoo et al. 2015; Surtees 2013). Related 
criticisms were made regarding anti-trafficking’s emphasis on law enforce-
ment, which – according to critics – either had minimal effect (pointing to 
very low conviction rates) and in some cases outright counterproductive due 
to increased police corruption (Keo et al. 2014). Relatedly, both academics 
and practitioners have pointed to how anti-trafficking becomes co-opted for 
border control purposes, given that deportations are a far more common 
outcome of trafficking interventions as opposed to a substantive protection 
of labour migrants’ work conditions (Anderson 2012).
A series of media scandals involving rogue anti-trafficking actors have not 
helped. Over the years, the anti-trafficking sector attracted a range of indi-
viduals and organisations (often with celebrity blessing), which resembles 
what Jock Stirrat has labelled “furry animals” (in contrast to “dinosaur-like” 
established aid programmes) (2006b). Several of these organisations prem-
ised their operations on highly visible social media campaigns involving 
exaggerated claims regarding human traffickers and bravado-like rescues of 
trafficked victims (Kempadoo 2015). Many of these activities resembled vig-
ilantism and raised serious ethical questions regarding alleged victims’ con-
sent and the credibility of victim narratives that were presented (to obtain 
donor funding). Perhaps the best-known example of such organisations is 
the Somaly Mam foundation (Molland 2019a). Although the main criticism 
within the anti-trafficking community towards her has been the harmful 
(and futile) practice of rescue and rehabilitation (often against victims’ con-
sent), the public critique of Somaly Mam was largely based on her apparent 
factitious claims of being a trafficking survivor, something that was exposed 
in Newsweek (Marks 2014).
Throughout my fieldwork, aid officials from both UN agencies and NGOs 
(who often had previously worked for anti-trafficking programmes) expressed 
open frustration with anti-trafficking praxis. “There is no result!,” Brenda, 
an official from UNICEF’s regional Bangkok office, told me whilst rolling 
her eyes. Anthony, another senior UN official explains “rescued victims 
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don’t want stupid vocational training that NGOs provide them. Some even 
escape from the NGOs!” Another regional UN official, Suzanna, told me 
bluntly “everyone knows … [anti-trafficking] is useless and it doesn’t help at 
all.” Nick, who himself had worked on anti-trafficking since the late 1990s 
had become disillusioned with anti-trafficking responses, alleging that it 
“does not resonate” with donors. Similar to Robert’s observation regarding 
the dwindling status of anti-trafficking at the beginning of this chapter, Nick 
confirmed that UN agencies “have all scaled back operations.” Thomas, 
the manager of the Trafficking Prevention and Safe Migration Consortium 
(TPSMC, to be discussed in Chapter 4), similarly proclaimed to me that 
“donors are fed up with trafficking.”
Such views appear remarkably similar to well-established academic cri-
tiques of anti-trafficking: as anti-trafficking discourse is premised on pre-
scriptive categories – you must either be a “trafficker” or “trafficked victim” 
in order to elicit policy responses (more on this below) – interventions become 
individuated and reductionist. Anti-trafficking only targets a small number 
of migrants which in themselves are limited to alleged victims (counselling 
services and repatriation) and traffickers (prosecutions, which to date are 
largely unsuccessful). Hence, anti-trafficking does little to affect meaningful 
structural change for labour migrants, which contributes to depoliticisa-
tion of labour migrants’ work conditions (Anderson 2012; Kempadoo 2015; 
O’Connell Davidson 2012). This being said, although there is evidence of 
considerable critique and cynicism amongst both practitioners and aca-
demics regarding anti-trafficking praxis, this does not in itself necessarily 
account for the changing tractions amongst aid discourses. In fact, this 
would fallaciously assume one can directly deduce discursive saliency in 
light of programme efficacy (Mosse 2005a). Relatedly, it would be an over-
simplification to suggest that safe migration has replaced anti-trafficking in 
a wholesale manner. As with any discourse, both anti-trafficking and safe 
migration unfold within a complex policy space where discourses overlap, 
blur, and compete. The question then is not so much how safe migration has 
taken on dominance, but rather under what circumstances social and insti-
tutional actors do things in the name of safe migration (Wedel et al. 2005). 
To appreciate this, we must pay attention to aid modalities and broader 
questions pertaining to the infrastructures of aid.
Safe migration and aid modalities
How to advocate for labour migrants’ rights and well-being within context 
of broader political and public ambivalence towards migrants? The aid 
sector’s answer to this dilemma has been to appeal to emotions, evidenced 
by anti-trafficking discourses. This is also why some organisations have 
adopted the language of “modern slavery” as it, similarly to anti-trafficking, 
individuates a structural problem of exploitative labour into a dichotomy 
of perpetrators and victims. This in turn produces unambiguous moral 
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categories (who disagrees with assisting a trafficking victim?) which in turn 
mobilises responses.
Although modern slavery has become an increasing, dominant alternative 
discourse to trafficking (for academic critiques, see Chuang 2014; Gallagher 
2017; Kempadoo 2015; Kotiswaran 2017; O’Connell Davidson 2016), its 
regional influence remained limited during my fieldwork. Although both 
ILO and IOM are contributing to the newly promulgated modern slavery 
index on a global level, modern slavery was yet to enjoy a similar take-up 
either through programme implementation that I studied or general atti-
tudes amongst aid practitioners.2
As explained above, safe migration has become an important term 
amongst UN agencies, NGOs, Mekong government, and donors. Yet, safe 
migration does not appeal to emotions or morals. Rather than being framed 
in negative terms (human suffering), safe migration simply states its desired 
policy outcome: safety in migration. Rather than grounded in a humanitar-
ian ethos, safe migration expresses a technocratic concern with migration 
trajectories. Brenda (UNICEF) explains the programmatic appeal of safe 
migration in contrast with anti-trafficking thus:
when you are trafficked, you are at the end of a long chain of things that 
have gone wrong so the task should be to address this systematically 
before it gets to this. Anti-trafficking has a tendency to make organ-
isations focus on the immediateness of victims, but without thinking 
about the broader context in which trafficking unfolds.
Brenda is here pointing to both latitudinal (“the broader context”) and tem-
poral (“before it gets to this”) limitations of anti-trafficking. She believes 
safe migration provides a more “holistic” approach. Suzanna similarly 
critiques anti-trafficking for being “too much of a boxed approach” which 
provides piecemeal interventions (such as rescuing victims) but without 
addressing questions of why labour markets and migration are structured in 
ways which produces vulnerability amongst labour migrants. Suzanna told 
me: “We wanted to move away from small projects. Trafficking is too nar-
row. This is where it links with safe migration. It’s about the whole migra-
tion cycle.” Similar to Robert’s comments at the beginning of this chapter, 
Suzanna and Brenda perceive safe migration as addressing systemic dimen-
sions of migration governance.
A key reason why practitioners make this distinction has to do with 
how anti-trafficking and safe migration “constructs subjects as objects 
of power” in different ways (Shore and Wright 1997, 3). Anti-trafficking 
and safe migration initiatives are both instruments of subjectivation. Yet, 
whereas anti-trafficking is premised on categories of ascription (i.e. you are, 
or you are not a trafficked victim) safe migration interventions do not rest 
on a similar logic of subjectivation through binary statuses (what Foucault 
called “dividing practices,” Foucault 1982, 777). Whereas anti-trafficking 
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objectivises migrants by targeting a specific category of migrants (i.e. traf-
ficked victims), safe migration interventions focus on migrant dispositions 
which applies to entire migrant populations, and therefore objectivises 
through a logic of totalising encompassment (Ferguson and Gupta 2008). 
The difference has practical significance for aid programmes. Whereas 
anti-trafficking has a tendency to narrow operational space (i.e. migration 
that does not fit trafficking definitions fall outside aid programmes’ field 
of action), safe migration widens the scope in terms of temporality (pro-
active alongside reactive responses) and targets of policy (i.e. all labour 
migrants). As later chapters will show, safe migration programmes engage a 
far wider number of migrants compared with anti-trafficking interventions. 
Furthermore, this expands the kinds of actors and institutions that may fit 
under the auspices of safe migration programming.
The contrasting scope between anti-trafficking and safe migration is evi-
dent in terms of how the two discourses construct different “modalities 
of care” (Dunn 2012). Whereas anti-trafficking has over the years devel-
oped widely recognised pillars of interventions in the forms of the “three 
Ps” (prevention, prosecution, and protection), safe migration interven-
tions do not yet have a comparable institutionalised framework for inter-
vention. As Nick once commented upon my research, “we already have a 
well-established rich science on trafficking, so it’s good you look at safe 
migration.” For Nick, safe migration has yet to develop a clear programme 
logic. Still, notable contours of safe migration intervention modalities are 
emerging. For example, several organisations, especially ILO and IOM, 
frame interventions around “migrant resource centres” (MRCs) in both 
sending and receiving countries of migrants, which encapsulates a range 
of activities ranging from awareness raising, jobseeker support, assis-
tance with travel documents, as well as a range of other services. Aid pro-
grammes are actively involved in strengthening regulation of recruitment 
agencies which affects entire migrant populations (as opposed to selective 
focus on trafficked victims). It is notable how this has institutional effects 
as it replaces a concern with “traffickers” (i.e. law enforcement) with bro-
kers and recruitment agencies (i.e. labour inspectors). As such, in contrast 
to anti-trafficking’s narrow focus on law enforcement and humanitarian 
care for singular victims, safe migration radically broadens the field of 
interventions. Hence, the shift of emphasis from trafficking to safe migra-
tion denotes a programmatic reorientation away from what Nick rather 
caustically referred to as “boutique-style anti-trafficking projects” towards 
systemic migration governance. Rather than framing labour migration in 
light of exploitation and despondency, safe migration is thought of as an 
overarching management scheme which places migrants at the centre of 
action: safety in migration.
It may be tempting to see this reorientation as reflecting an “advance” 
in thinking around anti-trafficking interventions. Yet, as a growing body 
of literature on development suggests, currencies and judgments regarding 
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“success” of programmes cannot be “read off” in an unmediated positivis-
tic fashion (Crewe and Axelby 2013; Mosse 2005b; Olivier de Sardan 2005); 
instead careful attention must be given to how aid policies and discourses 
are mobilised and legitimated amongst aid actors (governments, donors, 
aid agencies, and the various social actors who work for them). Hence, the 
wider aid context is vital to understand why safe migration has taken on 
increasing importance within the anti-trafficking sector.
For years, project-based aid assistance has served as a dominant conduit 
for aid delivery. Projects are typically funded by bilateral or multilateral 
donors and are implemented by either UN agencies, consultancy firms or 
NGOs. Projects are time-bound (typically 3–4 years) and relatively specific 
(and thereby narrow) in scope. However, over the years project-based aid 
delivery has come under attack for contributing to high transaction costs, 
unnecessary complexity as well as contributing to fragmentation of the aid 
sector (Killick 2004; Paul and Vandeninden 2012). These concerns are in 
part reflected through the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness which sig-
nals a broader change with in the aid sector to move from projects to pro-
gramme and sector-wide approaches to aid (OECD 2008). This reorientation 
aligns with a large-scale global “grand schemes” such as the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and the more recent SDGs.
This shift from project to programme delivery has also taken place 
amongst aid agencies that work on migration and trafficking. Under this new 
aid architecture, donors favour approaches to migration that can more eas-
ily be mainstreamed within large-scale development objectives. For exam-
ple, preceding the UN Global Compact on Migration the Global Migration 
Group, an interagency group comprising UN agencies and the World Bank, 
produced several policy papers on sector-wide approaches to migration 
and development (GMG 2010). The Compact on Migration is precisely the 
result of this general trend within aid towards wider, systemic approaches to 
migration. This has important implications for bilateral and multilateral aid 
funding. Today, compared the 1990s and 2000s, it has become increasingly 
difficult to fund niche-based activities. Hence, the reorientation towards 
safe migration reflects changing donor priorities within aid.3 Safe migra-
tion’s wider scope means it more easily dovetails these changing priorities 
(and thereby makes it more fundable). These changes to aid funding as well 
as safe migration’s appeal to wider migration governance, may seem para-
doxical as it brings to light state-centric dimensions within a concept which 
otherwise seems to be human-centric in how it places migrants as the centre 
of policy. The next section will consider this tension.
Safe migration and the state
If safe migration discourse broadens mechanisms for how labour migrants 
can be assisted, why would bilateral donors (i.e. governments) support such 
endeavours? How can we explain such a “pro-migration” discourse within 
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a broader political context where unskilled migrants are treated with con-
siderable ambivalence (if not outright hostility)?4 Throughout my fieldwork, 
I would at times bring this question up with senior UN officials as well as 
representatives from bilateral donors. One afternoon in Bangkok I was hav-
ing a coffee with a senior government official from an important bilateral 
donor who funds both anti-trafficking and safe migration initiatives. On the 
question of why his government would fund safe migration programmes, 
he responded: “Sverre, you know the answer to this; it’s James Scott; see-
ing like a state!” The academically inclined government official elaborated 
further. The safe migration concept, he said, obfuscates the fact that this is 
about the state. “It makes it sound like the focus is on migrants but it’s really 
about the state’s desire to regulate migration.”
Although safeguarding labour migration may seem to be an unlikely 
policy response given the states’ preoccupation with restrictive migration 
and border control relating to unskilled migrants, migration policy is also 
heavily informed by economic imperatives and labour demand (whether it 
being safe migration, temporary, or guest worker programmes). Yet, cir-
cular migration schemes do not equate free movement as they comprise a 
political compromise between market liberalism (which depends on supply 
of cheap labour) and neo-conservative political forces (which guarantees 
eventual return of migrants) (Feldman 2011b). Hence, circular migration 
schemes, including safe migration initiatives, are ultimately premised on 
a politics of return (Xiang, Yeoh, and Toyota 2013). In this sense, safe 
migration gels with the state’s desire to scale up migration governance, a 
view that was echoed by officials I spoke to within bilateral donor agen-
cies.5 This is reflected in the language adopted in both the SDGs and the 
Global Compact on Migration, which both employ the phrase “safe, orderly 
and regular migration” (United Nations 2015, 2019). This language is also 
reflected through bilateral donor accountability. For example, ILO’s project 
document (funded by the Australian government) states:
Tripartite Action to Protect Migrants within and from the Greater 
Mekong Sub-region from Labour Exploitation (the TRIANGLE pro-
ject) aims to significantly reduce the exploitation of labour migrants 
through increased legal and safe migration and improved labour 
protection.
(International Labour Organization 2009, 
5 emphasis added)
Juxtaposing safety with “regular” and “legal” migration makes the state-centric 
focus clear. But why then not simply label this a “legal migration project”? 
An excessive focus on legal migration does not only have implications 
for human rights and humanitarian sensibilities amongst NGOs, human 
rights activists, and (possibly) some UN agencies, but can also complicate 
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bilateral relations between governments. Another bilateral donor represent-
ative explained this point to me thus:
By labelling a safe migration initiative “legal migration” one is in 
effect implying that state authorities are either failing to, or is unwill-
ing to enforce order. This can be especially sensitive when dealing with 
migrant sending countries. Including the phrase “safe migration” sof-
tens this langue and makes it more appealing.
Despite the states’ desire to regulate migration, safe migration has a cer-
tain diplomatic usage as it allows bilateral action to address other states 
(failure) in regulating migration without coming across as a critique. As 
such, safe migration furnishes different (and partly competing) ideologies 
and priorities. It accommodates both the state’s desire to regulate and make 
migration legible, whereas it at the same time speaks to human rights and 
humanitarian sensibilities amongst NGOs and practitioners. The fact that 
safe migration facilitates different competing priorities does not mean that 
aid actors are unaware of this. For example, the Global Alliance against 
Trafficking in Women (GAATW, which often advocate for safe migration) 
has also warned against state-centric usages of the concept:
some states seek to promote the idea that regular migration is always 
safe and orderly, and irregular migration is inherently unsafe, and dis-
orderly. A worrying corollary to this binary is the extension to view-
ing regular migrants as “good and deserving of rights,” and irregular 
migrants as “bad.”
(GAATW 2019, 9)
Similar criticisms have been made by other academics (Zimmerman 2016) 
and even organisations that promote a state-centric focus on legal migra-
tion, such as the ILO and IOM, through their programme collaborations 
with various governments (Suravoranon, Harkins, and Lindgren 2017). 
Hence, safe migration is subject to contestation. Although we have thus 
far explored various reasons why both state and aid actors may gravitate 
towards the concept, it remains unclear what aid practitioners understand 
by the concept, let alone how they are meant to operationalise safety in 
migration; questions we will now turn to.
Locating safety in safe migration
“What is safe migration?” Linda repeats the question I just asked her. 
“Safe migration …” Pause. “It is about making migration as safe as pos-
sible.” Without noticing her tautological response, she continues answer-
ing my query through her own questions. “Is safe migration the same as 
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legal migration?,” she asks rhetorically? “No! We know it’s not quite like 
that,” she says. “That’s why we [her organisation] use the phrase ‘regular 
migration’ and not legal migration,” she says. Migration that is legal, Linda 
explains, is not necessarily safe. “Legal migration is, however, important 
but not always sufficient.”
Linda works for the same organisation as Robert, albeit based in the 
Myanmar country office. In addition to accompanying their field activities 
relating to their safe migration work, I held several conversations with pol-
icy officers, such as Linda, regarding their work and safe migration. Linda 
tells me that the first time she encountered the concept was back in the mid-
2000s. This was in the context of them receiving funding from the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID), she said. She recalls 
discussions with her boss about terminology. The boss argued that they 
should call it “safer migration;” not “safe migration,” she explains. Linda 
laughs, commenting that the semantics in English might not be that impor-
tant to Myanmar migrants. Yet, this does not prevent her from broadening 
the semantic horizons of safe migration discourse. Safe migration is more 
about “gainful migration,” she says. In order to gain from migration, Linda 
clarifies, you must be safe. Linda tries to explain. “So, safe migration then 
becomes,” according to Linda, “about asking villagers why they migrate.” 
Linda elaborates further. “The point is that migration is not an end itself. 
Many say they migrate to gain an income. But what is it that they want to do 
with that income? Some families don’t know what they want to do with their 
income,” she alleges. “Sometimes, you have family migration where kids are 
left with their grandparents. But this can lead to poor child raising and kids 
can end up with drug problems.” Linda continues, “one can’t assume money 
brings happiness to the children … so, we need to focus on migration as a 
life strategy and untangle the reasons for why they migrate.”
Despite Linda’s multiple elaborations on the concept, I am left puzzled 
what safe migration means for her, let alone what it is meant to achieve for 
Linda’s migration aid project. Her explications are full of tautologies (“safe 
migration is about making migration as safe as possible”), and semantic 
multiplications. On the one hand, safe migration, according to Linda, 
becomes a question of regular migration as it relates to – yet is not quite 
the same – as legal migration. Yet, given the uncertainty in migration out-
comes (how can an aid agency guarantee safety?) aid programmes run the 
risk of promising too much. The solution? Replace the noun with the adjec-
tive: safer migration. Thomas, whom I introduced earlier in the chapter, 
told me: “safe migration doesn’t work because it implies that you somehow 
ensure safety without any means for a project to guarantee this. This is why 
we prefer the term safer migration as we provide services that are helpful 
but doesn’t guarantee an outcome.” Thomas’ response helps explain why 
several practitioners sometimes use the phrase “smart migration.” “Smart” 
and “safer” migration reorients programmes’ focus from outputs to inputs 
(i.e. what programme can deliver as opposed to guarantee). Furthermore, 
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this semantic leap tacitly broadens the concept away from the state (legal 
migration) towards migrants’ dispositions (being smart).6 For Linda, she 
ultimately settles on the concept “gainful migration” which broadens safe 
migration outwards towards broad developmental objectives. Attempts to 
clarify safe migration simply results in a multiplication of vocabulary. The 
result? Semantic thickness – as opposed to clarity.
This kind of lexical acrobatics is commonplace amongst my inform-
ants. For an outsider, such language may seem perplexing, somewhat 
overbearing, yet nonsensical. The fact that informants who work for safe 
migration projects would often ask me to explain the concept during 
interviews, such as Suzanna, is quite telling of the concepts unintelligibly. 
Programme documents, training manuals, project reports, evaluations, 
and research reports are full of references to safe migration, yet vague, 
and often silent, regarding its meaning (ILO 2012, 2014b; International 
Labour Organization 2009). For example, ILO’s Tripartite Action to Protect 
Migrants within and from the Greater Mekong Sub-region from Labour 
Exploitation (the TRIANGLE project) “aims to significantly reduce the 
exploitation of labour migrants through increased legal and safe migra-
tion and improved labour protection” (2009, 5), yet does nowhere provide 
any definition or exposition of what is meant by safe migration. Yet, it con-
stitutes an important part aid programmes’ bureaucratic technical knowl-
edge (Olivier de Sardan 2005).
In Chapter 1, I foreshadowed how safe migration discourse commonly 
include references to state-sanctioned migration (passports, work permits), 
progressive awareness raising, notions of social capital within migration 
(recruiters, brokers, and acquaintances) and counter-networks (hotlines 
and outreach services). All of these ingredients are frequently juxtaposed 
with safe migration within aid reports and how practitioners explain 
safe migration (ILO 2014a, 2014b, 2015b, 2015a; International Labour 
Organization 2009).
Similarly to the comments by Linda, Thomas and Robert, although pro-
grammes often ground their work in reference to the need for legal docu-
ments in migration, practitioners do not see what they do as equivalent to 
promoting mere “legal migration” as they are keenly aware that legal status 
by no means guarantees positive outcome for migrants. A discussion paper 
by IOM makes this point quite clear:
The relationship between “regular” and “safe” migration, and between 
“irregular” and “unsafe” migration, needs to be considered when defin-
ing safe migration. “Regular” migration does not necessarily ensure 
“safe” migration; neither does “irregular” migration necessarily lead 
to “unsafe” migration. Migrants with irregular statuses may be at more 
risk than those migrating through regular channels. However it should 
be acknowledged that people migrating through regular channels can 
also be at risk of being trafficked or face risks of exploitation and abuse, 
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at times only once they have reached their destination. Meanwhile, 
irregular migrants with irregular status might have travelled safely to 
their destination, avoiding exposure to major risks, even after arrival.
(IOM 2016, 5)
UN agencies, such as IOM and ILO, have cautioned against simplistic 
assumptions equating legal and safe migration (Suravoranon et al. 2017). 
Yet, such caution does not result in safe migration programmes abandoning 
a focus on legal migration. As Thomas once told me, “although we know 
legal migration is not necessarily safe, we can’t say illegal migration is safe.” 
Indeed, legal migration pathways are a central component within several 
aid programmes’ project documents, training manuals, and programme 
implementation, whether it takes the form of awareness raising (informing 
migrants on the importance of legal documents), regulation of recruitment 
agencies (which are central in operationalising legal migration pathways), or 
supporting pre-departure training (which is central to the state’s formalisa-
tion efforts of migrant populations). Paradoxically, the very same agencies, 
such as IOM and ILO, appear to both embrace, yet critique a state-centric 
focus on legal documents, a point we shall return to. But, if legal migra-
tion is, as Linda says, “not sufficient,” what else is then needed to ensure 
safe migration? It is here we see aid programmes’ focus on “safe migration 
knowledge, attitudes and practices” (McCabe n.d., 38) orients programme 
interventions towards migrants’ dispositions in order to “ensure that migra-
tion choices become informed so that potential migrants are better aware of 
safe migration” (Pillinger 2015, 16). Hence, safe migration moves from the 
legal to the social in the sense that migrants’ behaviour (attitudes, knowl-
edge) and social relations (migrants’ networks, recruiters) are central to 
safe migration strategies. But what kind of attitudes and knowledge should 
migrants hold to ensure safe migration?
to provide potential migrants and their family members with the ability 
to make informed decisions about working abroad, and to emphasise 
the benefits and increase knowledge about the procedures for migrating 
through legal channels for those who choose to go.
(ILO 2014a, 12)
Here, safe migration discourse goes full circle. Migrant disposition con-
forms with a state-centric ideal-type migrant: the legal migrant. Hence, “the 
social” loops back to the legal. Yet, as we have seen in the introduction of 
this book, safe migration awareness raising also comprise notions of social 
capital; that is, the importance of the right kind of relationships in migra-
tion whether this being in the form of licensed recruitment agencies, bro-
kers, and friends assisting with migration. What should be clear to us is that 
safe migration, as expressed either in programme documents or by practi-
tioners, remains contested, yet elusive, with tautological references to both 
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the state (legal documents) and the individual (migrants with the “correct” 
dispositions) within migration pathways. This, in turn, structures aid inter-
ventions that are implemented under the auspices of safe migration. The 
anthropological question then becomes how social and institutional actors 
navigate such contested and elusive parameters through their instrumental-
isation, a theme that we will return to in later chapters.
At the same time, we must attend to the specific context where safe migra-
tion unfolds. As a bureaucratic migration management discourse, it is after 
all implemented within a political and cultural context where patrimonial 
relations remain significant even within government and institutional set-
tings (to be explored in Chapter 3). Although safe migration has become a 
recognised nomenclature amongst English speakers, its Lao and Thai equiv-
alent – henggan koen nyai phort bpei (labour movement safe from risk) – is 
only occasionally used amongst Thai and Lao aid workers and govern-
ment officials that work directly with migrants. The term has no equivalent 
expression in Burmese. Unsurprisingly, although the safe migration con-
cept is ubiquitously used amongst international organisations and NGOs, 
migrant groups rarely employ the concept in their work, despite considera-
ble collaboration taking place between UN agencies, NGOs, and migrant 
groups (see Figure 2.1). Later chapters will return to how these (dis)connec-
tions have crucial consequences for safe migration instrumentalisation.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined how safe migration has emerged, partly out of 
anti-trafficking, as a central policy concern for governments, NGOs, and 
UN agencies. Safe migration is conceptually vague, yet this is precisely 
what makes it malleable, and therefore appealing to a range of actors. 
Perhaps the most important point about the shift to safe migration is that 
it is not informed by clear empirical evidence that this “works better” than, 
say, anti-trafficking. Instead, the shift, as we have seen, has more to do with 
internal structural changes amongst aid programmes themselves. Hence, 
when analysing safe migration we learn more about the institutional log-
ics of aid modalities than the conditions of the migrants themselves. Yet, 
to understand these institutional logics, we have to attend to how aid 
actors, such as Linda, articulate safe migration and how this intersects with 
aid praxis.
* * *
My conversation with Linda had been dragging on for some time. After 
repeated attempts to get a sense of what she meant by safe migration, she 
grabbed a piece of paper. “Some time ago, I had a meeting with some rep-
resentatives from the Department for International Development (DFID, 
United Kingdom’s government aid agency). Through or conversations 
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about safe migration I ended up with a venn diagram like this.” Linda jot-
ted down three words: “documentation,” “transaction,” and “acceptance,” 
circling each word to demonstrate how they overlap. By acceptance, Linda 
explained that “this could be acceptance in a community [i.e. not being 
excluded from a migrant community] but also trust.” Although Linda did 
not use the phrase, she seemed to be pointing to social and cultural capi-
tal as resources within migration. Documents referred to passports, visa, 
work permits, and the like. “Transaction,” Linda explained, could mean 
economic dimension of migration (such as paying for documents) but also 
forms of reciprocity migrants had to engage in (including bribery).
Linda’s Venn diagram speaks to common formal dimensions of safe 
migration programmes (such as legal documents and social networks 
in migration, to be explored in Part II) but also informal dimensions of 
safe migration (such as different forms of reciprocity and brokerage, to be 
examined in Part III) that too often fall outside the purview of programme 
implementation. But is all this, in Robert’s words, actionable? This is the key 
question, the next chapters will explore.
Notes
 1. To my knowledge, the latest, substantive piece of research that was under-
taken with a focus on human trafficking in a Lao context was commissioned 
by the UN-ACT project (Baker 2013), the only remaining regional UN pro-
gramme with a specific trafficking focus. Interestingly, despite the report’s 
focus on human trafficking, only 3.5% of the migrants’ surveyed were con-
sidered trafficked victims, a similar number to an earlier report by the now 
disestablished trafficking project implemented by the ILO (ILO-IPEC and 
Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare Laos 2003).
 2. Several informants were strongly opposed to any modern slavery discourse. 
Explicating the ascendancy of modern slavery and its relation to anti-trafficking 
and safe migration is well beyond the scope of this book. Tentatively, I provide 
the following tentative reason why modern slavery has yet to gain momentum 
in a Mekong context: to date, modern slavery has become most prominent in 
post-industrialised countries, such as the United Kingdom and Australia. In 
contrast, anti-trafficking emerged primarily in the 1990s within a context of 
development aid. Hence, these policy instruments have different trajectories 
(and with different path-dependencies). Modern slavery discourse has gained 
momentum after the 2009 global financial crisis where there has been a gen-
eral decline in aid funds. Modern slavery tends to be propagated by commer-
cial business actors (as opposed to aid actors) which can in part be explained 
by the neoliberal underpinning of this discourse (see Molland 2019b). Hence, 
whereas modern slavery appeals to market-driven discourses, both safe 
migration and anti-trafficking are state-centric discourses which helps explain 
why modern slavery may not (yet) have the same appeal within conventional 
aid delivery.
 3. It is notable that the only regionally based trafficking programme implemented 
by the United Nations which has survived happens to have an explicit focus 
on “grand schemes.” The UNIAP project serves as a secretariat to the COM-
MIT initiative a regional multilateral MOU between Mekong countries which 
seeks to enhance collaboration on the combat against human  trafficking. 
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Hence,  due to its large-scale, cross-governmental role on coordination, it 
fits more easily with the aforementioned donor shift compared with other 
trafficking initiatives.
 4. An observant reader may point out that although there is considerable hostil-
ity directed at migrants in many contexts, attitudes towards migrants vary a 
great deal. Public attitudes towards migrants also depend on different “kinds” 
of migrants (e.g. whereas unskilled labour migrants may be considered unwel-
come, highly educated expatriates may be highly sought after).
 5. One cannot rule out specific political dynamics within a donor country. For 
example, a DFAT official told me that the recently elected labour government 
in Australia made the funding of ILO’s triangle project (phase 1) far more doa-
ble as the Australian Labour Party has traditionally been more sympathetic to 
the ILO compared with the Liberal government.
 6. The phrase “smart migration” was also used in the early 2000s under the aus-
pices of anti-trafficking awareness raising by UNICEF Laos, as well as several 
of the activities that Robert was involved with in Cambodia at the time. This 
behaviouralist emphasis within anti-trafficking and safe migration activities is 
also evident in more recent training manuals, such as World Vision’s “Smart 
Navigator” (World Vision 2014).
DOI: 10.4324/9781003185734-3
In order to have labour solidarity, you must have national solidarity
(School Director, Myanmar Migration School)
Sunday. A shopping centre on the outskirts of Bangkok, which caters for 
outer suburban Bangkok residents. The adjacent park is a meeting spot 
for young folk to pass time. When walking from the main road towards 
the shopping centre, one easily spots the mix of local Thais and Myanmar 
migrant workers that frequent the centre. Yet, the reason for my visit is dif-
ferent. I am here to locate Lao migrants. My visit, which took place early on 
during my fieldwork, is in many respects an extension of my earlier work on 
Lao-Thai anti-trafficking along the Lao-Thai border (see Molland 2012b), 
as I am keen to understand how aid agencies in the greater Bangkok region 
connect with Lao migrants through safe migration programming.
Thus far in my fieldwork, there is no shortage of aid programmes who, 
either in print or through interviews, claim they assist Lao migrants, 
alongside Myanmar and Khmer migrant communities. A staff member 
from one NGO had advised me to visit this particular shopping centre 
as this is where her organisation usually does outreach amongst Lao 
migrants. Lots of Laotians hang out in the adjacent park on Sundays, 
I was told. Hence, the reason to visit the shopping centre on this sunny 
Sunday, scouting for Laotians. Upon arrival, the adjacent park is imme-
diately visible. My research assistant and I commence strolling through 
the park grounds. The NGO official was right. The park is certainly a con-
gregation point for migrants. One can easily spot migrants hanging out, 
either underneath the shady trees or on one of the many park benches. 
Yet, based on appearance and on audible chatter, they are all Burmese. 
We continue our stroll. We strike up conversations with various people we 
pass. Some are Burmese. Others are Thai. We continue our investigative 
stroll in the park. We stop at a van to buy some ice cream as this provides 
an opportunity to chit chat. We ask the ice cream seller about the park 
and who comes here. “Lots of Burmese workers hang out” we are told. 
As this is close to nearby factories this makes sense. Any Lao workers, we 
wonder? “Not really,” we are told.
Omnipresence and nothingness
Lao and Myanmar migrants compared
3
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After some further strolling and random conversations, we fail to identify 
a single Lao person. We walk back to the shopping centre where we converse 
with some of the street vendors that sell snacks. One vendor seems jovial 
and relaxed. We explain our predicament. You won’t find many Lao around 
here, he tells us. But, you should try the market (talat) four kilometres down 
this road. He explains to us the whereabouts. Upon his advice, we jump on 
a local bus which takes us to the market a few kilometres away.
Upon arriving at the market, the omnipresence of Myanmar migrants 
is obvious. Women wear thanakha (a yellow paste made of grounded san-
dalwood applied to one’s cheeks) and many men wear sarongs (longyi) – 
both Burmese markers of appearance that are distinct from Thais. Several 
shops advertise their produce in Burmese script. Burmese chatter is audible 
throughout the marketplace. No attempt whatsoever is made at concealing 
Burmese ethnicity. We walk into the market itself. Besides a range of differ-
ent food products, this is also a main market for seafood. We walk around 
striking up conversations with both street stall owners and customers.
After some initial ice-breakers, we ask one vendor “do you know of any 
Lao people.” “No,” he replies. Then, the vendor next door blurts out “but 
you are Lao, no?!” The man who had just alleged no Lao are present qui-
etly nods his head, admitting to being Lao. The neighbour stall-holders 
smile. Laughter fills the air. We attempt to get the conversation going. Yet, 
responses are fleeting and vague. As we move on throughout the day, we 
encounter similar problems. Although we are able to identify five Laotians, 
chummy conversations are not forthcoming.
Where are the Laotians?
At first glance, my difficulties with locating Lao migrants may seem unsur-
prising and naïve. As any fieldworker knows, just as determining people’s 
identity by appearance is riddled with methodological problems, gaining 
rapport with marginalised subjects (e.g. migrants) is challenging within 
short time-frames. Yet, these challenges contrast with the relative ease I 
had experienced thus far in accessing, conversing, and even hanging out 
amongst Myanmar migrants. This contrast was not limited to this Sunday 
visit. Besides visual differences (more on this below), Myanmar migrants 
appeared far more willing to speak, even regarding sensitive topics (such as 
police corruption and the use of brokers, themes that we will return to in 
later chapters). Lao migrants, on the other hand, were hard work, both in 
terms of locating them and striking up conversations.
At first glance, the contrast seems self-evident. It is after all well-known 
that Lao migrants constitute a much smaller migrant group compared with 
Myanmar migrants. Hence, once should not be surprised by the relative ease 
in encountering Burmese migrants compared with Lao, which, in turn, helps 
explain why aid organisations may engage the former more than the latter. 
Yet, this contrast requires further unpacking. As this chapter will explicate, 
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reasons why aid organisations provide assistance to certain migrants (and 
overlook others) relate directly to how Burmese and Lao migrants comprise 
different forms of sociality. This, the present chapter suggests, is crucial in 
order to understand what later chapters will explore: how safe migration 
praxis is operationalised at local levels.
A pattern developed throughout my fieldwork. Safe migration pro-
grammes would describe their activities, either in interviews or in print, 
as encompassing the three main labour migrant groups in Thailand: 
Myanmar, Lao, and Khmer migrants. When asking about specific activities 
and the possibility of accompanying the organisation during their imple-
mentation, initial claims of working across all migrant groups regressed 
to a more modest claim: “we only work with some Lao” I was told. For 
example, Anan, a manager for one large safe migration project, told me that 
although most of their target group are Myanmar migrants, they also assist 
Lao migrants. Anan kindly facilitated a visit to one of their many migrant 
training centres where he alleged some attendants were Lao. Yet, upon visit-
ing, the centre’s Director, Ma Ni, looked dumfounded at me when I queried 
the centre’ work with Lao migrants. “There are no Lao here” (khun Lao 
mai mi), Ma Ni replied. Likewise, another Thai NGO who specialises on 
street children and child trafficking initially agreed to an interview regard-
ing their safe migration work with Lao migrants. Yet as our conversation 
progressed, it turned out that the examples the NGO director provided us 
with were more than a decade old.1 Similarly, Myanmar Migrant School 
(see Chapter 1) was heavily dominated by Myanmar migrants, although the 
school had for years operated as an MRC under the auspices of a larger 
safe migration programme that allegedly serve Lao, Khmer, and Myanmar 
migrants. Throughout my entire fieldwork, I was only able to speak with 
two Lao students at Myanmar Migrant School. Despite a formal claim to 
work with Lao, Khmer, and Burmese migrants (often under the rationale of 
a regional approach to safe migration), most of these programmes were in 
practical terms Myanmar-specific projects.
Even amongst projects that worked along the Lao-Thai border, the same 
kind of phenomenon took place. One NGO manager proudly expounded 
to me their safe migration activities along several of Thailand and Laos’ 
shared border crossings. They worked at both sides of the border, I was told, 
collaborating with both Thai and Lao authorities, providing safe migration 
awareness raising (mostly through distribution of leaflets). They were soon 
to expand work into a new border checkpoint, the manager told me. He 
readily agreed to me visiting their project sites. Yet, after a lot of back and 
forth, it turned out that project activities were only operational at one bor-
der checkpoint (which we will return to in Chapter 4).2 Yet, when visiting the 
check point some months later, it became apparent that although the NGO 
did indeed work at both sides of the border, the safe migration work was all 
about the return process. The leaflets we hoped to see being handed out to 
migrants entering Thailand was not taking place.3 Once again, what was 
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presented as robust safe migration work with Lao migrants turned out to be 
non-existent and inconsequential.
My repeated visits to safe migration programmes in order to understand 
their work with Lao migrants fizzled to nothing. Claims of working with 
Lao were exaggerated, or dated. In many cases, Lao migrants were sim-
ply nowhere to be seen.4 In contrast, the ubiquitous presence of Myanmar-
specific safe migration programme activities was so overwhelming that 
it could not be ignored ethnographically. At the same time, it would be a 
mistake to reorient the research away from the Lao towards the Myanmar 
migrants as this would in effect echo safe migration programmes’ skewed 
focus. The contrasting ubiquity of Myanmar safe migration activity and pro-
grammatic nothingness relating to the Lao, I suggest, invites several conun-
drums that must be interrogated in order to unearth how safe migration aid 
modalities are operationalised in specific contexts: why do programme offi-
cials make flippant claims regarding their work with Lao migrants, despite 
minimal or non-existent programme activity? A provisional answer may 
be that most programmes, who are used to fleeting donor visits, may be 
unexcepted of anthropologists’ closer scrutiny of their local activity in light 
of their verbal claims. The discrepancy between what aid programmes say 
and do may also reflect donor-driven aid. Claiming to work across migrant 
groups allows programmes to state their work on a regional (as opposed to 
national) level, which has stronger donor appeal; a reality I am intimately 
familiar with given my previous work with the UN. Working “regionally” 
allows for “big narratives” which is useful for funding purposes, and echoes 
the previous chapter’s discussion of grant schemes in development aid.
Yet, none of this helps explain why (and how) aid organisations privilege 
Myanmar migrants and neglect Laotians through their programming. As 
alluded to in the introductory vignette at the beginning of this chapter, what 
accounts for the detectability of Myanmar migrants compared to invisible 
Lao migrants? And what does the contrast between energetic programme 
activities with Myanmar migrants (as opposed to programmatic inertness 
with the Lao) tell us about safe migration programme execution and incor-
poration of migrant communities in Thailand more broadly? As will be expli-
cated throughout this chapter, Myanmar and Lao migrants are incorporated 
into Thai society differently. This is crucial in order to appreciate how safe 
migration interventions are structured. As such, this chapter provides the 
wider context for the safe migration programmes that this book examines: 
the Mekong region, with specific focus on Thailand, Lao, and Myanmar.
Programme (il)legibility
Aid practitioners are cognisant of the fact that most safe migration activi-
ties target Myanmar migrants. Although several programmes claim to work 
with Lao migrants, many also acknowledge the difficulties accessing them. 
The sheer scale of the Myanmar migrant population in itself is quite telling. 
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According to the UN, the number of official registered Myanmar migrants 
comprises more than two million, compared with some 200,000 Lao migrants 
(Harkins 2019). Hence, there are favourable economies of scale in targeting 
Myanmar migrants. The Lao are also integrated into Thai society in very 
different ways compared to most Myanmar migrants (though some variation 
exists depending on ethnicity) which makes Lao less easily detectable from a 
programme point of view. The Lao are (as the Thai) part of the broader Tai 
language group, and most Thais residing in north-eastern part of Thailand 
are ethnic Lao (Thaweesit 2014; Walker 2009). Most Lao are subject to con-
siderable Thai social and cultural exposure (in part due to ubiquitous Thai tv 
reception in Laos). Young Lao readily understand Thai and many can speak 
it well (albeit with an accent). Laotians with extensive migration experience in 
Thailand often speak Thai fluently to the point where, say, Bangkok residents 
will not be able to distinguish a Lao from an Isaan speaker from north-eastern 
parts of Thailand. Although residents in border areas may be able to more 
easily distinguish Lao migrants (in part due to better familiarity with different 
Lao dialects), this overlaps with another important point of affinity: kinship. 
Most Isaan residents are ethnic Lao, which in recent times has been reinforced 
with cross-border marriages between Laos and Thailand (Thaweesit 2014).
Although Lao is widely thought of as inferior neighbours, they are at 
the same time (especially in northeast Thailand) thought of as relatives 
(phinong). Hence, Laotians do not easily stand out within Thai society 
quite in the same way as migrants from Myanmar. This also predisposes 
Lao migrants to wanting to fit in (Thaweesit 2014) which is reinforced by 
Laotians broader cultural orientation towards Thailand. Hence, conform-
ing with Thai sociality is not merely a practical tactic but also a desirable 
social disposition for many young Lao. Lao migrants’ closer cultural ties 
with Thailand also helps explain many aid workers’ neglected attention to 
them. “Lao migrants tend to do better,” one UN official, told me; a common 
assumption made within the aid sector (yet, as later chapters will show, this 
assumption requires rethinking).
In contrast, Myanmar migrants visibly stand out due to their ethnicity. 
With the exception of some ethnic groups, such as the Shan, most Myanmar 
migrants arrive in Thailand without any Thai language skills. The lack of 
Thai language skills makes them depended on others (such as brokers) but 
also contributes as a marker of difference. This is reinforced by the sim-
ple fact that, as in the marketplace described above, Myanmar migrants 
in many cases observe a different dress style – such as longyi (a sarong for 
men) and faces decorated with thanakha – which makes them unmistakably 
identifiable as Myanmar migrants. In contrast to Lao migrants, fitting in is 
not a viable strategy for many Myanmar workers which – as will become 
evident  – contributes to a disposition to form networks and associations 
amongst other migrants in order to get by.
The contrasting visibility of Lao and Myanmar migrants (which also man-
ifests linguistically) means that from the perspective of aid programmes, 
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Myanmar migrants are easily identifiable, whereas detecting Lao migrants 
requires considerable extra investigative labour (which presents obvious 
operational challenges for NGOs). In addition, even when identifying Lao, 
considerable resistance and employment of weapons of the weak (Scott 
1985) take place in communication through a range of tacit oppositional 
tactics. Once opportunities for social intercourse and dialogue presented 
themselves throughout my fieldwork, evasion was commonplace in the form 
of vague answers, silences, deliberate misunderstandings of questions, and 
even simply walking away.5 Although such responses may easily be under-
stood in light of cultural dispositions, including the aforementioned desire 
to wanting to fit into Thai society and culture, we will later see how such 
tacit resistance is best understood in political terms. Myanmar migrants, on 
the other hand, were generally willing to talk and had few qualms sharing 
their views on a range of topics – even sensitive ones.
The divergent visibility between the Lao and Myanmar migrants also 
manifests themselves spatially. Whereas Myanmar migrants often work and 
reside in larger clusters (typically in dormitory compounds), Lao migrants 
are often dispersed in smaller groups, in many cases co-habiting with local 
Thais. Some aid officials point to how Myanmar migrants are more prom-
inent in labour sectors characterised by larger economies of scale (such 
as construction work, seafood processing, and factories), Laotians tend 
to work in service sector work, which further helps explain this pattern, a 
point that has been observed in large-scale surveys on Lao migrants (Baker 
2013; IOM 2016). Myanmar migrants’ spatial concentration is not limited to 
workplaces and residential patterns. In the greater Bangkok region, several 
temples have over the years become important congregation points for many 
Myanmar migrants, in part due to the presence of expatriate Myanmar 
monks. I would sometimes attend festivals at temples comprising thousands 
of Myanmar migrants. As later chapters will show, these temples are central 
for migrant sociality and financing of migration assistance. Throughout my 
fieldwork, I could not find any resembling pattern amongst Lao migrants.
Hence, Myanmar and Lao migrants’ contrast in how they are (in)visible in 
socio-cultural, linguistic, and spatial terms. Yet, reasons why aid programmes 
skew towards targeting Myanmar migrants cannot merely be explained by 
these contrasting forms of visibility. As later chapters will detail, aid delivery 
depends on intermediaries through supply chain of aid assistance, and in 
order to understand how this comes about we have to consider political and 
historical dimensions of Myanmar and Lao labour migrants.
Migrant incorporation and political legacies
There is a surprising lack of comparative analytical work on Laos and 
Myanmar, given their shared legacy of authoritarian rule with tokenistic 
(albeit varied) gestures towards a socialist ideology.6 The political domi-
nance of the ethnic majority group (Burman and Lao) is precarious in both 
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the countries, either due to ongoing ethnic conflict in border areas (in the 
case of Myanmar) or demographics (the majority ethnic Lao population 
only accounts for approximately 40% of the total population of Laos). At 
the same time, there are important differences. The Lao government appears 
far more successful in incorporating different ethnic groups and territories 
into the Lao body politic. With the exception of fragmented opposition 
(mostly related to the historical legacy of ethnic Hmong opposition during 
the Vietnam War), no serious armed of political opposition exist to the Lao 
government, which stands in stark contrast to ongoing armed conflict and 
the proliferation of armed groups in several parts of Myanmar.
In contrast to Myanmar’s legacy of military rule, Laos is more simi-
lar to Vietnam (and to some extent China) in its Soviet-style form of gov-
ernance where a party structure mirrors the government apparatus from 
the national level all the way down to the village level (Creak and Barney 
2018; Rehbein 2007, 2017). Although Laos has liberalised its economy sig-
nificantly since the late 1980s, one-party rule remains. Despite relaxing its 
economic, social, and cultural spheres since the late 1980s, to this day the 
government, including its mass organisations (which has no equivalence 
in Myanmar), are meant to serves as the main vehicle for any “civil soci-
ety” activities. Although the Lao government may appear to have relaxed 
its political grip on everyday activities, it closely polices any attempts at 
establishing anything resembling civic institutions outside government 
structures. For example, local NGOs have up until recently been banned, 
and continue to be subject to restrictions.7 Although Lao authorities allow 
non-profit associations (NPA), they are tightly controlled by authorities 
and “only give the appearance of being civil society organisations, and in 
some instances appear to be more an opportunity for retired bureaucrats to 
provide ongoing services to the country and convenient channels for donor 
funds.” (Lyttleton 2008, 267)
The disappearance of the local NGO activist Sombath Somphone in 2012 
underscored the severe limitations on how much activities can take place 
outside the state (Rathie 2017; Sims 2015). Relatedly, although the Lao gov-
ernment is in many respects feared by local people, it is also a source of 
attraction. Although it is difficult to pinpoint the popularity of the govern-
ment given the lack of freedom of political opinion, many Lao do engage 
the government in various ways. For example, obtaining a position as a 
state official within government is widely sought after, even amongst sev-
eral ethnic minorities. Similarly, joining the party (even across ethnic lines) 
is important for social upward mobility (Rehbein 2007). This means that 
people gravitate towards the state apparatus for jobs and prestige. Indeed, a 
central argument that has been made in Lao studies in recent years, is how 
Laotians seek (as opposed to resist) the state (Creak and Barney 2018; High 
and Petit 2013; Singh 2014).
This has important implications for assistance provision. Besides 
state-sanctioned activities, the only other mode of support is premised on 
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kinship and patrimonial relations. Within a social context where social rela-
tions are premised on a subsistence ethics (often based on kin) and “big 
man” (phu yai) patrimonial relations (Rehbein 2007, 2017) reciprocity there-
fore rarely extends beyond kin and friends to “distant others” (though, the 
2018 dam collapse in southern Laos suggests an emergent Lao discourse of 
assistance which extend beyond kin). It is worth noting how this disposi-
tions Lao migrants to both help and seek help. For example, ethnographic 
studies of internal and cross-border Lao migrants demonstrate the domi-
nance of kin and acquaintance-based recruitment (Huijsmans et al. 2014; 
IOM 2016; Malam 2012; Molland 2012b). A study of Lao garment factory 
workers point to social marginalisation due to the absence of alternative 
networks of support, compared with their village-based kin networks back 
home (Malam 2012).8 Thai-based studies on Lao migrants similarly report 
how Lao migrants “lack social networks and rely only on kinship ties and 
good relationships with Thai villagers.” (Thaweesit 2014, 179) These findings 
reverberate through my own fieldwork for this book. Lao migrants report 
to rely solely on kin (phinong) and friends (peuan) in Thailand.9 At the same 
time, young Lao people grow up within a political environment where the 
very thought of establishing (let alone, seeking support from) associations 
outside the state is an alien one.
The situation for Myanmar migrants looks very different. Despite a 
shared political history of one-party authoritarian rule, Myanmar’s expe-
rience with military dictatorship has had a very different effect on local 
level social organisation in Myanmar. Despite brutal violence, Myanmar’s 
military regime has engaged in a process of non-engagement (in terms of 
government services and support) at local levels. As several scholars have 
pointed out, this has left a void where local communities simply had to fend 
for themselves through a range of self-reliance mechanisms (Dove 2017; 
McCarthy 2019, 2020). Hence, self-reliance constitutes an important ethos 
and practice which has emerged out of the state’s failure to support its citi-
zens (Dove 2017; McCarthy 2019, 2020) Recent economic and political lib-
eralisation appears to have reinforced (as opposed to lessened) this idiom, 
where both private business (often in patrimonial relations with state offi-
cials) and local village-based groups engage and support a myriad of local 
initiatives across the country which blends Buddhist principles of assistance 
with neoliberal conceptions of self-responsibility (McCarthy 2020; Prasse-
Freeman 2015b; also see Rose 1992):
Myanmar’s culture of self-reliance is a legacy of the military’s indiffer-
ence to the basic social welfare needs of the population, further rein-
forced by the current state counsellor’s recent speeches that citizens 
should “muster courage and self-confidence” to take personal respon-
sibility for their own and the nation’s solutions and not expect govern-
ment solutions…
(Dove 2017, 216)
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The emergency of smartphones and social media coupled with recent human-
itarian natural disasters in the aftermath of political liberalisation appears 
to have further reinforced this trend (McCarthy 2020). Despite Myanmar’s 
poverty, it has one of the world’s highest rates of donation-provision in the 
world which can be attributed to state-neglect of its citizens (Dove 2017). 
Furthermore, how charity transposes to collective action seems more prom-
inent in a Myanmar context where an enormous amount of self-help groups 
and associations exist for all kinds of purposes (Dove 2017). In addition, it 
is also worth noting the traditional role of Buddhist monks in Myanmar. 
Although Thailand, Laos, and Myanmar are majority Buddhist countries, 
Burmese monks are more dominant in secular and political affairs, such as 
the 2007 “Saffron Revolution,” which in part can be explained by the impor-
tance of self-reliance outside state institutions as discussed above.10
Two points emanate from all this: in contrast with the Lao government’s 
omnipresence where local villagers must channel collective projects through 
the state, Myanmar’s military rule has thrusted self-reliance onto local citi-
zens. In contrast to Myanmar, where self-management is expected, Laotians 
are discouraged from self-organising around communal projects outside 
state structures (and can be severely punished in attempting to do so). 
Second, an ethos of support and care beyond kin and immediate social rela-
tions is in evidence in Myanmar in a way which has yet to develop in Laos.
The differences in authoritarian governance have important bearings on 
migrants’ social organisation. In Thailand’s border areas, a range of infor-
mal Myanmar-based networks and associations have been documented in 
relation to migrants and refugee populations (Brees 2010; Campbell 2018; 
Décobert 2016). As we saw in the introduction to this book, and as later 
chapters will explicate, informal Myanmar migrant networks and associa-
tions are plentiful in the greater Bangkok region and is central to migrant 
assistance. For example, in one province where a lot of my research has 
taken place, no less than ninety different migrant associations operate. 
Although most of them would relate to cultural or religious affairs, includ-
ing funeral groups that are remarkably similar to what Cavelle Dove 
describes in the context of self-help group back in Myanmar (2017), many 
also relate more directly to migrants’ welfare (especially health) and even 
workers’ rights. Amongst the Lao migrants, I was unable to detect any sim-
ilar forms of associations or networks.11 The only case that I am aware of 
that may resemble a Lao migrant network relates to the Lao national Od 
Sayavong who according to Human Rights Watch was reported missing 
in 2019 due to his human rights and labour activism in Thailand (Human 
Rights Watch 2019).12 The reason for this difference in social organisation 
is simple: whereas Lao migrants are dispositioned to evade formal forms of 
self-organisation, Burmese migrants build on pre-existing forms of sociality 
and networks that are ubiquitous in Myanmar.
The only thing resembling a “Lao community” in Thailand to my knowl-
edge is found in certain villages along the Thai-Lao border. I had the 
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opportunity to visit one such local village in one border province during 
my fieldwork which local Thai NGO workers referred to as a “Lao village” 
(Baan khun Lao). Border zones are of course very different to urban and 
suburban Bangkok with its adjacent industrial zones. The Thai side of the 
Lao border (i.e. the Isaan region) is after all primarily populated by Thai 
nationals who are ethnic Lao and speak a Lao dialect. Social-, cultural-, 
and kin-based networks straddle the border and are multiple. The Isaan 
region is also a part of Thailand which has experienced several waves of 
Lao migrants, where some (but far from all) have become Thai citizens 
(Thaweesit 2014).
In this particular village, approximately 80% of its inhabitants were Lao 
nationals. The migration into the village had gradually evolved since the 
early 1990s (initially triggered through intermarriage). Even Lao grandpar-
ents had migrated across from Laos as their younger family members could 
no longer look after them due to their migration to Thailand. Although 
some of the residents were undocumented, quite a few of them held Lao 
passports making monthly return trips to Laos to renew their legal stay 
in Thailand. Yet, in terms of social organisation of various forms of assis-
tance, the village is geared towards Thai services. Villagers use the Thai 
health system when needed, and local children with Lao nationality attend 
local Thai schools, something I was able to confirm by a chance visit by one 
of the local Thai teachers. The local development initiatives in the village 
(which includes a saving scheme and agricultural initiatives and a project 
targeting work conditions for agricultural workers) are implemented with 
the oversight of the Thai village chief in collaboration with a local Thai 
NGO. In such a Lao “community,” there are no Lao collective forms of 
associations as such.
One added factor that helps explain the divergent Lao and Myanmar lev-
els of self-organisation again relates to political histories and legacies. Since 
Myanmar’s student uprisings in 1988, a large group of student activists ended 
up as political exiles in Thailand, of whom many founded associations (Brees 
2010; Décobert 2016). Until this day, many of them remain in Thailand. 
Some of these political exiles have gradually taken on labour migration as 
an added topic of activity alongside political activities relating to democra-
tisation processes back home in Myanmar. A political exile community in 
Thailand is directly related to labour politics through the establishment of 
the Federation of Trade Unions of Burma (FTUB), a political exile labour 
union, which in recent years have expanded their activities back in Myanmar 
(now called the Confederation of Trade Unions of Myanmar, CTUM, see 
Arnold and Campbell 2017). Hence, as labour migration has increased since 
the 1990s, Myanmar migrants have had a pre-existing political exile com-
munity to tap into. U Ba Sein, who I introduced in Chapter 1 is one such 
leader. This also helps explain his merging of labour migration and demo-
cratic futures as topic of discussion (see Chapter 1). In later chapters, we will 
meet several other informants, including expatriate Monks, who share U Ba 
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Sein’s trajectory as political exiles from the 1988 student generation, and has 
now taken on migration assistance in Thailand, which can fruitfully be con-
sidered as a form of political remittance (Piper and Rother 2020).
In contrast, no equivalent Lao political exile community in Thailand 
exists, despite a large Lao diaspora in the Unites States, France, and 
Australia. In order to locate anything resembling a Lao political exile com-
munity in Thailand, one has to go back to the Lao Issara movement of the 
1940s in the context of Japanese invasion of Laos and subsequent French 
attempt at regaining control of Indochina (Ivarsson and Goscha 2007; 
Rathie 2017). This is not to say that there may not be any forms of emer-
gent self-organising taking place amongst Lao migrants. Ongoing labour 
migration to Thailand since the early 90s coupled with newfound use of 
social media may eventually result in such change. And the aforementioned 
case of Od Sayavong may constitute an example of labour activism that may 
expand in the future. Yet, during my fieldwork, no such social organisation 
was in evident in the greater Bangkok region, let alone in border provinces.13
Handelman’s (1977) seminal work on ethnic incorporation can usefully 
be applied to understanding the contrasting social organisation between 
Myanmar and Lao migrants. Based on the discussion above, one can observe 
that for migrants in Thailand, Lao as an ethnic label primarily exists as a 
category of ascription which may serve as foundation for friendships and kin 
relations amongst other Lao migrants. Lao migrant sociality is orientated 
towards Thai society, in part due to the fact that many Lao social relations 
straddle the Thai-Lao border (either through inter-marriage or pre-existing 
kin relations). This weakens the basis for a Lao migrant corporate group. 
Enduring social relations hardly goes beyond this. In contrast, Myanmar 
migrants constitute tight corporate groups and associations that constitute 
a mix of both pan-ethnic- and ethnic-specific groups (i.e. specific migrant 
groups for Karen, Mon, etc.) (Décobert 2016). Lao migrants have few or 
no effective networks, or overarching associations. Amongst the Myanmar 
migrants, we even see contours of political incorporation in the sense that 
associations take on pseudo-state functions (the facilitation and assistance 
with employment, access to health services and education) and can become 
rallying points for migrant workers’ rights through quasi-union activity. 
Their networks, as later chapter will show, also facilitate redistribution of 
resources. Following Handleman, one may even see contours of a Burmese 
territorial community. In several industrial zones, residency patterns follow 
either ethnic of national identification where we see large concentration of 
Myanmar migrants in factory dormitories which in itself reinforces migrant 
sociality (see Campbell 2018). Many Myanmar migrant associations are 
based in districts and provinces with large Myanmar migrant populations. 
The fact that Myanmar migrants in some cases have given Burmese street 
names to their surrounding areas is quite telling of this form of territoriali-
sation of a migrant sociality. As later chapters will reveal, Myanmar migrant 
sociality also comprises important virtual dimensions through social media.
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All of this helps explain why safe migration programmes in Thailand tend 
to focus on Myanmar migrants, and neglect the Lao. Yet, central parts of 
safe migration aid delivery, such as pre-departure training, take place “at 
home.” How then, do these contrasting socio-political differences structure 
safe migration delivery in sending countries?
Contextualising safe migration in sending countries
Laos and Myanmar’s contrasting authoritarian systems also help to shed 
light on how safe migration implementation unfolds in those two coun-
tries. In Myanmar, safe migration programme activities take place within 
a broader context of political, economic, and societal liberalisation and a 
consequential aid boom dominated by western aid actors. UN agencies 
and international NGOs collaborate with numerous locally based NGOs 
and community groups. Although government permissions are required 
for both aid programmes and researchers, my field visits to programme 
activities (e.g. pre-departure training, pre-decision training in villages and 
townships) went on with little interference from government bodies. Local 
partners that worked on safe migration activities were often enthusiastic, 
proactive, and engaged. Local village-based associations that took part in 
activities demonstrated upbeat engagement with programmes in ways that 
I have never encountered in a Lao context.14 In contrast, the operating envi-
ronment for aid actors in Laos remain constrained. All activities must go 
through government bodies and (at least nominally) international aid organ-
isations ought not to implement activities without government oversight. 
This means that programme implementation is frustratingly slow, and – to 
me, appeared to have become even more difficult since my PhD fieldwork 
(2005–2006) and my time with the UN (2002–2004), most likely due to the 
weakened influence of western aid in light of Chinese encroachment. This 
does not only complicate research access.15 Aid activities are severely cur-
tailed, with the result that the kind of programme activity that could easily 
be observed in Myanmar is either slow coming or entirely absent in a Lao 
context. For example, despite one UN agency being in its second phase of 
operation during my fieldwork, they were still struggling with making their 
MRC centres operational at provincial and district levels.
Accompanying village-based safe migration awareness raising provided 
impossible to organise, not only for myself but also – by admission from one 
UN official – for Bangkok-based programme staff. This is not to say that 
there is never a situation where implementation takes place at local levels, but 
rather that programme officials themselves are severely limited in scaling up 
interventions and (importantly) develop a context-specific understanding of 
their own programmes. Safe migration implementation in the Lao context 
struggles to push itself beyond aid agencies own offices and various training 
workshops in seminar rooms with government counterparts. An important 
point about all this is this: in contrast to considerable programme activities 
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amongst Myanmar migrants in both sending and source communities, Lao 
safe migration activities constitute a form of programmatic nothingness.
Implications for assistance
In his seminal work on participatory development in the early 1980s, influ-
ential development studies scholar Robert Chambers pointed to how aid 
programmes routinely overlook the poor (Chambers 1981). A range of 
biases perpetuated by the aid sector, including short time-frames and “tar-
mac bias” (i.e. where aid activities take place where you have road access), 
result in aid programmes unperceiving rural poverty which ultimately 
explains why aid programmes often overlook the poorest of the poor. The 
privileging of Myanmar migrants over Lao in safe migration programme 
aid delivery can similarly be explained by such bias. The sheer size of the 
Myanmar migrant population coupled with pre-existing migrant networks 
and associations (which partly stems from a community of political exile 
leaders) makes it far easier for aid programmes to operationalise assistance 
activities amongst Myanmar migrants. To paraphrase Robert Chambers, 
there is no such pre-paved road to access Lao migrants.
At the same time, the way I contrast Lao and Myanmar migrants in terms 
of their discernibility can easily be misunderstood. Throughout my field-
work, it became apparent to me that most expatriate aid workers had a very 
poor understanding of the informal Myanmar aid associations that I was 
encountering. Although aid workers are fully aware that a lot of their activ-
ities take place amongst Myanmar migrants, this does not mean they neces-
sarily had a solid grasp on how their own assistance was operationalised at 
local levels. It is important to keep in mind that aid delivery (as I explained 
in the previous chapter) constitutes in themselves chains of programme 
implementation. Just like any supply chain, they are susceptible to obfus-
cate micro-social practices (and thereby muddle responsibility and blame). 
This is why several of my expatriate aid informants could be flippant about 
their various claims regarding programme implementation amongst Lao, 
Khmer, and Myanmar migrant workers as they would themselves primarily 
only know these social worlds through budgetary and project reports from 
the various local actors (typically Thai NGOs) they sub-contracted to carry 
out implementation. As such, the divergent ways safe migration aid delivery 
connect with different migrants relates to co-production of visibility and 
invisibility, a theme that we will return to in later chapters.
Conclusion
This chapter has explored how safe migration programmes dispropor-
tionately target Myanmar migrants, where Lao migrants are in practi-
cal terms marginalised, despite aid agencies official claims of supporting 
them. Due to linguistic, cultural, and social similarities with Thailand, 
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Lao migrants are predisposed to “fit in” in Thailand, whereas Myanmar 
migrants become predisposed to self-organise. Furthermore, the polit-
ical legacies and contexts of Myanmar and Laos are crucial in order to 
appreciate how Myanmar migrants are predisposed to self-organise, it is 
inconceivable for Lao migrants to self-organise outside state structures. In 
addition, a pre-existing Myanmar political exile population in Thailand 
further helps explain how it is far easier for UN agencies and NGOs to tap 
into Myanmar migrant communities compared with Lao migrants. We also 
here see contours to what will become important in order to understand 
how safe migration is instrumentalised: the role of intermediaries. A key 
reason, I conclude, why Myanmar safe migration activities are omnipresent 
(as opposed to Lao nothingness) can be explained by how the former has 
the necessary conditions in order to enable intermediaries through chains 
of migration assistance.
Notes
 1. As it turned out, the Director was referring to collaboration with Lao author-
ities. When he mentioned the names of some of the officials, it became clear 
to me that he was, by chance, referring to my former Lao government col-
leagues from the time I served as a project advisor for the UN inter-agency 
project on Human Trafficking. The cases he referred to was from the 1998–
2004 time-period. I am unsure why he wanted to “pass off” this as part of 
their current work, but one possibility may be a credulous belief that I was 
somehow connected to potential donor funding.
 2. By chance at one of my visits to Nong Khai, where the programme manager 
alleged, they already had good cooperation with the provincial immigration 
police on their safe migration awareness raising and screening, I had a chance 
meeting with an immigration police officer during one of my visits. The offi-
cial happened to work for the same police unit that the NGO claimed to be 
working with. I asked the officer if he had ever heard of this particular NGO, 
to which the officer affirmed in the negative. After some more probing the 
police officer recalled having met the NGO manager at a conference some 
time back and that there was some mention of possible collaboration, but the 
police officer made it clear to me that there was nothing remotely close to 
being a collaboration.
 3. I later learned from another Lao-based NGO that there was a turf war between 
local NGOs resulting in different organisations handing out leaflets different 
days. After some more querying, it turned out that this only took place once a 
month.
 4. I have in other writings pointed to how – in contrast with Foucauldian-based 
claims of omnipresent governmentality through counter-intentional effects – 
the Lao aid sector is hopelessly detached from Lao lifeworld’s (Molland 
2012b).
 5. In contrast to my earlier research on Lao migrants, investigating the inter-
section of safe migration aid delivery and migrants with the greater Bang-
kok region as the main focal point provided less opportunities for building 
rapport. My earlier research on anti-trafficking discourses and sex commerce 
along the Lao-Thai border was different as it took place within entertainment 
venues where there is considerable scope to converse and build social relations 
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with informants (Molland 2012b). As we will see later in this chapter, the 
integration of migrants looks very different in Bangkok compared to border 
areas (which denotes the importance of spatio-governmental aspects of how 
migrants are integrated into host communities). For example, Lao sex workers 
are far more visible in border contexts, compared to Bangkok, where some 
80% of sex workers are Lao (Molland 2012b). Ironically, despite a discursive 
emphasis on the inaccessibility and invisibility of sex commerce in trafficking 
discourses, Lao sex workers are relatively speaking more easily identifiable in 
a border context compared Lao migrants employed in other sectors.
 6. There are, of course, important contrasts between how the two countries relate 
to socialist doctrines. Whereas socialism has been highly tokenistic in a Bur-
mese context, Laos experienced an actual social revolution with the advent 
of the Lao Communist party, the Phatet Lao. In recent years, the adherence 
to socialism in Laos has become increasingly perfunctory, which is why it is 
frequently referred to as a post-socialist state in Lao studies.
 7. Although this policy has been liberalised somewhat over the years, local 
NGOs are few and curtailed (Singh 2009).
 8. Lan Anh Hoang points to a similar dynamic in her comparative study of 
Vietnamese and Philippine migrants in Taiwan (Hoang 2015). In contrast to 
Philippine migrants who engage in considerable levels of self-organisation, 
even in public space, Vietnamese migrants are constrained in how they con-
nect with other fellow Vietnamese migrants beyond kin relations: “The work-
ers in my study come from northern Vietnam where bonding capital (strong 
ties) reigns over social life. Their narrow radius of trust (limited to kinship 
and village ties), as a result, serves to decrease the degree to which they are 
able to trust outsiders and cooperate with them.” (Hoang 2015, 13) Although 
one ought to observe caution extrapolating such insights from Vietnamese 
migrants, it is noteworthy that Laos’ one-party rule emulates Vietnam, where 
there are limited avenues for migrant workers to establish social relations and 
reciprocity that falls between the state and village-based kin and friends.
 9. Through ought my research I was able to interview approximately thirty Lao 
migrants who in various ways had encounters with safe migration or migra-
tion assistance programmes. None of them were aware of any Lao-based 
migrant groups. Commonly, migration and recruitment took place through a 
combination of friends, family, and brokers, and some of them were married 
to Thais.
 10. In contrast, the Lao Buddhist Sangha is more similar to Thailand’s in the 
sense that Monks are not permitted to engage in anything considered politi-
cal. In addition, the Lao Buddhist Sangha political influence has been sever-
ally curtailed (see Stuart-fox and Bucknell 1982).
 11. It is worth noting that the scale of these associations does not necessarily indi-
cate cohesion as many groups are factionalised along religious, cultural and 
ethnic lines.
 12. At the time of writing, it remains unclear to what extent Od Sayavong was 
involved in Lao-based labour networks, as opposed to political protest 
against the Lao government. During my fieldwork, not a single UN agency, 
NGO, broker, migrant, or other informant reported any knowledge of either 
Od Sayavong or any Lao-based migrant networks.
 13. One thing I have noticed in communication with Lao migrants in Thailand 
over the years is how they link poverty to government failure in ways that 
I have not heard amongst either internal or returnee migrants in Laos. For 
example, when interviewing a migrant in Laos a typical response would be “we 
migrate because of poverty.” Yet, when I speak to Lao migrants in Thailand, 
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interlocutors would often add that poverty-induced migration is due to “Lao 
government corruption.” No doubt, such critiques reflect a loosening grip of 
Lao governmentality but also suggest a latent critique of Lao government.
 14. During one field visit to Pyin Oo Lwin, Myanmar, local associations that took 
part in a training programme on child labour, pre-departure labour migration 
training and enterprise bargaining, facilitated by the ILO. To my surprise, I 
learned that it was the local association, not ILO, who had taken the initia-
tive organizing the training. Such locally grounded enterprising dispositions 
stand in stark contrast to my experiences in Laos where the aid sector face 
constant struggles with lack of local initiatives in aid programming.
 15. Migration research is sensitive in a Lao context. For example, Lao scholar 
Simon Creak was informed by University colleagues in Laos that human traf-








We need awareness if we want to migrate.
(Workshop facilitator, pre-decision training, 
Myanmar)
It is early morning near a border checkpoint along the Lao-Thai border. A 
group of 15 Lao migrants sit on benches in the immigration police centre 
awaiting the information session to commence. One of the NGO represent-
atives from TPSMC (see Chapter 2), who collaborates with the immigration 
police, had distributed safe migration information leaflets to the migrants 
ahead of the session. Some migrants look at the leaflet, whereas others seem 
indifferent, checking social media on their smartphones to pass time. In the 
background, police officers chit chat and attend to various logistical issues 
relating to deportation paperwork. Despite being a deportation centre, the 
atmosphere is amiable and relaxed.
Then, one of the police officers greets the migrants politely with a wai 
(a polite bow with palms joined together) and commence the information 
session. Before deporting the migrants back to Laos, the officer explains, he 
wants to share some information first. “When entering Thailand, you must 
do so under the MOU programme,” he says.
The pink card will expire on the 31 March this year. The Thai 
Government, Thai Immigration Police Officers, Governmental Officers 
are all worried that you all would be exploited or deceived if you don’t 
have the required documents to live and work in our country. There was 
a recent case where Burmese migrants working on a boat did not receive 
their wages for a year.
He then goes on to explain that the police, in collaboration with the NGO, 
will ask the migrants some questions before they are returned back to Laos. 
“Since you did not legally come into the country this time, please make 
the legal arrangements when your return home before coming back again,” 
the police officer proclaims. “We wish you good health and richness in the 
New Year.”
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The police officer hands over to one of the TPSMC outreach workers, 
who goes through the content of the leaflets that was distributed earlier. 
The leaflet provides information on how to avoid exploitation when work-
ing in Thailand, the outreach worker explains. “What risks are there if you 
don’t have legal documents?” she asks the migrants. “Employers refuse to 
pay wages” one migrant utters. “Workers can be exploited” another migrant 
adds. “That’s right” the TPSMC officer replies. “And you would also be at 
risk of getting arrested by police.” She then points to various phone num-
bers on the leaflets that migrants could call if in trouble.
Later on, I had the opportunity to informally converse with both the 
TPSMC officers and police separately while the migrants were being inter-
viewed for trafficking identification victims screening.1 I ask TPSMC and 
police separately whether they had any idea whether migrants actually act 
upon the information they receive. Do Lao migrants obtain passports, work 
permits, and take steps to avoid labour exploitation as stipulated in the leaf-
let, I wonder? Both TPSMC field staff and the police are quite prepared 
to admit no clear method allows them to establish this connection. Later 
on, my research assistant and I are allowed to accompany the police to the 
Thai-Lao checkpoint. TPSMC has a similar arrangement on the Lao side 
of the border. After the handover between Lao and Thai police, a parallel 
Figure 4.1  Thai police and TPSMC provide safe migration advice during a depor-
tation procedure.
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process takes place on the Lao side. In collaboration with Lao police and 
officials from the Lao Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare (MoLSW), the 
deported migrants are asked similar screening questions and provided with 
information on safe migration. I repeat the questions I earlier asked their 
Thai counterparts. How do you know the safe migration awareness-raising 
material work, we wonder? “There is no way for us to know this” one Lao 
official readily admits. The disconnect between programme objectives and 
outcomes does not appear to prevent TPSMC and their Lao and Thai gov-
ernment collaborators from rolling out their safe migration interventions.
Safe migration, pre-departure, and spatio-temporal reversals
The information session I here describe is one of the numerous exam-
ples where government bodies and NGOs attempt to safeguard migra-
tion through awareness-raising sessions premised on predictive ideal-type 
migration: advising migrants prior to departure on administrative processes 
(such as obtaining passports and work permits) and assistance mechanisms 
(e.g. hotlines), to ensure safety in migration. During our three-day stay at 
the Lao-Thai border, we were allowed to observe several instances where 
migrants were going through such information sessions. Typically, such ses-
sions take place under the auspices of “pre-departure” training in source 
countries of migrants which has become commonplace in the Mekong 
region and elsewhere. Yet, in this case, we see a spatio-temporal reversal 
of the process, where safe migration pre-departure training takes place as 
part of the repatriation process. Rather than informing migrants on safe 
migration prior to departure, the session is held during their return process 
(through deportations) back to Laos. At first glance, this may seem con-
tradictory but makes sense within a context where oscillatory migration is 
commonplace. The likelihood of returning migrants re-migrating explains 
why safe migration awareness raising can be provided upon migrant’s 
return, and points to the ubiquity of Lao-Thai cross-border migration. The 
fact that the police officer is in effect encouraging migrants to return (albeit 
with legal documents) is telling of the increasing acceptance of cross-border 
migrations along the Lao-Thai border.
The spatio-temporal reversal also points to how formal policy prescrip-
tions are adapted through policy praxis. One of the reasons TPSMC ends 
up with inverted safe migration aid delivery has in part due to the admin-
istrative convenience involved. Whereas it is difficult for them to access 
aspiring migrants who are crossing the border from Laos into Thailand, 
deportations allow an entry point where they can engage migrants directly 
as they in practical terms have – quite literally – a captured audience.2 
Furthermore, the way TPSMC adapts to local contexts points to a broader 
implication regarding the relationship between policy prescriptions and 
outcomes. When NGO staff and police openly admit that they have no 
way of knowing if their safe migration awareness raising actually works, 
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they are, in Foucauldian terms, fully aware of the “immanent disjunction 
and dissonance between the ‘programmer’s view’ and the logic of practices, 
their real effects…” (Dean 2007, 83). Although they implement programme 
activities that are meant to contribute to migrants’ safety, they have no clear 
means of knowing if this desired policy objective comes to fruition. It is 
precisely the intersection between such disjunctions – between policy intent 
and outcomes – and the spatio-temporal reversals described above, which 
comprises the central theme for this chapter. How is it that pre-departure 
awareness raising can be scaled up despite no monitoring? As the following 
pages will explicate, through policy prescriptions based on pre-departure 
and pre-decision training, programmes are forced to engage in processes 
where both spatial and temporal principles within their programmes are 
reversed. Yet precisely because the interventions are based on an antici-
patory logic, connecting prescriptions with outcomes becomes opaque. In 
turn, such opaqueness intersects with how pre-departure and pre-decision 
training blur legal and administrative entitlements with ideal-type migrant 
subjectivities. As the chapter will explicate, this contributes to a highly indi-
viduated behaviouralist discourse within safe migration activities which 
straddles well beyond pre-decision and pre-departure training.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, it explicates how a behavioural 
change discourses have become central within anti-trafficking and safe 
migration programme activities. Second, it traces how this discourse 
manifests itself through spatial reversals within pre-decision training and 
pre-departure training. Third, it considers other programmatic attempts 
that link behavioural change to spatial (beneficiary tracing) and structural 
dimensions (i.e. targeting employers) of labour migration.
From territorial governance to epistemological behaviourism
For years, awareness raising has remained a central component for UN 
agencies and NGOs who work with migrants. Yet, important changes 
have ensued since the advent of anti-trafficking programmes in the 1990s. 
Awareness raising within early anti-trafficking efforts in the Mekong region 
was situated within a broader community development agenda (Molland 
2012b; Thatun and Marshall 2005). By providing opportunities “at home,” 
it was argued, human trafficking was “prevented”: if aspiring migrants 
decided against migration, then no trafficking would occur. Awareness-
raising messages echoed this logic by emphasising the dangers of migra-
tion. Over the year, this approach was heavily critiqued by both academics 
and practitioners as ineffectual but also politically problematic as such 
interventions risked becoming unintended, extended arms of border con-
trol; something which was at odds with aid organisations’ claim of human 
rights approaches to migration.3 Yet, over the years, things changed. NGOs, 
UN agencies, and even governments acknowledged that the real empha-
sis ought not to be placed on whether people abstain from migration, but 
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how trafficking, exploitation, and other forms of problems can be mitigated 
through the migration process. The awareness-raising message changed 
from “don’t go” to “if you go, go safely” (Molland 2012b). During the 2000s, 
agencies recalibrated their programmes accordingly.
This change has both practical and theoretical significance as it alters 
the relationship between governance and space. It moves awareness rais-
ing away from territorial control. Rather than anchoring populations to 
territory (“don’t go”), it attempts to safeguard migration through mobil-
ity (“go safely”). Furthermore, although trafficking awareness raising has 
always been a technology of anticipation (as “prevention” is by necessity 
prior to the event), safe migration programmes have made awareness rais-
ing central in a double sense: in addition to constituting a central pillar of 
programme intervention (pre-decision training, pre-departure), safe migra-
tion information applies to all potential migrants (as opposed to particular 
“kinds” of migrants, i.e. migrants at risk of trafficking). Hence, safe migra-
tion awareness messages open a wider space for how migration governance 
is enacted as it transcends a governmental logic premised on spatial and 
territorial control. This is not to suggest that safe migration awareness rais-
ing is necessarily separate to activities under the auspices anti-trafficking. 
Indeed, as explicated in Chapter 2, anti-trafficking programmes were cen-
tral in popularising safe migration awareness raising throughout the 2000s. 
Agencies hired research, monitoring and evaluation consultants in order 
to carefully recalibrate how awareness raising could move beyond simplis-
tic “don’t migrate” messages towards a focus on safety in migration. As a 
result, agencies produced a range of training manuals in order to assist their 
awareness-raising efforts.
Perhaps, one of the most influential reports amongst agencies in the 
Mekong region at the time was a discussion paper supported by the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) which was a culmination of a series of work-
shops involving several UN agencies and migration partners. Re-Thinking 
Trafficking Prevention: A Guide to Applying Behaviour Theory starts off 
with a truism: “we cannot assume that increasing a person’s knowledge and 
understanding about a particular risk will lead them to take action to avoid 
that risk.” (Marshall 2011, 7). It then goes on to highlight several examples 
of how current awareness-raising approaches often fail to achieve desired 
outcomes by, for example, failing to acknowledge that:
It may also be the case that potential migrants understand the risks but 
are not able to access ways of reducing those risks. For example, there 
may be safer legal migration channels but these may be restrictive in 
terms of costs, time, or criteria in terms of age or qualifications.
(Marshall 2011, 8)
As such, the report hints at an acknowledgment of structural reasons 
for migrants’ vulnerably. Yet, the focus on “behaviour” remains central 
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throughout the document. For example, it suggests the following goal and 
activities under the auspices of potential safe migration activities:
Safe migration goal: Prospective migrants in District X take the follow-
ing steps below to protect themselves from exploitation:
1 Take a copy of the personal documentation of their recruiter and leave 
with a family member, village chief, or other trusted source;
2 Leave details with family member, village chief or other trusted source 
as to where they are going and who with;
3 Memorise a phone number they can call for assistance in the destina-
tion country; and
4 Talk to three other returned migrants for advice about protecting them-
selves during migration and at destination.
Eventually, specific targets and indicators can be set for this goal, such 
as increasing the proportion of prospective migrants who undertake at 
least three of the steps above.
(Marshall 2011, 14)
The specific activities suggested exemplifies how safe migration moves from 
territory (“stay where you are”/“don’t migrate”) to conduct: a set of iden-
tifiable actions that individuals ought to take through migration. As such, 
the report is – quite literally – a textbook example of what Xiang Biao has 
labelled epistemological behaviourism which:
treats migration as a behaviour distinct in itself, that is, a particular 
class of intentional human actions responsive to particular stimuli and 
constraints. Disparate human flows are thus imagined into a singular 
subject that can be analytically isolated.
(Xiang 2016, 669)
Such behaviouralist discourses are widespread in policy circles, and migra-
tion aid policy is no exception (see Killias 2010). UN agencies (ILO 2015a), 
NGOs (World Vision 2014), and even government bodies (Ministry of 
Labour and Social Welfare Laos n.d.) have produced a range of training 
manuals with similar behaviouralist assumptions and advice similar to the 
Re-Thinking Trafficking Prevention report. Although many of these initia-
tives, as evident in TPSMC’s leaflet described at the beginning of this chap-
ter, provide emphasis on documents (passports and work permits), others 
provide more emphasis on social dimensions of migration. World Visions’ 
Smart Navigator training manual, which I referred to in the introduction of 
this book, is exemplary of how it maps migrant behaviour through a check-




Answer these questions when you first start having discussions about 
moving to take a job outside your community. Discuss these questions 
with your family.
Information About Your Destination
Do you know where are you going?
If yes, write the name of the town here:
Do you know anyone who lives in the town to which you are going?
Do you have that person’s phone number?
Can you call that person to make a plan to meet when you arrive?
Information About the Journey
Do you know how you will return to your home country when the job 
finishes?
How much does the return trip cost? Write the amount here:
How much does it cost to live in the place you are going if you don’t 
get a job when you first arrive? Write the amount here:
Do you have enough money to live for a while when you first arrive 
and for the return trip?
(Remember, it is dangerous if you have to borrow money from the 
recruiter or employer to make the trip, or if you have to go into debt to 
pay a deposit to the recruiter. It is dangerous to arrive at a new job in 
debt to the recruiter or employer.)
Are you travelling with friends?
Information About the Job
Do you know anyone who has been hired through this person or a 
recruiter before?
Does the person who got a job sometimes come home to visit?
Does the person who got a job call his or her family?
Does this job sound like other jobs you have heard about?
Does it pay the same amount of money as other migration jobs you 
have heard about? (If it sounds too good to be true, it might be a lie.)
Can the person who is organising the job for you tell you the name of 
the company you will work for? Write it here:
Can the person tell you the address and phone number of the com-
pany? Write it here:
Can you look up the name and address of the company on the 
Internet?
Do you have a contract?
If you do not have a contract, have you discussed the conditions of 
your work?
Can you read and understand the whole contract?
Do you agree with everything the contract says?
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Documents
If you are going to another country, do you have a passport and a 
work visa for that country?
People to Contact
Will you bring a mobile phone with you so that you can contact your 
family when you are away?
Do you know an organisation or person to contact in the other town/
country – if something goes wrong and you need help and safety?
The more times you answer yes, the safer your plan is.
Both the Smart Navigator manual and Re-Thinking Trafficking Prevention 
report make it clear how safe migration goes beyond a focus on legal travel 
documents to emphasising the right kind of knowledge and relationships 
in migration. Hence, the social eclipses the legal. As will become evi-
dent, different agencies approach this differently, and it is not unusual for 
pre-departure training to emphasise state-centric dimension of migration 
(such as the importance of passports and utilising licensed recruitment 
agencies). Yet, advocating the use of, say, passports takes place within a 
discourse that aims to calibrate migrants’ dispositions. And it is here, the 
relevance of epistemic behaviourism is the key. On the one hand, training 
manuals seek to mould specific dispositions and behaviours through train-
ing accompanied by pre- and post-test of migrants’ “awareness” (more on 
this below, also see Chang 2018). Hence, recalibrating migrants’ behaviour 
is premised on a logic of verification in response to training sessions with 
clear panoptical characteristics (as we will see, pre-departure training com-
monly takes place in seminar rooms or village compounds).
Yet, at the same time, such manuals apply a tick-in-the-box approach to 
assessing safety in migration where either “….specific targets and indicators 
can be set for this goal, such as increasing the proportion of prospective 
migrants who undertake at least three of the steps above” (Marshall 2011, 
14), or “[t]he more times you answer yes, the safer your plan is” (World Vision 
2014, 14). The operational logic is not one of verification but one of profiling 
based on categorisation and ranking. This pushes safe migration awareness 
raising interventions towards what I have alluded to several times earlier 
in the book: governance premised on anticipation. Success can be assessed 
before migration commences. At the same time, migrants’ conduct replaces 
a governmental concern with territorial control. Hence, epistemological 
behaviouralism merges two theoretical themes that I canvassed in the intro-
duction of this book: disciplinary power and governmentality on the one hand 
and security, modulation, and simulation on the other hand. Furthermore, 
it is precisely safe migration behaviouralist discourse, expressed in manu-
als like Rethinking Trafficking Prevention and Smart Navigator, which 
brings together the various assemblages of safe migration interventions: the 
importance of legal documents (passports and work permits), migration 
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infrastructure (migrant networks, brokers, and recruitment agencies as facil-
itators for migration), and a range of support mechanisms (such as hotlines).
Yet, as social scientists are well aware, a recipe is not the same as food. One 
cannot deduce social practice from training manuals. Anthropological and 
sociological critiques of policy-orientated behaviouralist discourses are plen-
tiful, well-known, and point to several profound problems with their assump-
tions, including the tendency to confuse migrants’ behaviour with their social 
condition (Fassin 2017) and mistaking the prescriptive for the descriptive 
(Merry 2016; Neumann 2017). Despite the Re-Thinking Trafficking Prevention 
report placing considerable importance on how a “behavioural approach” 
will strengthen aid programmes monitoring, evaluation, and impact, it is easy 
to see how the report neither evidences nor explains how safety is meant to fol-
low from the recommendations the document provides. For example, whether 
migrants “[l]eave details with family member, village chief or other trusted 
source…[m]emorise a phone number they can call for assistance,” or “[t]alk to 
three other returned migrants for advice about protecting themselves during 
migration and at destination” (Marshall 2011, 14) do not show much in and of 
themselves (indeed, later chapters will explicate the precarity of such actions). 
Yet, before we even get to the question of efficacy of policy outcomes, the 
ethnographic question becomes this: how do aid agencies produce the kind of 
safety that their training manuals stipulate in specific settings?
Before pre-departure: Pre-Decision training
The Labour Migration Consortium (LMC) is a small local NGO that col-
laborates with Linda’s (see Chapter 2) safe migration programme. LMC is 
a key agency that operates in one of the Myanmar border areas. As their 
activities take place in village communities with high levels of out-migration 
to Thailand (and to a lesser extent Malaysia, Singapore, and even Japan), 
they are in practice curtailed by the kinds of interventions they can provide. 
Being based in a source community of migrants, LMC’s programmatic tar-
get – safe migration – is situated elsewhere, both spatially and temporally. 
Hence, in practice, their interventions are reduced to two things: target-
ing migrants with information prior to departure, coupled with attempts 
to connect returning migrants with local development objectives (typically 
related to migrant remittances). In this sense, LMC’s activities resemble 
TPSMC’s activities but in reverse: whereas TPSMC target migrants on their 
return back to Laos LMC ground their interventions in local villages with 
high levels of circular migration.
Today, it is the first part of LMC’s work – awareness raising for aspiring 
migrants – which takes prominence. LMC had prepared the event in con-
sultation with a cluster of villages in a local district. In order to ease access 
for participants from several villagers, the event is held at a local temple. 
Around 30 participants between 19 and 32 years of age are in attendance 
that day. MLC staff seem well-prepared. They have structured the work-
shop into several modules, which are all designed to aid aspiring migrants 
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in terms of their migration decision-making. The modules comprise a vari-
ation of advice on laws and regulations (pros and cons of migrating legally 
or illegally; how to migrate through licensed recruitment agencies; human 
rights and labour law), the importance of social relations in migration in 
order to mitigate risk (i.e. whether you have friends or relatives who are 
migrants and how to stay in touch with friends and family during migra-
tion), as well as various sessions on practicalities relating to migration (cul-
tural etiquette in a foreign country) and saving strategies in order to remit 
money. In other words, the awareness raising resembles the kind of training 
manuals previously described in this chapter. As the training proceeds, the 
organisers allow considerable scope for attendees input, no doubt inspired 
by participatory methodologies that remain popular amongst aid agencies.
Participation comes most to light in the use of role-play where the organ-
isers are able to engage participants in possible migration scenarios in order 
to strengthen aspiring migrants’ decision making. One role-play exercise 
includes a daughter and her family’s deliberation regarding whether she 
should migrate to Thailand for work to support the family. The role play 
commences with a humorous spin. “Don’t go” the aspiring migrants’ older 
“sister” exclaims, as “you will end up marrying another man” (laughter). “I 
will send money home” the aspiring migrant replies. “I can trust you - we 
know each other” the “mother” adds. “When I come back, I want to open 
a clothing shop.” After some further deliberations regarding the possible 
positive and negative aspects of migration, the mother says: “Ok you go. 
We need to investigate further about how to migrate.” Subsequent to the 
role play, participants are asked to cross-check the role-play story against a 
checklist for migration decision making, which includes:
• Who will migrate?
• Impact on the ones left behind.
• Domestic or international migration.
• How much you know about the place you want to migrate (including 
whether you have any family members or friends present at destination 
point that can potentially help you)?
• What kind of job?
• Match your skills.
• What skill gain? [sic]
• How much money to send (remittances)?
• How to communicate with family members?
• What to do with money you send home?
• How much cost to migrate?
• What you hope to gain from migration?
The organisers then go through how the participants matched the role-play 
story against the check list. The more complete answer under each question, 
the more informed the migration is likely to become, LMC staff explain.
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The participants appear genuinely enthusiastic about the training. Yet, 
as the day progresses, several dissonances become evident. The training is, 
as is common in aid, formulaic. Participants are advised that when working 
in foreign countries, the working day should not exceed eight hours without 
overtime. If this is breached, the employer can be taken to court, one of the 
organisers alleges. Although the training session considers the possibility 
that some migrants may prefer unlicensed, extra-legal migration (in part due 
to the low cost), this is quickly side-parked, instead providing ample space 
for elevating formal, legal migration – through state-sanctioned recruitment 
agencies – as the preferred migration pathway. “What is good about going the 
legal way,” one of the organisers asks before answering her own question: “you 
will get full labour rights and full salary.” Such advice is provided despite the 
fact that both implementers and participants reveal to me through informal 
conversations over tea breaks and lunch that they are well aware of ongo-
ing reports (either through social media or returning migrants) on violation 
of migrants’ rights, including serious abuse and malpractice within formal, 
legal, state-sanctioned recruitment chains. As I learned later in the after-
noon, nearly all the participants followed Migrants Assist Migrants (MAM) 
on Facebook, which is one of the most prominent migrant self-help groups in 
Thailand, which includes daily updates on various abuse of migrants which 
often takes place regardless of migrants’ legal status (see Chapters 5 and 9).
After the lunch break, space is provided for an informal discussion with 
the participants about migration. I was curious how the aspiring migrants 
would find jobs abroad, given the advice that had been given through the 
training thus far. One man in his twenties tells the group that he has already 
undertaken the pre-departure training offered by a recruitment agency in 
Yangon and is awaiting his placement. Several other migrants are already 
well ahead with initiating their migration. Three young women have already 
paid huge amounts, around 2000 USD, to a broker whom we later learned is 
a Monk. The pious broker had promised secure passage to work in Malaysia 
as domestic workers. Visibly shocked by hearing this troubling news, Ma 
Thida, one of the MLC’s managers, queried whether the broker provided 
any receipt. The three young women confirmed that no receipt had been 
given. This led to a general discussion on brokers.
Similar stories emerged the next day in training session in an adjacent vil-
lage. A group of participants claimed that their key conduits for migration 
was through “friends,” though later on it became clear that brokers were also 
central to participants’ migration plans. They had paid brokers upfront fees 
but had then not heard anything. They had waited for three months. They 
were effectively stranded in the village. The problem with unscrupulous bro-
kers was an immediate problem for both the aspiring migrants as well as Ma 
Thida and MLC. Ma Thida told me that although they had good experience 
with the authorities dealing with malpractice amongst licensed recruitment 
representatives (which she alleged was now less of a problem), no immediate 
strategy was available to them in tackling unlicensed brokers who fleeced 
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migrants for money. As no receipt was provided, it was nearly impossible for 
MLC to act on the case, Ma Thida told me. Hence, the distinction between 
licensed recruitment agencies and unlicensed brokers was essential in this 
context. Yet, as Ma Thida explained to me, this point was hard to get across 
to MLC’s target communities. Although the distinction between a recruit-
ment agency and a broker (boisa) is easily understood in Burmese, this dis-
tinction is not recognised in the local vernacular (Shan and Pa’O).4
The training progressed. At the end of the day, the participants are asked 
to again fill out the pre- and post-test survey in order to measure partici-
pants’ awareness of migration in light of the training. Echoing the train-
ing itself, the survey questions are strongly skewed towards legal migration 
channels through the formal bilateral MOU system as the preferred migra-
tion pathway.5 Then, flipcharts are used for participants’ feedback. No 
doubt the semi-public nature of the evaluation contributed to a certain 
courtesy bias. All participants rated the training as “good.”
Pre-decision: Four paradoxes
The pre-decision awareness raising I describe here constitutes one out of 
numerous safe-migration-related interventions that are implemented by 
NGOs, UN agencies, and governments in the Mekong region under the 
auspices of either pre-decision, pre-departure, or post-arrival training. 
Throughout my fieldwork, I was able to observe similar sessions in a range 
of locations, including Mon State, Shan State, Mandalay, Nong Khai, and 
Mukdahan.6 I will return to the several of the dynamics relating to these 
initiatives in later chapters. For now, I elucidate four paradoxes that such 
training presents.
First, formal programme logic suggests a chronological sequence: 
pre-decision training is meant to precede pre-departure training. Whereas 
the former is intended to provide migrants with an informed ability to 
decide whether they should migrate, the latter is meant to target migrants 
who already have made their decision regarding migration. Yet, dur-
ing MLC’s training, it becomes evident that several participants have 
already undertaken pre-departure training. This reversed sequence can be 
explained in light of the fact that MLC’s bureaucratic logic (which is partly 
imposed by the international organisation that funds them) works against 
any chronologic sequencing of their pre-decision training. Although the 
training is meant to offer a neutral platform for local villagers to consider 
the pros and cons of migration, the programme has (due to donor pressure) 
targets for training attendance. Hence, the training resembles preaching 
to converts as it is easier to mobilise participants who already are geared 
towards migrating. Hence, several of the participants attend the training 
while passing time awaiting news from either their broker or recruitment 
agency. As such, several participants are deep into the migration plan-
ning process where many of them have already signed up with recruitment 
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agencies. In contrast to a formal programmatic objective of a chronologi-
cal process (pre-decision, pre-departure, departure, etc.), migration prac-
tices precede decisions.
Second, such temporal reversals relate to a spatial challenge. Although 
this intervention places specific focus on migration to Thailand, some of the 
aspiring migrants are destined for elsewhere: Malaysia, Singapore, South 
Korea, and Japan. Despite a formal discourse of connectedness, which is 
evident in the Global Compact on Migration (United Nations 2019, 10), 
where pre-decision and pre-departure training are meant to be linked to 
post-arrival training and other support services in migrants destinations, 
such connectedness remained a programmatic fantasy which only exists in 
training manuals and aid reports, and had little relevance to the specific 
circumstances of MLC’s pre-decision training.
Third, although the formal training focuses on regulation and law (the 
importance of passports, work permits, health insurance, etc.), once par-
ticipants and MLC engage in informal conversations regarding migration, 
the discussion gravitates towards the question of brokers and social connec-
tions in migration. The importance of connections through friends and how 
to trust – and deal with “good” and “bad” brokers – dominate discussions. 
Hence, although the training content gives priority to how legal status is 
achieved (e.g. how to obtain documents), conversations move from the legal 
to the social and relational.
Fourth, MLC’s pre-decision training raises broader questions regarding 
programme efficacy and the reproduction of programme activities. What 
exactly did the training achieve? Some 30 people received information 
on pre-decision migration yet without any clear way of knowing whether 
this information would indeed result in safety for the aspiring migrants. 
Echoing the training manuals discussed above, safe migration decisions are 
assessed through categorisations expressed through checklists and pre- and 
post-test questionnaires (as opposed to any means of verification of actual 
migration outcomes). Prescriptive advice (e.g. utilising licensed agencies) is 
privileged, whereas context-specific problems are unaddressed (e.g. how to 
address unscrupulous, local brokers; the widespread social media report-
ing on malpractice within legal migration pathways). Furthermore, the 
fact that several migrants already have either made decisions or engaged in 
migration processes even before the training, the whole exercise is by its own 
logic partly redundant. Furthermore, some participants have already lost 
significant amounts of money due to unscrupulous brokers. Migration had 
become “unsafe” even before commencing. Yet, MLC has no obvious way 
to deal with the situation. Despite the tragicomic nature of such situations, 
this does not bring the programme to a halt. Indeed, the participants ranked 
the training as a success (which in turn will be reported back to MLC’s main 
donor and collaborator: Linda’s safe migration project). As such, the train-
ing is a world onto itself. Both the implementation and evaluation of the 
training session unfold regardless of the context where it takes place.
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Pre-decision training sessions like the one I here describe underscores 
how aid implementation does not depend on the translation of policies into 
outcomes (Mosse 2005a). At the same time, several temporal inversions take 
place. As an act of programmatic bad faith, attention to specific context of 
migrants’ life worlds becomes opaque. Yet, this is not to suggest that aid 
agencies do not attempt to overcome the kind of spatial and temporal chal-
lenges involved in tracking migrants’ well-being through migration. One 
strategy which attempts to address this is beneficiary tracing.
Beneficiary tracing
Several aid programmes have taken up beneficiary training in order to 
determine migration outcomes in light of pre-departure training and coun-
selling. An ILO report explains its rationale thus:
One of the main support services provided to potential migrant workers 
in countries of origin is safe migration counselling. A central objective 
of this counselling is to provide potential migrants …with the ability 
to make informed decisions about working abroad, and to emphasise 
the benefits and increase knowledge about the procedures for migrat-
ing through legal channels for those who choose to go…To assess that 
impact, several MRCs have begun tracing counselling beneficiaries 
through follow-up phone calls [which] seeks to determine the extent to 
which the services provided contributed to those behaviours – rather 
than other external forces, events or actors… The approach is designed 
to capture both the intended results (informed decision-making about 
migrating for work, increased knowledge about how to migrate safely, 
and better protection of rights in destination countries) and unintended 
results (counselling that convinces beneficiaries that labour migration 
is profitable without informing them of the potential risks involved or 
migrants facing abuse in spite of using a licensed recruitment agency 
to migrate regularly). The information obtained should also be used 
to provide follow-up services to migrants and adjust the approach to 
service provision where indicated.
(ILO 2014a, 12)
Hence, through follow-up calls subsequent to pre-departure training 
or counselling, NGOs and MRCs are able to assess migration outcomes 
through beneficiary tracing. As the activity is based on a phone call, inter-
ventions can potentially be scaled up considerably as they sidestep logistical 
constrains relating to physical co-presence. Beneficiary tracing echoes cer-
tain characteristics that we identified above regarding training manuals. On 
the one hand, beneficiary tracing objectifies migration outcomes through 
verification (through follow-up phone calls). Hence, for individual migrant 
cases, beneficiary tracing is reactive. At the same time, scaling up beneficiary 
Departures 73
tracing allows aid agencies to prospectively assess migration outcomes based 
on an ex post facto aggregate (i.e. X% of migrants report positive experience 
utilising a licensed recruitment agency). As such, it resembles how insur-
ance companies project risk and premiums, and embodies the analytical 
distinction between discipline and security as discussed in Chapter 1. As 
such, beneficiary tracing comprises de-territorial interventions (the where-
abouts of migrants are irrelevant to the intervention) where efficacy of safe 
migration awareness raising and counselling combines chronological verifi-
cation, with prognostic assessment based on aggregates.
Yet, in practice, the uptake of beneficiary tracing appears piecemeal and 
limited for a range of reasons. One constraint is practical. As migrants need to 
change SIM cards when crossing international borders, it limits programmes’ 
ability to reach beneficiaries as migrants’ phone numbers in destination coun-
try may not be known prior to migration. It is curious why programmes have 
not given more thought to the possibility of requesting social media contacts 
(such as WhatsApp and Line) as they are ubiquitously used by migrants and 
do not depend on country-specific SIM cards (see Chapters 7 and 9). Another 
limitation is political. Following up with outbound migrants is not only time 
consuming but also requires migrants’ consent. As state officials are often 
involved in pre-departure training, migrants may be less inclined agreeing 
to have state officials scrutinise their whereabouts. Given the authoritarian 
political legacies of migrant source countries, such as Laos and Myanmar, 
one should not underestimate the serious implications this has for how 
migrants (dis)engage such processes. For example, Lao authorities have for 
years both fined and confined returning migrants who officials believe have 
breached migration regulations. This point is even recognised by aid agen-
cies. For example, one of the ILO’s evaluation reports makes the following 
observation regarding beneficiary tracing amongst Vietnamese migrants:
While the findings are very encouraging, the potential response bias 
should also be considered. Government officials contacting migrants 
to ask questions regarding recruitment agencies – to whom they often 
have well-established linkages – as well as requesting information about 
behaviours that violate Vietnamese law, mean that the high response 
rates related to the use of regular channels must be qualified somewhat. 
Further data collection by an objective and non-duty bearing research 
institution during the end-line survey will provide a clearer picture of 
the impact of the safe migration counselling provided.
(ILO 2014c, 100)
Possible reactive responses where one cannot distinguish migrants’ defer-
ence to authorities from actual migration outcomes are a recognised prob-
lem within beneficiary tracing. This self-critique also brings attention to 
how migration governance, and the various modes of objectification it 
entails, are mediated through social actors (such as state officials), which 
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has important bearings on how encounters between safe migration interven-
tions and migrants produce certain kinds of knowledges and practices. This 
point is brought to light by considering a third approach that has become 
popular in relation to pre-departure training and behavioural change dis-
courses: safe migration awareness-raising videos.
“Know before you go”
The consolidation of pre-departure and pre-decision training has emerged 
alongside an increasing “tech utopia” within the aid sector. Digital tech-
nologies, social media, and online media content have become part of aid 
programme activities (see Bernstein 2016). As such, the safe migration sec-
tor exemplifies how data doxa (Smith 2018) intersect with humanitarian and 
emancipatory projects. The considerable increase in social media and smart-
phone use (even amongst poor migrant workers) makes such interventions 
an attractive proposition. UN agencies and several NGOs have been on the 
forefront in developing various social media apps, ranging from assisting 
with the identification of trafficking victims to crowd-sourced rankings of 
labour migrants’ employers resembling TripAdvisor.
Perhaps, more dominant is the production of video content. IOM has been 
at the forefront of this trend, with its own dedicated programme – IOMx – 
which produces safe migration awareness-raising material on a broad scale.7 
As with beneficiary tracing, such interventions are appealing due to their 
de-territorial quality, although – as will become evident in Chapter 9 – UN 
agencies and NGOs social media presence is easily dwarfed by migrant self-
help groups’ social media use. Videos are also transposable as they can eas-
ily be employed within programme activities. During fieldwork, I observed 
both ILO and IOM videos being employed by other aid agencies and even 
government departments within the context of pre-decision, pre-departure, 
and post-arrival training sessions. Awareness-raising videos also share tem-
poral qualities with beneficiary tracing in how they connect the past and 
future. On the one hand, they are meant to shape migrants’ conduct (thereby 
being future orientated) while at the same time being grounded in migrants’ 
real-life worlds (which connects to past action).8 As such, they are models for 
and of reality and can therefore be thought of in terms of simulation.
Throughout fieldwork, I had several opportunities to speak to migrants 
regarding such videos. One afternoon, my research assistant and I visited a 
group of Lao migrants at the outskirts of Bangkok. We were initially intro-
duced to the migrants through an outreach worker related to a domestic 
worker project. Sai, Lanh, Phou, and Chan all come from southern parts of 
Laos. Although the initially claim to have been in Thailand for only two–
three years, as conversations progressed, it turns out that some of them had 
been in Thailand for much longer than that. Sai, now aged 32, arrived in 
Thailand as a domestic worker when she was 13. The others had been in 
Thailand for around five–six years.
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Initially arriving in Thailand as undocumented migrants with the assis-
tance of friends and acquaintances, they have in later years been able to 
obtain legal documents. The transition from an undocumented to docu-
mented status is in part due to the fact that the Thai government is becoming 
increasingly insistent on migrants holding legal documents, they tell me. In 
addition, obtaining passports in Laos has become much easier and cheaper 
than in the past. They all relied on brokers in order to obtain a passport.
Despite this similarity in legal status, only Phou holds a work permit. The 
rest of them are technically in Thailand as tourists without any work per-
mit. This means that they cannot be too choosy with work, Lanh explains, 
as many employers are now reluctant employing workers without work per-
mits. Yet, despite holding a work permit, Phou is not necessarily better off 
than the other women. During our conversation, it becomes clear that the 
cost of the work permit is simply passed onto Phou, which challenges com-
mon claims relating to the potential advantages of holding legal status.
After a while, I ask if they would be ok with me showing them a video on 
my phone made by an organisation that helps migrants.9 I tell them that I 
am interested in hearing their views and thoughts about the video. Once the 
6-minute video animation is complete, we discuss its contents. The video 
resembles awareness-raising content described earlier in the chapter: along-
side the importance of legal documents, the importance of going through 
licensed recruitment agencies, consulting friends and knowing how to seek 
help is emphasised. Initially, Sai, Lanh, Phou, and Chan express affirming 
responses. “The video tells us how to migrate the right way,” Lanh says. “It 
tells us what we should do when we go to another country” Phou adds. Chan 
suggests it is helpful that the video provides phone numbers that migrants 
can call.
After further discussion, I point out to them that although they all allege 
the video provides useful information for migrants, they had not done any-
thing of what the video recommends. None of them had gone through the 
formal bilateral labour channels between Laos and Thailand, nor had they 
utilised formal recruitment agencies.10 To the contrary, they had engaged 
in practices (such as relying on brokers) which the video warns against. 
Although they had over time obtained passports, all but one of them did 
not possess a work permit. Furthermore, although they all expressed use-
fulness regarding hotlines numbers, none of them knew of anyone who had 
requested assistance in this way.
The conversation shifts towards reflecting on the differences between the 
video and how they had themselves migrated. Recruitment agencies are 
expensive, they said. Furthermore, going through formal channels makes it 
difficult to change employers, a fact that they had learned through friends. 
Lanh alleges that in such cases you could change jobs, but this would incur 
a huge informal fee that is typically paid back through monthly deduction 
from your salary. They also have heard of migrants who have ended up with 
no salary even when they went through requirement agencies. Obtaining 
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a work permit is prohibitively expensive. It would cost 20,000 Baht (646 
USD) to change their status from a tourist visa to a work permit. Phou, who 
had obtained a work permit, was still being charged deductions from the 
employer who simply passed the work permit cost onto her.
The conversation with Sai, Lanh, Phou, and Chan encapsulates a central 
problem that Robert identified for us in Chapter 2: the difficulty for migrants 
to act on awareness-raising messages, a point that has also been noted in 
recent commissioned research on safe migration (Kiss and Zimmerman 
2019). Awareness-raising material, in the forms of videos and pre-departure 
interventions, assumes safe migration can be invested in migrants’ individ-
ual behaviour. However, several social and structural forces work against 
this. In other words, the behaviouralist discourses that underpin these 
interventions contribute to masking the situated contexts of migrants. How 
would Sai, Lanh, Phou, and Chan respond to a beneficiary tracing phone 
call from an MRC in Laos? The initial response they gave me reveals inter-
locutors can readily allege support for one kind of behaviour when asked 
(e.g. going through a recruitment agency) whilst not doing so in practice. 
The fact that verbal utterances do not reflect actual behaviour is a truism 
for social scientists (Jerolmack and Khan 2014). Yet, what is of importance 
in this context is to appreciate how such encounters produce two effects: it 
allows safe migration interventions, in the form of awareness-raising vid-
eos and beneficiary tracing, to produce data that confirms their models of 
intervention (which in turn contributes to producing “success”) whilst at the 
same time obfuscating any serious attention to how migrants have to navi-
gate assistance relating to labour abuse (a theme we will explore in greater 
detail in later chapters). These dynamics are also apparent in cases where 
safe migration programmes attempt to move beyond an individuated focus 
on migrants in how they attempt to target behaviours that result in exploita-
tion of migrants.
Behavioural change: Beyond migrants
The behavioural change models within pre-departure training discussed 
so far target migrants, thereby ignoring wider societal constellation of 
forces that contribute to migrants’ precarity. Such criticisms are partially 
acknowledged within the safe migration sector, witnessed by programmatic 
efforts to address this shortcoming. One such example is professionally pro-
duced short films that are meant to target employers of domestic workers, 
thereby contributing to broader social changes in attitudes and treatment of 
migrant workers.
Open Doors is a three-part short film series depicting encounters between 
middle- and upper-class families and their live-in domestic workers from 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. The Thai segment (IOMx 2016b) 
depicts a widowed well-healed businessman, Krit, and his relations with his 
Burmese domestic worker, Fon, who also has nanny duties for Krit’s child. 
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The film portrays Fon’s daily struggles as she is not allowed a day off which 
makes it a real struggle for her to attend to a sick relative. One day, these 
pressures cause Fon to be late picking up Krit’s child from school, which 
results in conflict between Krit and Fon. However, Krit is himself under 
enormous pressure at work, which ultimately leads him to reflect on his own 
role as Fon’s employer. In the end, he allows Fon one day off work.
The film is professionally produced, with convincing acting. The choice 
of focusing on a widowed man, I learned in an interview with one of the 
films’ sponsors, was in part to depict a modern, urban Thai family context 
where traditional gender patterns are starting to change. The video has been 
a central part of the IOMx’ awareness-raising campaign. As with the film 
script, audience impact of the video has also been, similarly to the examples 
discussed above, pre- and post-tested with the use of Knowledge, Attitude, 
and intended Practice (KAP) impact assessment tools distributed through 
online platforms to employers of domestic workers (IOMx 2016a). The tool 
produces a KAP index which is meant to map behavioural change based on 
a pre- and post-survey. The findings of the KAP index survey are explained 
thus: “The objective of the video was to raise awareness of live-in domestic 
worker exploitation and encourage employers of domestic workers to adopt 
practices to reduce exploitation (such as providing one day off per week).” 
(IOMx 2016a, 1) The findings from the survey were positive: “87% of viewers 
processed the messages of Open Doors. This means that it was interesting 
and they learned something new of which 46% said they would speak to 
others about the issue.” (IOMx 2016a, 2) Hence, the KAP survey contributes 
to legitimating the video production as a successful awareness-raising inter-
vention targeting employers of domestic workers.
But, how and why would employers change their perceptions of domestic 
workers, resulting in allowing one day off per week, based on the Opening 
Doors video? Researching employers of domestic workers poses a range of 
methodological challenges (in part due to inaccessibility), yet during my 
fieldwork, I interviewed five urban Thai families, whom all employ domestic 
workers, regarding the video. Furthermore, I also had the opportunity to 
discuss the video with a range of migrant domestic workers during fieldwork.
Urai, a well-healed Thai lady, with a cosmopolitan disposition (due to 
her considerable international travel experience) appreciated the profes-
sional production of the video. Although the acting, in her view, was con-
vincing, she expressed doubts regarding the video’s communicative impact 
amongst ordinary urban Thais. “It’s too western” she said, pointing to the 
atypical nature of a male being in charge of managing a domestic worker. 
Urai qualms regarding this choice of script was echoed by Supa, who has 
employed both Burmese and Lao domestic workers for years. When I asked 
Supa what she thought was the films’ main message, she replied “do never 
let a husband be in charge of managing a maid!” In effect, Supa misinter-
preted the video through the same traditional gendered lens that the video 
was (in part) attempting to challenge. For Supa, the broader point of the 
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film (i.e. allowing the maid a day off) was turned on its head: it exempli-
fied a failure in managing domestic workers, which did not conform with 
traditional Thai gender roles. Drawing attention to Supa’s response is not 
to poke fun at how awareness-raising messages become mistranslated. The 
broader point is that KAP surveys like these cannot grasp either the con-
text of respondents’ answers, let alone reasons behind attitudes, beliefs, and 
behaviours (for extensive critiques of KAP surveys, see Good 2010; Pelto 
and Pelto 1997; Size 2009). The way the video is attempting to communicate 
the importance of allowing one day off also comes with tacit assumptions 
regarding the temporal nature of housework, something that surfaced in 
conversations with domestic workers.
In contrast to employers (who all claimed that the language used by the 
employer in the video was much harsher compared to reality), domestic 
workers I spoke with at U Ba Sein’s language school (see Chapter 1) con-
sidered the interactions between the employer and the maid to be much 
less grim compared to their own circumstances. Ma Mya Moe, a domestic 
worker from Myanmar, immediately understood the point about advocat-
ing for one day off. “But this is not how it works in practice,” she alleged. 
Ma Mya Moe herself was in the situation of being allowed a day off (hence, 
her ability to attend U Ba Sein’s language school). Yet, this did not translate 
into a reduction in workload. Instead, she was simply expected to catch up 
on the missed work before and after leaving for school. For her, Sundays – 
despite being formally a day off – was a gruelling back-breaking day of 
labour requiring her to get up extra early and go to bed extremely late in 
order to make time to attend school. Ma Mya Moe highlights an important 
point about domestic work in a Thai context that seems to have been com-
pletely lost on the producers of Open Doors: housework is not defined by 
calendrical time (as assumed in the film) but a notion of a moral economy 
around time-use. For domestic workers like Ma Mya Moe, “a day off work” 
is simply a reorganisation of arduous labour. Despite the film attempting to 
move beyond an individuated focus on migrants’ (e.g. pre-departure train-
ing) to target wider, societal attitudes towards migrants (in order to improve 
structural discrimination against domestic workers), it ends up producing 
the same behaviouralist discourse explicated earlier in the chapter, but 
without recognising its own mistranslations. The film’s producers consider 
it a success regardless of what Ma Mya, Uraj, and Supa may think or do.
Conclusion
This chapter has explored how epistemological behaviouralism has man-
ifested itself across a range of safe migration interventions including 
pre-departure training, awareness raising, beneficiary tracing as well as 
broader awareness raising attempting to move beyond an individuated focus 
on migrants (by targeting employers). We have seen how these interven-
tions engage an anticipatory logic (where efficacy of interventions is partly 
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assessed in advance of interventions) which tends to be positivist in orien-
tation (i.e. epistemological behaviouralism). This contributes to a form of 
institutional bad faith where interventions can carry on, even being judged 
as successful, while migration praxis is made opaque despite a program-
matic allegiance to generate “behavioural change.” As later chapters will 
show, such obfuscation has real implications – not only that it obscures the 
efficacy of policy interventions – but it also enables transposing culpability 
away from the state and employers, thereby making migrants blameable for 
their own despondency. In order to appreciate how this comes about, we 
need to consider state-centric dimensions of pre-departure and pre-decision 
training of migrants, that is, the insistence on documents and legal migra-
tion pathways. Chapter 5 will explore this dimension of migration manage-
ment in great detail.
Notes
 1. The victim identification process is curious. We were allowed to sit within ear-
shot of some of the interviews and could hear the questions listed on the form 
being read out. The included the migrant’s name, home address, basic infor-
mation about their migration to Thailand (which routes), kind of employ-
ment they had in Thailand, whether they got paid while employed, and what 
types of assistances they are looking for. We were told that this was part of 
a pre-screening process for identifying trafficking victims. I asked the NGO 
how they could possibly get any clues about trafficking from such generic 
questions. They said that sometimes they would also look for other signs, such 
as whether women were wearing revealing clothes as this could be a sign of 
working in prostitution. A similar blurring between sex work and assumed 
trafficking vulnerability has been thoughtfully critiqued in the Australian 
context (Ham et al. 2013).
 2. Pre-departure training in Laos is complicated for several reasons. First, 
due to the authoritative political context, many NGOs have difficulties with 
permissions allowing sustained access to village communities with aware-
ness raising. This point was confirmed to me several times throughout field-
work from aid workers. Second, although TPSMC had attempted to provide 
safe migration awareness raising and distribution of leaflets to outbound 
migrants on the Lao side, this was for similar reasons curtailed and lim-
ited in practice. Third, cross-border migration to Thailand spans a range of 
formal and informal border crossings making it difficult to target migrants 
during departure.
 3. It must also be noted that the reason several organisations implemented such 
activities was not necessarily that they believed they were right, but that they 
operated within a political conservative context which made more progressive 
awareness raising messages difficult.
 4. It is worth noting that ethnicity also has bearing on how local people seek 
assistance. Ma Thida, who is herself member of one of the local ethnic groups, 
told me that many local people do not have the confidence to approach gov-
ernment officials, who are typically ethnic Burmese, with their problems (such 
as fraudulent brokers) due to a historical legacy of ethnic conflict. Teachers 
too are typically Burmese and school curriculum is in Burmese language. In 
this sense, MLC arguably serves as an important intermediary in how they 
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provided a conduit for migrants to facilitate their migration. For example, 
during my visit I personally observed villagers who had attended MLC’s 
training visiting MLC’s office in order to obtain assistance with passport 
applications.
 5. For example, the survey asks the following leadings questions regarding 
migration pathways:
  Please explain the good benefits of legal migration.
• Safe and secure travel to the country of destination.
•  Can receive full employment benefits and rights as per the law of the desti-
nation country.
• Can travel and move independently in the destination country.
•  The possibility for becoming a victim of trafficking and labour exploitation 
is low.
• Can avoid being arrested or repatriated by the destination country.
•  When the employment term is expired, you can safely return back to the 
country of origin.
 6. The training content within both government-led pre-departure and 
post-arrival training as well as NGO- and UN-led pre-decision and pre- 
departure training are surprisingly similar. They all focus on labour law, how 
passports and documents can be obtained and the various entitlements and 
obligations that comes with them. Although government-led training gives 
more emphasis to the regulatory dimensions of migration (alongside cultural 
etiquette), NGO and UN training tends to cover more ground in terms of 
social relations in migration (e.g., the pros and cons migrating with licenses 
and unlicensed recruiters and friends).
 7. As with many other agencies, IOMx emanates from anti-trafficking interven-
tions, under an earlier partnership with MTV Asia.
 8. Awareness raising videos are typically either based on documented cases 
or engage pre-testing (through focus groups or other methods) in order to 
achieve a sense of social realism. Some examples: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=Ay39-h1kbDo
 9. The video can be accessed here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
kHPSU8a9Gyg
 10. With the exception of Sai, all have migrated to Thailand after the implementa-
tion of both the MOU and the establishment of licenses recruitment agencies 
(Huijsmans and Phouxay 2008).
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1 Requesting Migrant Employment quotas for the employers
2 Processing Passports for the migrants by getting letters of attorney 
from the employers
3 Getting Visa for the new Passport/CI books
4 Processing (transfer) Work Permit from Pink cards to Passports/CI 
books
5 Getting Re-Entry seals for migrants who visits home
6 Extension of old visa
7 Getting 90 days presence seals
(Broker lists his various document processing services)
Introduction
The previous chapter revealed how documents (passports, border passes, 
visas, and work permits) are central to a behaviouralist discourse within 
safe migration awareness raising and pre-departure training. Yet, legal 
documents go beyond a question of migrants’ conduct as they confer spe-
cific rights and obligations that are meant to ensure safety. Passports and 
work permits do not merely provide migrants with an entitlement to reside 
and work in a host country for a certain time; in principle (though not 
always in practice), they also instil migrants with legal entitlements under 
the Thai labour law (e.g. minimum wage, stipulated work hours) and con-
duits for redress against various forms of malpractice (e.g. underpayment, 
exploitative work conditions). At the same time, formalising labour migra-
tion (which is premised on mapping of biometric data) complements the 
state’s security concerns as it enhances legibility of migrant populations. 
As such, passports and work permits directly connect migrants with for-
mal authorities in a way which makes it possible to think of safety from 
the point of view of the state. Whereas the previous chapter demonstrated 
how a behaviouralist discourse within safe migration awareness rais-
ing decontextualises labour migration praxis, this chapters explores how 
state-sanctioned migration pathways produce abstracted legibility through 
State-centric safety and 
biometric economies
Documents and recruitment chains
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biometric documentation (passports, work permits) which at the same time 
heavily depends on an economy of informality (i.e. brokerage). This, in 
turn, reinforces another central characteristic that we canvassed in the pre-
vious chapter: spatio-temporal reversals.
Legal documents have become central to government-led interventions 
relating to labour migration in the Mekong region. As in other parts of 
the world (GMG 2010; Xiang 2012), this process involves licensed recruit-
ment agencies that play a central part in the operationalisation of legal 
labour migration flows. This chapter interrogates how Mekong govern-
ments attempt to achieve safe migration though formalisation (passports, 
visas, and work permits) and the regulation of labour recruitment chains. 
Furthermore, the chapter examines various crises that transpire within 
such regulatory mechanisms. More specifically, this includes how govern-
ments seek to curb extra-legal brokering practices within licensed recruit-
ment agency schemes. Yet, as this chapter will demonstrate, attempts 
to root out intermediaries tend to result in its opposite: proliferation 
of brokers.
Safety, documents, and the state
Anthropological literature on the state has widely documented how gov-
ernance and statecraft comprise totalising aspirations coupled with pro-
cesses of simplification. A range of social theorists, commonly drawing on 
the intellectual legacy of Michel Foucault and James Scott, point to what 
Trouillot calls the legibility effect. Through processes of simplifications, 
populations are objectified and made governable “through the subjects they 
help to produce” (Trouillot 2001, 132). This way, governance both totalises 
and individuates. A central spatio-political arena where this takes place 
pertains to border control and migration governance.
Although migration governance relates to spatial control of populations 
(i.e. who are permitted to cross territorial boundaries?) it is important 
to recognise that border control is just as much a question of identity. In 
Melancholy Order (2008), Adam McKeown traces the historical emergence 
of regulatory migration regimes where state-sanctioned systems for identify 
verification replaces localised emic categories of ascription:
Identity became less a function of who one knew or could claim as a 
relative than of the ability to fulfil carefully defined categories of fam-
ily, status, occupation, nationality, and race. This helped create actual 
migration patterns that more closely approximated the ideal of free 
migrants making independent choices to better their own lives and that 
of their families. Individuals and their families even came to be seen 
as the natural units of migration that existed prior to rather than as 
a product of regulation. Regulations then claimed to select and pro-
tect these free individual migrants from the abuses of private interests. 
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Increased regulation could thus be presented as a means of fulfilling 
rather than impinging on free movement and individual rights.
(McKeown 2008, 11)
In this way, regulation of migration is intimately connected to the emer-
gence of a liberal understanding of a free migrant (McKeown 2008). Agents 
of regulation become instruments for emancipation. This logic is easily rec-
ognised within the context of border control and biometrics. Border control 
is ultimately underpinned by a logic of detection and sorting. Allowing or 
refusing entry is premised on who you are. As such, border control is a filter-
ing system which is aimed at allowing passage of the right kind of migrants 
and blocking “undesirables.” Crucially, undesirables are not limited to 
unwanted migrants, but also unsavoury aspects of migration infrastructure: 
unscrupulous brokers, fraudulent passports, people smugglers, and traffick-
ers (Feldman 2011b). This is why both government agencies and even some 
humanitarian NGOs argue that biometric technologies in border control 
constitutes a form of protection for migrants (Jacobsen 2017; Stenum 2017). 
Furthermore, migration regimes are not merely a question of border control 
(i.e. who are allowed passage), but a how migration status mediates bun-
dles of rights and entitlements relating to a wide range of matters, including 
work entitlements. Formalising ones’ identity and minimising identity fraud 
(through biometric documentation), it is argued, enables marginalised peo-
ple (refugees, undocumented migrants) to potentially seek entitlements. Yet, 
the legibility effects of biometrics have wider implications:
[B]order crossing is ultimately a game of probabilities. One effect of 
biometric identification systems is the disembodiment of the individual 
traveller and the elimination of his or her qualitative personal history. 
Since the state recognises the traveller through a digital representa-
tion… For it is not the qualitative experience lived through a body that 
is the primary object of management but rather the status that the state 
attributes to the quantitative, digitalised representation of the body 
(for example, tourist, business traveller, citizen of a failed state). The 
individual’s dynamic history is less important than the static category 
assigned to the individual’s biometric representation. … biometrics has 
“shifted the emphasis from habeas corpus to “habeas cognos.” Your 
existence was proved because you had a body. But today you only exist 
if you have information [about your body].
(Feldman 2011b, 121)
The point about probability is easily grasped in terms of border control 
and underscores the prognostic dimension of the behaviouralist discourse 
we explored in the previous chapter: biometric data in migration manage-
ment is a coding system (as opposed to surveillance in a Foucauldian sense) 
which allows border control to take place in advance, such as fining airlines 
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for allowing certain travellers to embark a plane (Carling and Hernández-
Carretero 2011). The same logic also applies to safe migration policies 
which aim at safeguarding migrants. Legal status, many governments and 
aid agencies argue, prevents abuse and makes it easier for migrants to seek 
entitlements (legal minimum wage, overtime, etc.). Hence, formal migra-
tion identity (passports, visas, official healthcare documents and work per-
mits) allows state legibility to be turned into forms of eligibility (Andrew 
Walker 2015). They do not merely enhance the state’s ability to monitor 
migrant populations but also produce mechanisms for claiming entitle-
ments (Tazzioli and Walters 2016). Indeed, the push towards legalising 
migrants in Thailand is officially explained by Thai authorities as one of the 
main ways to eliminate trafficking, which includes biometric scanning of 
migrants in the seafood sector (Charouensuthipan 2017a). Hence, making 
claims against employers and the state, such as compensation claims due to 
work accidents, hinges on the legal status of migrants.
The formalisation of migration loops back to the pre-decision and 
pre-departure training we discussed in the previous chapter. Both the 
right kind of information and the appropriate formal legal documents are 
meant to pre-mediate risk. Hence, these regularity frameworks connect pre- 
emptive subject formation to state-sanctioned legibility. Analytically, these 
measures are important as they widen interventions beyond methodological 
individualism towards structural conditioning of safety. Yet, at the same 
time, it is important to keep in mind that the governmental logics I here 
describe unfold in political and bureaucratic contexts where patrimonial 
relations often underpin the state apparatus (Baker and Milne 2015). It is 
within these government rationalities that migration governance in the 
Mekong must be understood.
Formalising migration
The most significant change in Mekong region’s labour migration over the 
last two decades pertains to formalisation. Whereas it was difficult for most 
labour migrants to obtain legal status in the early 2000s, possessing full or 
partial formal migration status (passport, work permit, etc.) has become 
increasingly common, even within contexts that are not considered part 
of the formal labour sector (Harkins 2019).1 Thailand, being a receiving 
country for large masses of unskilled migration from Laos, Myanmar, and 
Cambodia, has been central to this process. In 2001, the Thaksin government 
introduced temporary registration cards for migrant workers in Thailand, 
colloquially referred to as “pink cards” (Gruß 2017). Both national security 
and economic policy considerations underpinned the new scheme, given the 
enormous number of undocumented migrant workers. Due to the difficulties 
for many migrants, especially from Myanmar, to obtain a passport in their 
home country, a registration card provided Thai authorities with a certain 
level of oversight over their migrant populations.2 Originally, the pink card 
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functioned as workplace registration card as it referred to the workplace 
of the migrant. Although pink cards, valid for two years, gave migrants a 
semi-legal status, it also restricted mobility. Migrants could not legally cross 
provincial boundaries which can usefully be considered what Aihwa Ong 
has labelled a zoning technology (2004) which bonds migrants to a specific 
employer within an economic special zone (also see Campbell 2018).
Over the years, several amnesties allowed migrants to register for pink 
cards (Harkins 2019; Huguet and Chamratrithirong 2011). Yet, Thailand 
has attempted to move away from pink cards to a formal migration system 
based on passports, visas, and work permits. This transition has necessitated 
bilateral cooperation with Thailand’s neighbours. Since the early 2000s, 
Mekong governments signed bilateral MOUs with Myanmar, Cambodia, 
and Laos with the purpose to legalise and regulate labour migration recruit-
ment (Harkins 2019; Huguet and Chamratrithirong 2011; Huijsmans 2014; 
Huijsmans et al. 2008). This process enjoyed backing from UN agencies wit-
nessed by a series of policy dialogue sessions and a concept paper commis-
sioned by the ILO (2001; Skeldon 2001). Comparable with temporary and 
quest worker programmes elsewhere, this policy was meant to constitute a 
triple win (Anderson 2012; Bylander 2019; Skeldon 2012): legal protection 
for migrant workers (thereby reducing labour abuse and human trafficking), 
access to cheap unskilled labour for employers (something the Thai econ-
omy heavily depended on), and national economic development for both 
receiving and sending countries (in the form of economic activity and remit-
tances flows).
The implementation of the MOUs has involved two important dimensions: 
the issuing of licenses for private recruitment agencies to import labour in 
both sending and receiving countries, as well as strengthened cooperation 
between governments to issue passports, health cover, visas, and work per-
mits (which includes access to social security schemes). Aid agencies and 
government officials often colloquially refer to labour migrants who go 
through this migration pathway as “MOU workers” or “MOU migrants.” 
The MOU process is separate yet, interrelated to the aforementioned pink 
card system. Hence, especially Myanmar and Thai authorities have several 
times joined forces to create mechanisms where migrants could verify their 
identity in Thailand which, in turn, would allow pink card holders to obtain 
passports and work permits (Gruß 2017). The MOU process involves a 
more rigid system where migrants can obtain employment through licensed 
recruitment agencies before arriving in Thailand. As will become evident 
below, the two processes interact with one another in complex ways (it is, for 
example, much harder to change employers under the auspices of the MOU 
system). The media, activists, and academics have critiqued these efforts 
pointing to the high cost of legal migration, bureaucratic red tape, as well 
as ongoing abuse of migrant workers despite their newfound legal status 
(Campbell 2018; Gruß 2017; Huguet and Chamratrithirong 2011; Huijsmans 
2014; Huijsmans et al. 2008; Suravoranon et al. 2017).
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During my fieldwork, criticisms reached new levels. The MOU system, 
it was alleged, resembled state-sanctioned human trafficking (Zaw Zaw 
2016).3 Such accusations were based on two observations. As many migrants 
simply could not afford the up-front cost of legal migration (which in many 
cases exceeds 10,000 Baht/323 USD), they must borrow money in order to 
pay the fee. Some recruitment agencies, it was alleged, paid this fee on the 
migrants’ behalf but with subsequent deductions of migrants’ salaries to 
cover the cost (sometimes with steep interest). In effect, migrants’ formal-
ised migration status exacerbated debt-bondage arrangements.4 In addition, 
many migrants ended up in different (and often worse) forms of employment 
compared to what was stipulated in their contracts. Scrupulous recruitment 
agencies either made fraudulent import permissions or recruited migrants 
well above their approved quotas (in order to boost profits) which resulted 
in agencies having to farm out workers to other workplaces. In effect, debt 
bondage, deceptive recruitment, and substandard employment had become 
part of the state-sanctioned system that was meant to prevent it.
These accusations constituted a sore point for Mekong governments. 
Thailand, in particular, had grown petulant due to ongoing criticisms in the 
United States’ annual Trafficking in Persons Report as well as an increas-
ing possibility of sanctions from the European Union due to Thailand’s 
alleged failure to curb labour abuse within its seafood sector (Marschke and 
Vandergeest 2016). The critique also went at loggerheads with Thailand’s 
main labour migration strategy, which aimed at scaling up MOU labour 
migration. The Thai government’s response was twofold: a new labour 
law with stiffer penalties for both migrants and employers, coupled with 
an emergency decree that weaponised Thailand’s Ministry of Labour with 
stronger pecuniary control over recruitment agencies. We will now con-
sider how such recalibration of government interventions relates to labour 
recruitment chains.
Recruitment chains and pecuniary governance
U Htay Ko operates a small recruitment agency for Myanmar migrant 
workers near Bangkok. Throughout my fieldwork, I had the opportunity 
to interview, and in some cases, spend considerable time, with individuals 
such as U Htay Ko. A recurrent topic in these conversations pertains to how 
recruitment agencies and brokers operate within the MOU labour recruit-
ment system. During one of our meetings, U Htay Ko explains his role thus:
If a factory wants to employ Myanmar migrants, they will normally 
contact me. I would go to the factory, meet with the management, 
inquire their labour requirements, the type of work on offer, the work 
environment, light-heaviness [arduousness] of work, gender suitability 
etc. During the discussion with the management, I also inform them 
about the salary and welfare as defined by the MOU agreement; and 
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their willingness to comply to the MOU standards in employing the 
migrants. Then I would contact the Myanmar recruitment agency that 
we have connections with, explain to them about the nature of work, 
gender suitability, work environment etc. When the Myanmar recruit-
ment agency is ready to send the workers, they verify whether the 
company would process the labour import procedures by themselves, 
or if they will use the service of a Thai Overseas recruitment agency.5 
According to the decision of the factory, migrants are then imported 
either directly by the company or via the Thai recruitment agency.
U Htay Ko reveals some of the complexities within MOU recruitment. In 
addition to multiple formal actors that connect employers with migrants 
(e.g. government agencies and recruitment agencies in both Thailand and 
Myanmar), several additional actors are integral to this process. Although 
U Htay Ko explains this process as being part of the MOU process, and 
therefore mandates licensed agencies, he makes no secret of the fact that 
he does not himself operate with a license. In effect, he is an intermedi-
ary between factories and recruitment agencies. Yet, U Htay Ko does not 
always deal directly with employers but goes through another intermediary, 
typically an employee who has risen through the ranks within the factory. A 
similar blend of the legal and extra-legal is also evident in how U Htay Ko’s 
practices connect to recruitment of migrants back in Myanmar.
As in Thailand, recruitment of labour migrants in Myanmar ought to 
go through licensed recruitment agencies. During my fieldwork, approxi-
mately 200 recruitment agencies operated in Myanmar and most of them 
were based in Yangon.6 However, as large pools of potential labour migrants 
are scattered across the country, Yangon-based agencies employ agent rep-
resentatives in order to connect with potential migrants.7 Although agent 
representatives are formally operating under the auspices of licensed recruit-
ment agencies, they are, in turn, dependent on informal contacts in order to 
reach potential recruits. The prevalence of sub-contracting arrangements is 
well-known amongst both aid organisations and government officials. For 
example, a provincial Labour Exchange Director in Mandalay, Myanmar, 
explained to me that these agencies did not always follow protocol and that 
informal sub-contract arrangements did occur on the local level. Our brief 
outline of recruitment chain under the MOU system explained above can be 
schematised as follows:
Employer › middleman › sub-contractor (such as U Htay Ko) › recruit-
ment agency (in Thailand) › recruitment agency (in Myanmar) › agent 
representative › sub-agent/informal connections › migrant.
Even within this example, no less than seven recruitment chains connect 
an employer and a migrant. Recruitment chains are often longer and more 
complex than this (a point commonly made by several informants ranging 
88 Modalities of intervention
from recruiters – such as U Htay Ko, government officials, and NGO staff). 
Furthermore, this is a simplified representation of recruitment: it only refers 
to how a Thai employer acquires contact – through recruitment agencies – 
with potential migrants. We are not even beginning to consider how actual 
paperwork (visa, passport, and work permit) and transportation are organ-
ised, nor how the recruitment agencies, employers, and migrants interreact 
with state institutions in order to obtain the necessary documents and per-
mits. Formal and informal (i.e. licensed/unlicensed) agents overlap, which 
help shed light on MLC’s difficulties, discussed in the previous chapter, in 
communicating legal migration pathways (as distinct from unlicensed bro-
kers) to aspiring migrants.
Such blurring between the formal and informal is not limited to 
Myanmar migrants. For example, in the case of Laos, informal interme-
diates are central to the migration process and are even formally (but per-
haps unintentionally) acknowledged. For example, one recruitment agency 
advertisement that circulates in the Lao press and social media promises the 
general public a commission between 200,000 and 375,000 Lao Kip (approx-
imately 20–40 USD) depending on how many recruits a person can mobilise 
for the agency. With the slogan “your friend gets a job, you get money,” 
licensed recruitment agencies in effect turn would-be migrants into sub-
agents of their own recruitment efforts in how they provide a commission 
for recruiting acquaintances. Hence, the blurring of formal and informal 
recruitment chains is structurally integral to labour recruitment. Pointing 
to the immense complexity and diversity of supply chains is not in itself new 
and has been well-documented in a range of regional contexts (Tsing 2009; 
Xiang 2012). What becomes analytically important is to explicate how the 
state attempts to finetune their regulation of labour recruitment chains.
As previously mentioned, during 2017 and 2018, the Thai government ini-
tiated a twofold reform to its labour migration policies, comprising revised 
labour laws and amendments (through an emergency decree) to how it 
regulates recruitment agencies. Whereas in the past, a recruitment agency 
license was conditional on a 100,000 Baht (3234USD) bank guarantee, the 
emergency decree increased this to a whopping 5 million Baht (161,740USD). 
This pecuniary, quantitative adjustment had important qualitative effects on 
the regulation of recruitment agencies. First, the dramatic increase meant 
that numerous recruitment agencies would not be able to afford it, result-
ing in a reduction of recruitment agencies. Hence, the Thai government’s 
capacity to monitor recruitment agencies increased considerably.8 Second, 
the 5 million bank guarantee became a potential powerful coercive tool in 
order to discipline agencies (by withholding funds) in cases of agency mis-
conduct, which at the same time financed the Ministry’s capacity to correct 
malpractice (such as funding the repatriation of migrants due to over-re-
cruiting beyond set import quotas). Through the mere adjustment of a bank 
guarantee, the Thai government provided itself with a form of “spreadsheet 
legibility” that would, according to Thai government officials, help root out 
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exploitation and trafficking within labour recruitment. This is also why the 
policy was from the government’s point of view compatible – and not con-
tradictory – with the move to roll out MOU migration on a larger scale. The 
policy had immediate effect on recruitment agencies.
Regulation and order: Effects of the bank guarantee
Siriwan is the manager of one of Thailand’s licensed recruitment agencies. 
Siriwan was usually calm-mannered, but today, she was notably stressed. 
When I walk into her office, she immediately starts talking about the impact 
of the recently promulgated 5 million Baht bond. My business has been bad 
recently, she complains. “It is difficult to get things done. I now work on 
other business and plan to close down this recruitment agency at the end of 
2017.” A lot of competition exists in this sector and influence from various 
government agencies, she says. I ask her about what she thought about the 
5 million bond. She says that the Emergency Decree on Bringing in Foreign 
Workers to Work with Employers in Thailand (Office of the Council of State 
2017) benefits rich recruitment agencies rather than help solve human traf-
ficking issues. The amount is simply too big for her to continue operating 
as a legally registered agency. What will be the impact of the regulation, I 
wonder? Siriwan says some companies who can’t pay the money will need 
to close down. Others would join forces putting money into a pot and reg-
ister as a new business. But this is bad, she says, as it will turn you into an 
employee of another company. She then reveals that although she intends 
to close her own business, she has committed 500,000 Baht (16,174USD) in 
support of one business contact in order for her to trade business alongside 
other agents under the auspices of a new company.
Siriwan’s move from acting as an independent licensed recruitment agent 
to operate under a consortium of several agents formally fronting as one 
company did not happen overnight but was the outcome of a longer pro-
cess of lobbying. For quite some time, Siriwan has been part of an asso-
ciation representing several Thai recruitment agencies. They total around 
280 members. They share various information and opinions through a Line 
text messaging group. The 5 million Baht bond had become a hot topic. The 
agencies had also held an emergency meeting. Siriwian shows me photos 
from the meeting. As many Thai official meetings, the obligatory meeting 
banner is displayed in the background. The title of the meeting is ironi-
cally framed as a “combat against human trafficking,” no doubt a branding 
exercise to make recruitment agencies appear humanitarian (as opposed 
to predatory) in labour recruitment management.9 The meeting, Siriwan 
explains, resulted in a letter that was forward to the Ministry of Labour 
where the agencies pleaded with the government to reconsider its position. 
Siriwan is furious with various labour activists and NGOs. She blames them 
for stirring things up as their accusations of trafficking amongst recruitment 
agencies had made the Thai government panic. The decree is the result. 
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Siriwan admits to me that “some brokers are bad.” Some agencies, she says, 
may request an import quota for 50 workers but recruit 200 in order to 
enhance profits.10 50 migrants are sent as registered (as per the MOU con-
tract), then they distribute the rest to other companies, which results in traf-
ficking (gan ka manut) cases, she explains. I ask her how workers can afford 
the upfront fee of 10,000 Baht (323USD). She explains that she advances 
money, which is subsequently deducted from their salaries. This can be a 
problem, she says, as if the migrant leaves early, she needs to cover the short-
fall. She says that in the contract with employers, she now only takes respon-
sibility for the workers the first three months.
It is revealing that Siriwan has no qualms acknowledging that some bro-
kers are “bad” due to unscrupulous recruitment methods, yet at the same 
time, she admits engaging in practices that NGOs and others have cri-
tiqued: advancing of recruitment fees (which according to NGOs in effect 
becomes a form of debt bondage).11 Yet, to Siriwan, the real problem with 
the new bond is that it assumes agents who had money are “good,” whereas 
smaller operators (such as herself) are “bad.” Furthermore, she has no faith 
in the policy eradicating scrupulous brokering practices. Siriwan explains 
further:
The more people [agencies] are forced to follow the legal requirement 
of the five million Baht for the collateral, the more corruption will hap-
pen. In my opinion, those who are working on labour issues [referring 
to recruitment agencies and brokers] should have knowledge on labour 
laws and processes relating to passports, rather than having money… 
Those who have money can open up a recruitment agency and then 
sub-contract to others who may not have sufficient knowledge on 
labour issues.
Siriwan’s predictions proved correct. Prior to the introduction of the 5 mil-
lion Baht bank guarantee, Mg Thaung worked as an agent for an officially 
licensed recruitment agency. His main function was to assist with interpre-
tation, ranging from keeping track of job qualifications of workers, as well 
as bringing new migrants to their employers once they arrived in Thailand. 
However, the company had to close as it could not afford the 5 million bank 
guarantee. Yet, according to Mg Thaung, this has not prevented many 
recruitment agencies from continuing their operations. After the closedown 
of the agency where Mg Thaung’s previously worked, he is now employed in 
the human resource department of a larger factory. His new job, he explains, 
is similar to the one he held at the recruitment agency: serving as an inter-
preter as well as overseeing migrants’ welfare. Mg Thaung confirms what 
both Siriwan and U Htay Ko alleged before: smaller companies who can-
not afford the collateral becomes sub-agents for larger, licensed companies. 
Sub-agents, Mg Thaung, explains, pay commission to a licensed company 
in order to operate under its name. To cover the cost, the fee is simply past 
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onto the migrants. This has in some cases resulted in considerable increase 
of fees for migrants (from 10,000/323USD to 15,500 Baht/500USD), accord-
ing to Mg Thaung.
Chareon and Thamrong, the managers of the fully licensed Mekong 
Migration Agency (MMA), explain the sub-contracting arrangements 
amongst agencies in more detail. MMA had been in operation for two years 
at the time I first met them in 2017. In late 2018, when the 5 million bank 
guarantee had been in operation for some time, they offer their reflections on 
its impact. Few agencies, they tell me, have the funds to cover the bond. The 
way they get around this problem, they explain, is as follows: agencies who 
intend to register, but without the sufficient funds, sell on licenses to others 
to operate under their name.12 The going rate to act as an agent representa-
tive is 100,000 Baht (3234USD) per license. Once enough licenses are issued, 
then the bond can be paid. The government knows this but are unable to do 
anything as the law does not explicitly prevent such arrangements, accord-
ing to Chareon and Thamrong. Yet, the relationships between agents and 
subagents are weak, often with little oversight, they allege. Although there 
has been a formal reduction in licensed agencies from 4 to 500 to around 
160, this does not mean an actual reduction in agents, they claim. To the con-
trary, it is probably higher than ever. “The bond,” Chareon says, “has con-
tributed to shaping career paths for brokers.” Thamrong explains further:
In the past, recruitment agency work was not a well-known career. But 
with the issue of 5 million Baht bond and the new fines of 400–800,000 
Baht (12939-25878 USD) for violation of the labour law meant that there 
was a huge demand for workers to go through the MOU system. This 
helped prosper a career pathway for recruitment agency brokers.
In other words, the increasing pressure on both migrants and employers 
to channel labour migration through the MOU system – coupled with 
the increased 5 million bond – has resulted in both capital concentration 
(i.e. only a few large agencies with formal licenses) yet a proliferation of 
sub-contracting arrangements with a resultant demand for sub-agents. If it 
is correct, as Chareon and Thamrong allege, that 100,000 Baht (3234 USD) 
is a common price for a sub-license, this suggests that some fifty subagents 
work under the auspices of one licensed recruitment agency (which totals 
5 million Baht).13 At the time of the interview, some 160 licensed recruit-
ment agencies operated in Thailand. In light of Chareon and Thamrong’s 
assertion, there may be as many as 7500 sub-agents operating within the 
MOU system. Not only does this constitute a proliferation of brokers, but 
it has also slowed down the whole MOU system and increased the cost for 
migrants as additional brokers engender increased commission fees.14
What my broker-informants describe is remarkably similar to Xiang 
Biao’s description of “going through windows” amongst Chinese labour 
recruitment agencies (Xiang 2012, 53). A larger company acts as a formal 
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front but with several sub-contracting operators within it. As Biao describes 
in the Chinese context, although such policy initiatives may provide the 
appearance of an ordered recruitment agency system (due to fewer agen-
cies), it constitutes a proliferation and increasing complexity of brokering 
practices. Hence, the new Thai policy represents an entrenchment of one 
of the problems it attempts to solve: migrants ending up in debt bondage 
arrangements before they arrive in Thailand where increasing cost of migra-
tion management is passed onto migrants. Yet, it is impossible to appreciate 
these processes without paying attention to the spatio-temporal dimensions 
of the MOU process, recruitment chains, and migration governance within 
a cross-border context.
MOU reversals and inversed recruitment chains
“I want to share an observation,” Chareon tells me.
The MOU system is designed to deal with large numbers of workers. 
Currently, Thai industry is less inclined to bring in large numbers due 
to less need; instead, medium and small-scale employers need workers. 
But it takes a long time to get workers through the MOU system. You 
must travel to the source country and with no guarantee of success or 
getting the right people. Coming illegal first and then formalise the sta-
tus later becomes the way of doing it. Let me give an example. Say, a 
noodle shop needs two workers. There is no way you will go through the 
MOU system. You come illegal first, then you formalise.
I instantly understood what Chareon meant. Inversed recruitment chains – 
where formal migration status is achieved subsequent to migration – were 
now also developing within the formal MOU system for Myanmar migrants. 
When I first met the Charoen and Thamrong the year before, they explained 
to me how this operated amongst Lao migrants (which was their main cus-
tomer base). At the time, I was initially surprised to learn that, despite being 
a labour recruitment agency, they did not carry out any recruitment of Lao 
workers at all. Thamrong explains why. In terms of labour recruitment, 
employers – not migrants – contact their company. The reason, he says, is 
that migrants already work for the employer and need support formalising 
their status, rather than assistance with migration. Hence, MMA does not 
get involved with the recruitment process itself. According to Thamrong, 
Lao migrants can easily obtain a one-month tourist visa in contrast to 
Khmer migrants (who only can visit for 14 days) and Myanmar migrants 
(where this was not an option at the time of the interview). So, when Lao 
people come to Thailand, they find work but then must formalise their 
employment, Thamrong explains.
The process, they say, is meant to function as follows: First, the employer 
must approach the district ministry of employment office notifying they 
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want to employ migrants.15 Then, the ministry of employment will consider 
the request. If they agree, they will inspect the workplace (for example, mak-
ing sure a restaurant is not a front for a commercial sex venue). The inspec-
tion, Charoen alleges, is part of the government’s anti-trafficking measures. 
After this step, the employer will come to MMA. The word used for this is 
“quota” (in English), regardless of numbers (i.e. the employer may receive a 
quota for one, or several hundred workers). Then, MMA will liaise with Thai 
labour authorities to obtain a “demand letter” which authorises the import 
of labour migrants based on the quota. The recruitment agency will then 
liaise with a Lao recruitment agency who will take care of labour recruit-
ment and the necessary paperwork in Laos. Once workers are recruited, 
they will liaise with Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare in Laos, who 
will issue a “name list” which includes names and passport details of the 
migrants. The “name list” is then sent to MMA who will forward this to the 
Thai Department of Employment. The Department of Employment will, in 
turn, issue a letter named “calling visa.” This letter will then be forwarded 
to the Thai Embassy in Vientiane. Once this is done, migrants can pick up 
their work visa at the Thai embassy in Vientiane, cross the border to Nong 
Khai where they will take part in post-arrival training (which includes safe 
migration awareness raising), and obtain their Thai work permit. Once this 
is done, they are ready to commence work in Thailand.
However, in practice, Charoen and Thamrong explain, the Lao migrants 
are already in Thailand before this process takes place. Hence, MMA – 
in cooperation with Lao recruitment agencies and government authorities 
in both the countries – simply processes the MOU applications in reverse 
order. Rather than carrying out any recruitment, MMA, in collaboration 
with their labour recruitment company counterparts in Laos, simply pro-
cesses all the paperwork within the MOU process (quota, name list, etc.) after 
migration has taken place. Once the paperwork is done, the Lao migrants 
(who already are working in Thailand) simply travel back to Vientiane to 
pick up their visa, followed by the post-arrival training and issuing of a 
Thai work permit. Thamrong and Charoen alleged that many migrants and 
employers prefer this process as it is quicker; it also becomes an informal 
probation mechanism as both migrants and employers are able to test the 
waters in the workplace before committing to a two-year MOU contract.
Although such policy workarounds may seem to go against official policy, 
it is widely practiced with the full knowledge of government officials. As 
I learned from Ministry of Labour officials in Nong Khai, this procedure 
is common amongst agencies and well-known amongst officials. As such, 
two processes co-exist. Whereas many migrants go through recruitment 
agencies in their home country and then enter the MOU process (which 
resembles how the system is designed), other migrants convert to a formal 
labour migration status through the MOU process after migrating. The rea-
son for the co-existence of these two processes can be explained in light of 
different migrant experiences. Typically, experienced migrants go through 
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recruitment agencies, such as MMA. Conversely, MOU workers who are 
recruited back home are often inexperienced migrants, an observation 
pointed out to me by several informants (both NGO officials and brokers).
Furthermore, employers, migrants, and recruitment agencies all have 
vested interested in cutting through bureaucratic red-tape which helps 
explain why the MOU system is full of inversed workarounds. We saw 
contours of this in the previous chapter. Rather than regulation preceding 
migration (to ensure safety and order), it does the reverse. It also consti-
tutes a spatial inversion (recruitment of migrant workers taking place in 
Thailand, as opposed to their home country). Throughout my fieldwork, this 
Figure 5.1  Charoen and Thamrong use a whiteboard to explain the MOU process 
from a recruitment agency perspective. The acronyms are as follows: Q = 
quota; Demd = demand letter; NL = name list; C/V = “calling visa”; V = 
visa; [Square box] = symbolises the Lao-Thai Friendship bridge where 
migrants cross; Training = post arrival training; Check-up = health 
check-up; WP = workplace.
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practice was ubiquitous amongst Lao migrants but also took place amongst 
Myanmar migrant workers. Migrants, recruitment agencies, government 
officials, and even NGOs referred to such practices as “MOU U-turn”: 
migrants travel to their home country in order to formalise their migration 
status, and then “U-turn” back to Thailand to formally commence their 
MOU contracts. This form of spatial reversal has broader implications for 
how bilateral migration governance is enacted through aforementioned, 
state-sanctioned post-arrival training sessions, which we will now turn to.
Post-arrival training and reversed extra-territoriality
During 2018, the Thai government established several migration processing 
centres in border areas. This was part of a large government-led process 
which aimed at boosting MOU migration as the main pathway for labour 
migrants. It is important to note that this transnational bureaucratic system 
is not new (Gruß 2017; Huijsmans 2014; Huijsmans and Phouxay 2008). Over 
the years, an unrelenting stream of bilateral labour migration initiatives 
have been rolled out. Yet, this particular initiative appeared unprecedented 
in its scale. The Nong Khai post-arrival centre, which had been operational 
for less than a year, had already processed more than 30,000 Lao migrants 
at the time of my visit. This stands in stark contrast to the mid-2000s where 
less than 10,000 workers went through similar processes over a much longer 
time period (Huijsmans and Phouxay 2008). During fieldwork, I had the 
opportunity to visit (as an observer) both pre-departure (in Myanmar) 
and post-arrival centres (in Thailand). My first visit to these centres took 
place in Nong Khai (at the Lao-Thai border) where all Lao migrant workers 
within the MOU system – including the ones who went through recruitment 
agencies such as MMA – go through.
Every day, Lao migrants arrive at the post-arrival training (typically 
escorted by their respective Lao recruitment agency) after obtaining their 
visa at the Thai Embassy in Vientiane, Laos. Migrants queue upon arrival 
to obtain a ticket number. The ticket number allows orderly handover of 
migrants’ passports which is necessary for confirming that migrants’ Thai 
visa and passport details match biometric data on their system in order to 
process their work permit (smartcard).16 While the work permit is processed, 
the migrants attend post-arrival training. As such, the post arrival centre is 
the first direct encounter between MOU migrants and the Thai state which 
merges subjection of migrants (moulding migrants’ disposition through train-
ing on safe migration) with the biometric, legal identity of migrants (pass-
port, visa, and work permit). Hence, the centre is central in crafting ideal-type 
migrants: legal, documented, and informed migrants (Rudnyckyi 2004).
The post-arrival training takes the form of a 1–2-hour information ses-
sion where staff go through a PowerPoint presentation which highlights the 
most important part of the Thai government’s post-arrival handbook. The 
content resembles the pre-decision and pre-departure training provided by 
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NGO and UN agencies as discussed in the previous chapter. In addition 
to an overview of passport and visa regulation requirements, the migrants 
are informed on their worker rights (such as minimum wage and annual 
leave entitlements) alongside advice on how to use the Thai social security 
and health systems. In addition, a few points are made about Thai culture 
(which seems rather redundant due to the strong cultural affinity between 
Laos and Thailand). After the training session, the migrants obtain their 
work permit and they are ready to go.
I had the opportunity to observe several such sessions in Nong Khai (as 
well as in Mukdahan). In all sessions, staff were polite, cordial, and well-
drilled about the content of their presentation. They would often ask spe-
cific questions to check that migrants had understood nuances relating to 
specific details and were capable of answering clearly in the few instances 
where migrants asked questions. Although interviews with migrants and 
labour officials at the post-arrival centre revealed some frustration with the 
process, the operation is relatively efficient as compared to other bureau-
cratic processes I have observed related to migrants. Although the train-
ing centre filled up with workers throughout the evening, staff seemed to 
manage the process fairly well. Attempts by some migrants and recruitment 
agency representatives to push line were swiftly cracked down upon. In 
effect, most migrants obtained their visa and work permit within one day.
Figure 5.2 Newly arrived Lao migrants at the post-arrival training centre.
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While visiting the centre, my research assistant and I had the opportunity 
to speak (beyond earshot of officials) to around a dozen migrants awaiting 
their work permits. All of them had paid the same amount to their respec-
tive recruitment agency (17000 Baht/550USD). Two migrants had gone 
through MMA. Except for one migrant, everyone had established jobs in 
Thailand, some of them with many years of migration experience. In effect, 
the migrants confirmed to us what Thamrong and Charoen had told us in 
Bangkok. The migrants go through the process in a back-to-front manner, 
where their migration status is formalised after migration. The fact that the 
post-arrival centre’s Director reconfirmed the commonality of this arrange-
ment indicates that the practice is both commonplace and tacitly endorsed 
by authorities.
Post-arrival centres – professed by UN agencies and governments alike 
(Abella and Martin 2015; Carling and Hernández-Carretero 2011; Chindea 
2015; Harkins 2019) – are meant to be part of a larger labour migration 
mechanism with a simple, yet specific sequence: post-arrival training 
ought to follow from pre-departure (which, in turn, ought to follow from 
pre-decision awareness raising). As the two last components are meant to 
take part in the migrants’ home countries, cross-border policy collabora-
tion is required. Yet, in practice, the collaboration between Thai and Lao 
governments is patchy. UN, NGO, and even government officials (including 
Figure 5.3 Post-arrival training session, Nong Khai, May 2018.
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the Labour director in Nong Khai) made no secret of this fact, complaining 
that it was unclear to them how much pre-departure training took place in 
Laos (a suspicion we got confirmed by speaking to serval migrants of whom 
none appeared to have undertaken any such training in Laos).17 Hence, in 
practice, awareness raising happens first after migrants arrive in Thailand. 
At this point, they are already deep into the process: they have already paid 
considerable money for recruitment; their visa is stamped, and they find 
themselves in Thailand. Although this is deeply problematic from the van-
tage point of policy intent, it may matter little to the migrants. As the dis-
cussion above demonstrates, many migrants already possess accumulated 
migration experience prior to entering the MOU process.
Why then do Thai authorities bother to spend time training migrants 
given the fact that the training should logically precede migration? Besides 
serving as an instrument for legibility by monitoring migrants who enter 
the Thai labour economy, the training, as later chapters will reveal, allows 
authorities to transpose blame onto migrants if something goes wrong 
within the MOU system. As such, the post-arrival centre can usefully be 
thought of as reversed extraterritoriality: safe migration training, which 
is meant to be promulgated in advance on foreign soil (and therefore 
pre-territorial from the point of view of a receiving country), takes place “at 
home” in a post-hoc manner. Yet, such U-turns and tempo-spatial reversals 
are not limited to MOU migrants. For several years, the largest group of 
documented migrants in Thailand have been the aforementioned pink card 
holders, who we will now turn to.
Zones of non-intervention: The CI centres
Although the MOU system has gained traction in recent years, the over-
whelming majority of migrant workers in Thailand are either undocumented 
or hold semi-formal status (i.e. “pink card” holders). As discussed earlier 
in this chapter, pink cards were introduced as a semi-formal work permit 
which allowed migrants to work in Thailand despite the lack of passports 
and other formal travel documents. However, Thai authorities have several 
times attempted to entice migrants to obtain passports in order to convert 
them onto proper work permits, a priority underpinned by the state’s secu-
rity concerns (see Carling and Hernández-Carretero 2011). During my field-
work, Thai authorities announced that pink cards would be phased out, 
which in effect would require migrants to obtain formal migration status 
through the MOU system.
Over the years, several amnesties have allowed migrant workers to go 
through a national verification process in Thailand (in collaboration with 
Myanmar, Lao, or Cambodian authorities) in order to formalise their status 
and obtain work permits. During my fieldwork, these efforts were renewed 
albeit with a strong focus on Myanmar migrants. Whereas it has become 
easier for some migrant groups (such as the Lao) to return to their home 
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country to obtain a passport, this remains difficult for many Myanmar 
migrants, due to ongoing security problems in Myanmar (including 
armed conflict in several areas). Recognising this situation, both Thai and 
Myanmar authorities established various bilateral forms of cooperation, 
allowing Myanmar migrants to verify their identity whilst in Thailand. All 
Myanmar pink card holders were required to obtain a “certificate of iden-
tity” (CI) from one of Myanmar Embassy’s CI centres in Thailand (no such 
equivalent mechanism took place for Lao migrants during my fieldwork, 
despite earlier precedent).18 Once migrants acquire the CI document, they 
can proceed to obtain a Thai work permit (“smartcard”) and health card 
and access the Thai social security system.
An agreement was made with 7/11 that the CI processing fee could be paid 
at their stores. Subsequently, migrants would be able to visit a CI process-
ing centre to obtain the CI document. Although the inclusion of 7/11 stores 
(which are ubiquitous in Thailand) made access easy for migrants, other 
Figure 5.4 Example of a 7/11 receipt for CI processing.
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problems quickly became apparent. NGOs and Migrant Associations, 
such as MAM (see Chapter 4), raised several concerns regarding the CI 
centres. For example, Ko Thet Oo, one of the MAM’s leaders, was par-
ticularly vocal in his Facebook posts (which at the time had more than 
200,000 followers):
Hello (Mingalarbar),
Today I would like to discuss three issues regarding CI Book pro-
cess… The Myanmar government intends to demolish brokers, but in 
reality, more and more brokers are thriving due to many limitations in 
the process … [T]he CI centre operators allege that only 450 CI books 
can be processed per day. [M]any migrants face problems as they cannot 
be processed within the day… More output would allow the migrants 
to process the CI in time and will remove the need to pay the brokers. 
In addition, more than 80% of the factories are closed on Sunday. If CI 
Centres [could] operate on Sundays… it would be of great beneficent 
for the migrants as they do not need to take a day leave from work to 
process the CI. It is so horrible that brokers are able to operate at the 
premises of the CI centres. This practice should be stopped.
MAM alleged the CI processing created bottlenecks that became breeding 
grounds for brokers. Fortuitous, serendipitous contacts enabled visits to two 
of the centres. During the first visit, few migrants are present, in part due to 
the fact that it was the beginning of New Year celebration (Songkran) and 
most migrants had by then returned to Myanmar. The manager explains the 
CI process within the centre as follows: first, migrants must fill out a form, 
provide the voucher from 7/11 (as proof of payment, see Figure 5.4), show a 
copy of their pink card, and submit one passport sized photo. When their 
number is called, they are interviewed. Once that is done, a photo, thumb 
print, and signature are obtained for the CI book. Migrants are also meant 
to provide a valid Myanmar identification document (commonly either a 
personal ID or house registration card). As few migrants have brought such 
documents along to Thailand, the centre also accepts electronic copies that 
are typically sent to the migrant by family members back in Myanmar via 
text messaging apps. The manager shows me an example of this practice on 
his own smartphone.
In lieu of documentation, they verify migrants’ identity by probing their 
personal details (such as the name of their grandfather, the langue spoken 
at home, and their address in Myanmar). The manager alleges they dou-
ble check this information. If the migrant claims to be from ethnic groups, 
such as Karen or Mon, the manager (who happens to be multilingual) will 
quickly check their linguistic abilities by asking them to say a few words 
or phrases in the relevant vernacular. If the migrant can answer all these 
questions promptly and without hesitation, then they pass the test. At the 
end of the interview, I ask what he thought about the brokers who have been 
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reported to set up shop outside CI centres. He expressed a somewhat disin-
genuous unawareness of their operations.
Yet, even before entering the centre, posters’ advertising brokers’ services 
were visible on the main road (see Figure 5.5), and their offices were located 
along the alleyway leading down to the CI centre making them impossible 
to overlook. Before entering the CI centre, itself my research assistant and I 
had the opportunity to speak to several of the shops. They all provided sim-
ilar services which includes assistance with filling out the forms in Burmese 
language (30 Baht), providing the required photo that must accompany the 
form (100 Baht), as well as photocopies of all the documents. They also pro-
vided advice to migrants (and employers) for the next steps in the process 
in order to obtain the work permit. All of the four operators we spoke to 
claimed that they did not provide any “queuing service,” but in two shops, it 
was accidently revealed to us that they did.19
Figure 5.5  Brokers advertise their services. The text with yellow-coloured font 
reads: “Services for document processing for alien [workers].”
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Our visit reconfirmed what was already becoming an increasing com-
plaint amongst migrants and aid organisations alike: the process that is 
meant to formalise migration status – which often is partly championed 
as a way of getting brokers out of business – was itself flourishing with 
brokers and rent-seeking practices resulting in considerable cost (and 
waiting) for migrants. Around the same time, our observations from our 
visit to the CI centres were reconfirmed through other migrant groups, 
such as MAM who livestreamed one of their CI centres visits through 
Facebook:
Ko Thet Oo: “I am very glad to meet you all at the CI centre. Do you 
come here to process CI by yourself, or do you need to pay to brokers? 
How much did you pay?”
Migrant A: “We had to pay around 5,000Baht to the brokers.”
Ko Thet Oo: “You had to pay 5,000Baht, right? How do you feel? Do you 
think it is low or high?
Migrant B: “We had to pay this way because we do not know the market 
price.”
Migrant C: “Only when we reached the centre, we learned from the  others 
that they spend about 1,500Baht.
Ko Thet Oo: “Do all of you know that the Myanmar Government has 
arranged to issue the CI books at an affordable price. But due to many 
situations, most migrants cannot receive this benefit. The migrants 
who come to this centre must pay 3,000, 4,000, 5,000 Baht to get 
the CI. Now when you know the truth, what would like to say to the 
Government of Myanmar, we will let them know your feelings via this 
video.”
Migrant A: “I do not know what to say. We do not blame the government. 
It is that we do not know anything about it. At first, we thought it will 
be good to take the broker’s service as we know nothing. Now we real-
ised that we were cheated by brokers.
Such video posts reveal how the CI centres had become a magnet for brokers. 
Yet, it proved difficult for authorities to address the problem. Thai police were 
reluctant to intervene. Although this may be interpreted as further indication 
that payback between brokers and officials took place (thereby preventing 
effective action), little evidence emerged during fieldwork to suggest that this 
was necessarily the case. A more important point about the CI centres is 
the mere fact that they function as pseudo-autonomous sovereign spaces. 
Giorgio Agamben’s work on the state of exception (1998, 2007) has been used 
extensively in the social sciences to analyse how heterotopic spaces, ranging 
from prison camps (Guantanamo Bay) to refugee camps, allow interventions 
to extend exterior to the law. The CI centres turn this on its head, making 
them zones of non-intervention. As the CI centres are operated under the 
auspices of the Myanmar Embassy (under a sub-contracting arrangement 
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with a private contractor), they resemble Embassies in a judico-political 
sense. This makes Thai police intervention difficult. Over time, the situation 
became untenable. The irregularities at the CI centres made it to the Thai 
and Myanmar press and the overall slowness of the system even resulted in 
reshuffling of the Thai Minister for Labour (Charouensuthipan 2017a; The 
Nation 2017; Zaw Zaw 2017a). After this debacle, Thai and Myanmar author-
ities launched yet another mechanism for verification process where they 
attempted to bring both the Myanmar and Thai regularity processes together 
through the briskly titled one stop centres, which we will now examine.
One stop centres
Rather than providing separate CI centres, the Thai government, in con-
sultation with the Myanmar Embassy, established one-stop centres, where 
migrants could process both the CI and work permit documents in one 
location. The one-stop centres also allowed Cambodian and Lao migrants 
to convert their pink cards to a formal work permit, albeit with slight dif-
ferent arrangements for national verification (Charouensuthipan 2017b; 
Charouensuthipan and Arunmas 2017). This was part of a nationwide push 
by Thai authorities to formalise all labour migrants in Thailand.
Given some fortuitous contacts with some Thai officials, my research 
assistants and I were able to visit a one-stop centre only days after its open-
ing. In contrast to the CI centres, it is located within a shopping mall close 
to a central thoroughfare outside Bangkok. The centre’s location within a 
shopping centre also makes gatekeeping and rent-seeking practices (endemic 
at the CI centres) more difficult. The one-stop centre is in essence an amal-
gamation of the CI centres (operated under the auspices of the Myanmar 
embassy) and the Thai government’s registration system for issuing social 
security, health insurance, and work permits. Before visiting the centre, we 
already had a good understanding of how it operated, based on conversa-
tions with some of our informants (a Ministry of Health official, a migrant 
assistance group representative, and one passport broker). The procedure 
can be schematised as follows: migrants would go through the same process 
as at the CI centres, which in this case is located right outside the shopping 
centre in mobile vans. Given the public location of the mobile CI vans, lim-
ited opportunity exists for brokers to operate. Once this was complete, the 
migrants could conveniently walk inside the shopping centre and complete 
the rest of the process offered by Thai authorities:
1 Obtain and fill out a registration form.
2 Enrol into social security system.
3 Obtain date for blood screening and associated biomedical information.
4 Medical screening and deworming (for Lymphatic filariasis, which in 
this case took place at a hospital or medical clinic separate from the 
centre).
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5 Fingerprint and photo by Department of Employment (for the 
smartcard).
6 Payment of processing fee.
7 Obtain visa seal for passport.
Yet, the systems’ apparent simplicity turns out to be anything but. The one-
stop centre is – even in formal terms – a two-step process: first, migrants 
must go through the entire process, but this would only allow a visa up 
to 31 March 2018. Subsequently, migrants are required to go through a 
second stage of the process in order to obtain an extended two-year visa. 
Whilst visiting the centre, further complexities become apparent. Large 
crowds of migrants (I estimate it to be at least thousand people present at 
the time of the visit) queue up in different lines. Colour-coded arrows on 
the floor are meant to guide migrants yet appear to have no bearing on 
how migrants’ queue (my research assistants and I later learned that this 
was due to repeated changes to the queuing process as instructed by offi-
cials). Numerous counters for different parts of the process are distributed 
throughout the centre alongside various posters with instructions on how to 
go through the registration process. Thai officials are crisscrossing the floor 
Figure 5.6  Mobile CI vans as part of the one-stop service centre. Some of the 
migrants we interviewed who used the service believed that the biomet-
ric iris scan (which is part of the registration procedure) was part of an 
eye health check.
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attempting to clarify questions and creating some sense of order among the 
queuing migrants. The Myanmar and Thai parts of the operation are not 
in sync. Whereas the Myanmar Embassy’s CI counters are operational on 
Sundays when migrants typically have a day off (perhaps due to pressure 
from social media posts by migrant groups such as MAM), the Thai govern-
ment processing counters are only open on weekdays.20 Based on interviews 
with both migrants and officials, it becomes apparent that migrants must 
spend several days completing the process.
Several steps take place in reversed order (for instance, blood tests take 
place after issuing of the work permit) and require extra visits at a medical 
clinic or hospital.21 The centre’s posters divide different migrants into dif-
ferent processes: instructions for migrants who already have completed the 
CI process before the opening of the one stop centre (category B) is different 
to other migrants who had not yet gone through this process (category A). 
Processing differs depending on the kind of work migrants are employed in 
(such as fishing and domestic work).22 Furthermore, the new work permit, 
the smartcard, is coloured pink, making it easily confused with the docu-
ment the one-stop process is designed to convert migrants away from: the 
“pink card.” To add further confusion to an already confusing situation, 
some of the processing rules change during the centre’s operation as the 
Thai authorities are running against the clock finalising processing of all 
migrants before the Thai governments’ self-imposed deadline.
Figure 5.7  Migrants queuing at a one stop centre. Multiple queues for different 
counters crisscrossing each other.
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Whilst migrants are queuing, there was ample opportunity to speak with 
many migrants (as well as some employers who also queued to register 
workers). Despite ubiquitous signage (written in both Thai and Burmese), it 
was notable how oblivious migrants are regarding the process. “How long 
have you queued?,” we asked a group of migrants. “We don’t know; we can’t 
think about such matters,” a young migrant replied. “How far are you with 
the process at the one stop centre,” we asked another migrant. “I don’t’ 
know. My employer takes care of this.” How much longer do you have to 
go to obtain your smartcard, we asked a third migrant, who replied: “I am 
unsure. I am waiting for my broker.”
“Brokers rust your brain,” U San Tint (a former migration broker) once 
told me, pointing to how migrants’ dependency on brokers is analogous to 
how a calculator makes us inept at computing equations in our head. Yet, 
the hesitant answers we receive at the one-stop centre underpin not merely 
how bureaucratic complexity breed broker-dependence but also how reli-
ance on brokers can in part be explained by the affective dimension bro-
kerage provides as it “enables migrants to maintain an emotional distance 
from the often anxiety-producing workings of bureaucracy” (Gruß 2017, 3). 
The lack of migrants’ ability to go through the process independently was 
obvious. During visits to one-stop centres, my research assistants and I ran-
domly surveyed 54 migrants of which 42% relied on a broker and another 
46% depended on their employer in order to go through the process. This 
dependency, although not immediately obvious, became clearer after spend-
ing some time at the one-stop centres. Alongside migrants, many employ-
ers, or employee representatives, are present, taking care of large parts of 
the processing (which largely consults of filling out necessary paperwork). 
Although many of them are formally acting as representative for respective 
employers, this is in practice a role that was simply outsourced to a Thai 
person who acts on the employer’s behalf. Officials at the centre admitted 
this, but alleged nothing could be done as employers can legally nominate 
another Thai citizen as their representative.
Rather than being a process which assists migrants with formalising 
their status, it constitutes complex maze – a bureaucratised, labyrinth-like 
version of an Ikea visit – which locks migrants into endless confusing pro-
cesses which produce broker-dependency (and informal revenue). Although 
the aforementioned problem of brokers relating to the CI centres had been 
reduced, it was now simply replaced with a new problem: brokering taking 
place under the auspices of employer representatives. Ironically, this made 
government intervention even more impossible than at the CI centres as 
there is nothing (technically speaking) illegal with employers appointing 
employer representatives. In effect, the CI centres contribute to formalising 
brokering within the system that was set up to prevent it. The relationship 
between formal and informal practices had come full circle: what starts off 
as a policy attempt (with UN backing) to formalise migration, produces a 
range of extra-administrative practices. Through a range of policy attempts 
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to curb such unintended effects, these practices are not reduced but dis-
placed and become operational under the auspices of formal migration pol-
icy practice.
Conclusion
This chapter has explored how state-centric endeavours to formalise 
labour migration produce – as opposed to eliminate – brokering practices. 
Despite various attempts to curb rogue practices (as seen at the CI cen-
tres), fine-tuning of policy interventions merely results in displacement of 
problems resulting in a proliferation of migrants’ dependency on interme-
diaries. Rather than producing autonomous, enterprising migrants, regu-
lar migration processes cements’ relationships between the states, brokers, 
and migrants.
Similar to what we saw in the previous chapter, the praxis of labour 
migration management – whether in the form of recruitment agency pro-
cessing or administrative sequencing within one-step centres – produces a 
range of spatio-temporal reversals. Needless to say, considerable income is 
generated from these processes, both through official fees for governments 
and an unknown amount of broker fees. As such, legal migration pathways, 
such as the one-stop centres and the MOU system, are arguably a capital 
resource (Molland 2012a). At the same time, the push towards legalising 
labour migrants can usefully be thought of as structural violence in terms 
of how bureaucratic procedures lock migrants into lengthy and costly pro-
cesses with limited flexibility, or indentured labour, given the restrictive 
terms that legal migration status bestow on migrants (Graeber 2012; Killias 
2010). Yet, informal workarounds are not necessarily all bad for migrants 
(e.g. how MOU U-turn arrangements allows both employers and migrants 
to “test the waters” before committing to a labour contract). The next chap-
ter will further explore how both legal, formal entitlements and informal 
practices structure assistance when migrants seek help.
Notes
 1. During fieldwork, I was able to document ubiquitous use of passports and 
work permits by Lao sex workers along the Lao-Thai border, despite Thai 
labour and migration regulation excluding sex work as a profession. The facil-
itation of work permits within sex commerce venues appeared remarkably 
similar to what I observed during fieldwork in the mid 2000s, which suggest 
strong continuities over the last decade (Molland 2012b, 2012a).
 2. Many migrants come from poor communities where birth registration docu-
ments are not standardised. In Myanmar many migrants cannot easily obtain 
official documents due to armed conflict. In the recent past, Lao migrants 
had to obtain official permission (an exit visa) in order to cross the border to 
Thailand, making legal migration prohibitive.
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 3. It is worth pointing out that such allegations are not new. For example, similar 
points have been made in academic circles relating to the Lao-Thai labour 
recruitment scheme in the mid-2000s (Huijsmans 2014).
 4. In addition, it is worth noting that many migrants end up becoming dependent 
on informal brokers in order to enter the formal MOU system. Sub-brokers 
result in additional costs. Hence, even in cases where migrants may (in theory) 
be entitled to a refund due to malpractice by either their recruitment agency 
or their employer, migrants would still be in debt to informal brokers. Hence, 
such financial arrangements contribute to bondage practices as it becomes 
unviable for many migrants to leave workplaces as they will be end up with 
accumulated debt problems.
 5. The MOU system allows Thai employers to liaise directly with a Myanmar 
recruitment agency regarding import of workers. Several informants told me 
that larger factories often do this as they have the necessary human resource 
capacity to process all the paperwork that otherwise would be handled by a 
Thai recruitment agency.
 6. Both Thai and Myanmar Ministries provide name lists of licensed agencies 




 7. As explained by the Director of the Labour Exchange Office in Mandalay, 
amongst the 200 agencies that operated in Myanmar at the time, only 21 agen-
cies with agent representatives in Mandalay. All these agencies were man-
dated to report to the Director’s office on a monthly basis, including names 
of persons recruited and for what type of job. The Director made no secret of 
the fact that sometimes agency representatives’ overcharge, or that agencies 
manipulate arrangements in other ways. Sometimes more people are recruited 
than what the employer is asking for, which leaves workers in limbo without 
a job.
 8. Ministry of Labour Officials in Bangkok made no secret of the fact that the 
previous system made oversight a challenge. Given that each agency had to 
report on a monthly basis, even administrating the paperwork volume is a 
formidable task. Reducing the number of agencies made this process, from an 
administrative point of view, much easier to manage for the Ministry.
 9. Such appeals to combat human trafficking also suggests how anti-trafficking 
discourse has been appropriated in surprising ways.
 10. Siriwan’s allegations echo what many other informants reported to me: fraud-
ulent recruiters either recruit beyond or fabricate their approved quotas. 
Although I was never able to confirm this, one broker claimed that a reason 
for the discrepancy between formal quotes and actual recruitment occurred 
due to tax avoidance.
 11. It should be pointed out that such practices are arguably not unusual in this 
particular context. Both commercial and labour practices are frequently prem-
ised on credit borrowings (see Andrew Walker 2012) or commission-based 
practices (see Molland 2012b).
 12. A Thai NGO official told me that he has heard brokers referring to this prac-
tice as “to buy the right to operate” (suu sit).
 13. It is safe to assume that some variations in such arrangements exist. As 
explained earlier in this chapter, Siriwan had put 500,000 Baht (16174.00 USD) 
towards her sub-contracting arrangement.
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 14. The slowed process was also commented upon by Chareon and Tham-
rong. The new bond meant that it now took them two months to get a quota 
approved, something which would only take a few days in the past.
 15. The employer is meant to demonstrate that they have been unable to fill the 
jobs with Thai workers (e.g. based on job advertisement that have resulted in 
unfulfilled positions).
 16. The “Smartcard” is Thailand’s new work permit, which has been rolled out 
through post-arrival training centers (Charoensuthiphan 2017)
 17. One large study by IOM and ILO suggests as little as 17% of MOU migrants 
on a regional level have received any pre-departure training. It is likely that 
the numbers for Laos are far lower than this (Suravoranon et al. 2017).
 18. Lao migrants have previously been included in national verification schemes 
(Huijsmans and Kabmanivanh Phouxay 2008). However, Thai labour officials 
confirmed to me that this was not currently taking place (see also Migrant 
Working Group 2017).
 19. When entering the second shop we introduced ourselves explaining that we 
were researchers from a University requesting interviewing them regarding 
their services, to which the staff responded “how many people do you have in 
your company to process? For special queuing you need to talk to our Thai 
Boss, but she is not here today.” After some further clarification, it became 
clear that they had mistaken us for being employers wanting to fast-track CI 
documents for our employees! In the fourth shop my research assistant could 
overhear a phone call from one of the staff (in Burmese) who was frantically 
trying to bolster the number of migrants to come to the centre, as they had 
bought too many queuing tickets earlier that morning in anticipation of large 
numbers. The shop was now struggling selling the tickets onto migrants due 
to the unexpected, limited traffic. In addition, my research assistant, who had 
been able to visit other centres earlier whilst I was back in Australia teach-
ing, was able to document that several of these shops would charge 4000 
Baht (130USD) for a “package service,” including fast-track queuing and 
paperwork.
 20. Such mundane bureaucratic discrepancies create further opportunities 
for brokering practices. For example, one informant of mine who is work-
ing closely with U San Tint (see Chapter 8) operates as a visa stamp broker. 
Migrants are required to obtain a stamp in their passport every three months. 
As the immigration office is closed on the weekend (when migrants typically 
have time off), he receives a commission from migrants to obtain the stamp 
on their behalf. He charges 100 Baht (3.30 USD) per passport where 80 Baht 
(2.60 USD) goes to his insider contact at the immigration office. He keeps the 
remaining 20 Baht (0.65 USD) as net profit.
 21. One health officer explained to us that the reason why some of the medical 
steps may appear a bit “back to front” is that blood tests take time to pro-
cess. As migrants have already completed the test through the CI process few 
concerns pertain to these cases. If anything is detected, they will contact the 
migrants. In most of these cases, migrants can continue work without any 
health risk and take medication.
 22. For example, domestic workers can’t be members of the Social Security fund 
(SSO) and must take out private insurance.
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Hotlines force the system [aid organisations] to work together.
(Senior UN official)
The two previous chapters demonstrate how migration channels that 
mandate legal documents (passports, work permits, etc.) produce (as 
opposed to eliminate) informal practices, including inversed procedural 
workarounds and proliferation of broker dependency. Although safe 
migration programmes often support legal migration pathways (such as 
pre-departure training under the auspices of the MOU system), Chapter 2 
explicated how several aid officials problematise equating safe migra-
tion with legal migration. This is not to say that aid officials deplore any 
focus on migrants’ legal status. As Gary, a UN official who has worked on 
anti-trafficking and migration management for several years, pointed out 
to me, although legal status may not guarantee better work conditions for 
migrants, it does make a difference to how migrants can access support 
from aid programmes. A migrant with a valid passport and work permit, 
Gary suggests, can more easily seek assistance as compared with undoc-
umented migrants. Whereas undocumented migrants who seek help may 
risk deportation and other forms of retribution due to their illegal migra-
tion status, Garry alleges that this problem does not arise for documented 
workers. Although legal migrant status may not prevent exploitation and 
abuse, it does make a difference for migrants when seeking assistance, he 
alleges. In other words, legal status relates to what Tania Murray Li calls a 
politics of entitlement (Li 2017).
Gary’s observation serves as a useful point of departure for examining 
how safe migration assistance provision unfolds. Whereas the two previ-
ous chapters explored safe migration in light of migrant departures from 
Laos and Myanmar, this chapter examines safe migration from the van-
tage point of Thailand and its role as host community for labour migrants. 
The chapter builds on a theme developed in the previous two chapters: 
how assistance provision compounds a tension between abstract, rule-
bound logics, and the informal practices that often underpin them. Yet, 
in contrast to the previous chapters, where informal practices often take 
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the form of subjectivities and social actors positioned outside safe migra-
tion programme implementation (such as unlicensed brokers), this chap-
ter illuminates how informality is integral to assistance provision itself. To 
put it differently, informality is produced “in house,” where aid officials go 
off-script. Negotiated outcomes precede technical-rational procedures and 
administrative guidelines. In what follows, these tensions are explicated 
through a specific focus on how safe migration programmes attempt to cre-
ate safety nets for migrants through the provision of outreach services and 
the operation of migrant hotlines.
Safe migration and hotlines
When asked to identify a key safe migration activity, aid officials often men-
tion migrant hotlines. Besides enabling migrant assistance, it also – accord-
ing to one senior UN programme manager, Nick (see Chapter 2) – “forces 
organisations to work together; contributes to data collection and creates 
accountability mechanisms.” As such, hotlines epitomise a key modality of 
care (Dunn 2012) that marries an abstract safe migration discourse with 
bureaucratic practices and activities that can be brought to life by NGOs, 
government bodies, and UN agencies. Yet, singling out hotlines as denot-
ing an archetypal safe migration activity is curious given that hotlines have 
been common within anti-trafficking for years.
Safe migration and anti-trafficking practitioners often promote hotlines 
as an innovative and cutting-edge aid response, despite their datedness. The 
historical roots of hotlines are found in the cold war geopolitics of the 60s. 
In the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, it was deemed important to 
establish direct information channels between the Soviet and US superpow-
ers in order to prevent possible misunderstandings between them (Aradau 
2016). Since then, hotlines have moved from security to the medical and psy-
chological, witnessed by a myriad of hotline services ranging from suicide 
prevention to domestic violence, and have become part of popular culture 
(Aradau 2016). In recent years, hotlines for labour migrants and trafficked 
victims have become increasingly popular both regionally and globally.
The uptake within the sector can be explained in light of its program-
matic appeal. First, hotlines comprise a totalising allure. As a de-territorial 
mode of assistance, a hotline can in principle be reached anywhere. As 
such, hotlines dramatically expand the spatial reach of action compared 
with conventional forms of service delivery (say, a counselling centre) and 
can be considered instruments for spatial encompassment (Ferguson and 
Gupta 2008). At the same time, the appeal of hotlines is just as much tem-
poral as spatial. Hotlines furnish the notion of immediate responses which 
“… materialises a particular temporality—of speed, acceleration, and deci-
sive action.” (Aradau 2016, 223). Immediateness interconnects with speed 
as direct communication between individuals in distress and an operator 
cancels out the need for intermediaries. Hence, hotlines enable direct, fast, 
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and firm action, denoting responses in the here-and-now present, which is 
underscored by its prefix (hotlines, after all, are meant to be “hot” and in 
demand). Hence, hotlines are firmly situated within an emergency discourse 
which helps explain why “[t]he proliferation of hotlines goes hand in hand 
with the proliferation of crises.” (Aradau 2016, 223).
Second, hotlines appeal to several of the moral-philosophical problems 
of distant suffering (Boltanski 1999), as hotline calls allow for interpersonal 
immediateness between the hotline operator and caller despite their spa-
tial separation.1 Although hotlines are technically comprised of speech acts 
in response to suffering, they appear as action given their alleged connec-
tion with assemblages of emergency responders. Furthermore, hotline calls 
provide anonymity which appeals to organisations that work with migrant 
communities. As expressed on one NGO website, “the ‘confidentiality’ prin-
ciple of hotlines makes it easier for irregular and illegal migrants, who are 
most at risk of being trafficked to come out.” (Tanaka n.d.) Hence, hotlines 
simultaneously totalise and individuate.
Third, hotlines are arguably instruments for legibility (Scott 1998) where 
“the telephone hotline brings visibility to the phenomenon by giving voice 
to its unseen victims.” (2016, 223). Hotlines appeal to a governmental logic 
of order due to their revelatory potential. This is depicted in the following 
terms by one of the Mekong regions’ many NGOs who operate hotlines:
With eyes and ears on the ground, workers have invaluable information 
on what happens in supplier facilities every day. Through worker voice 
channels such as the Issara hotline, Facebook, social media, and estab-
lished connections with migrant communities, Issara has a constant 
pulse on the voices of thousands of workers, who have the  capacity 
to uncover risks in complex global supply chains and drive structural 
changes in the way business is done, from small changes at the individ-
ual supplier level  to large-scale changes at the national industry level 
and how responsible sourcing is done globally.
(Issara Institute 2019)
Here, the hotline goes well beyond direct assistance as it connects migrants 
“with eyes and ears on the ground” and the NGO’s ability to maintain a 
“constant pulse on the voices of thousands of workers.” This purportedly 
allows the NGO to map abuse and exploitation within supply chains, which 
no doubt is aimed at appealing to corporate donors’ social responsibility 
sensibilities. As such, hotlines wed a panoptic and synoptic gaze where the 
many (i.e. migrants) watch the few (employers and brokers) and the few (hot-
lines) watch the many (migrant populations and work conditions). Given 
this, it is unsurprising that aid officials see hotlines as central to safe migra-
tion practice given the allure of its legibility effect (Trouillot 2001). Whether 
hotlines have the actual capacity to achieve such legibility is an entirely dif-
ferent question (to which we shall return to).
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In the Mekong region, numerous organisations working on either human 
trafficking, safe migration, or migration assistance have launched hotlines. 
The Thai government advocates hotlines as a central response to both 
human trafficking and labour migration assistance more broadly, includ-
ing in their annual trafficking report (Government of Thailand 2015). ILO’s 
project document stipules the development of hotlines as central activity 
(International Labour Organization 2009). Moreover, as demonstrated 
within the context of pre-decision, pre-departure, and post-arrival train-
ing in the two previous chapters, government agencies emphasise hotlines 
in their training (including information booklets that are distributed to all 
participants). This underscores both cross-border connectivity and the role 
of the state as a central actor within safe migration discourse.
The formal endorsement of hotlines contrasts with informal wide-
spread criticisms within the migration assistance sector itself. Although 
rarely articulated in a formal capacity, several aid officials express con-
cerns regarding hotlines in private. As one NGO manager, Thomas (see 
Chapter  2) exclaimed: “we used to run a hotline. It didn’t work at all. 
No-one called! Hotlines are completely useless.” But what about cases 
where migrants do call a hotline? What assistance is actually provided? 
By whom? And how? Despite the fetishisation of hotlines as a humani-
tarian-bureaucratic magic wand that can generate assistance, such crit-
icisms speak to the simple fact that hotlines are complex assemblages of 
objects and persons. This raises broader questions of how governance 
materialises. Within a context where hotlines are formally celebrated but 
informally critiqued, limited research to date examines migrant hotlines 
in the Greater Mekong Sub Region. This dearth of knowledge is surpris-
ing. Academic research on hotlines in western contexts (relating to suicide 
prevention and psychological trauma) points to important discrepancies 
between the intent and actual usage of hotlines (Backe 2018). Such dis-
crepancies will now be explored.
Calling hotlines
Twice during my fieldwork (in 2013 and 2018, respectively), my research 
assistants and I surveyed migrant hotlines employing a three-pronged strat-
egy: First, we mapped hotlines by collating phone numbers from organi-
sations’ respective websites and publications, as well as hotline cards that 
programmes distribute to migrants.2 Second, we called the hotline num-
bers in order to confirm their existence and (where possible) to carry out a 
short phone interview. Third, subject to agreement from the hotline oper-
ator, we followed up with face-to-face interviews in order to obtain more 
detailed information. We also requested hotline operators to – conditional 
on informed consent – introduce us to migrants who had used their hotlines 
services, a request that failed to generate any leads. Instead, serendipitous 
encounters during fieldwork allowed us to speak to a handful of individuals, 
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including migrants, employers, service providers, and even brokers, who 
had various interactions with hotlines. This allowed for several of the pro-
cessual dynamics relating to hotlines to be dissected.
The results from our first hotline mapping from 2013 (limited to Lao-Thai 
hotline operators) is a useful point of departure in order to shed light on 
how migrant hotlines constitute particular forms of assemblages. We doc-
umented 28 different phone numbers which included hotline operators in 
both Laos and Thailand. Out of the 28 numbers, we were only successful in 
reaching eleven operators. Seventeen of the numbers were either incorrect, 
disconnected, unresponsive (no one picked up), or irrelevant (one phone 
number turned out to be a provincial Lao post office). We discontinued call-
ing unresponsive numbers, which included the Lao Embassy in Bangkok, 
after three calls, made at random times over a one-week period.
Amongst the eleven hotline operators we successfully contacted (of whom 
most were based in Thailand), it turned out that few Lao migrants called any 
of them. Instead, callers were overwhelmingly Myanmar migrants and Thai 
citizens. Moreover, several hotline operators addressed domestic and sex-
ual violence (primarily related to Thais) rather than migration-related 
matters. In the few cases where operators received Lao-related calls, they 
usually derived either from employers requesting advice on how to register 
Lao workers or from migrants’ family members who called to learn about 
whereabouts of their migrant family members in Thailand. Several of the 
organisations were unaware that their phone number had been listed on a 
migration hotline card.
How the Lao-specific hotlines struggled connecting with the “right” kind 
of callers echoed more fundamental challenges with tying hotline callers to 
effective action. Although many of the hotline providers linked their oper-
ations with referral services, the practice of such referrals did not always 
function as intended. First of all, as most callers request advice on immigra-
tion and work permit processing, no actual follow-up is required. As such, 
hotlines are in practice helplines where information provision is passed off 
as action. Although calls sometimes require referrals to other organisations 
(especially relating to health problems), more than half of the hotline oper-
ators revealed to us that referrals were often in practice the reverse: that is, 
police and health workers referred cases to the NGO running the hotline. 
As we will see below, this does not stop hotline operators from counting 
such “referrals” towards their hotline statistics.
Throughout the hotline mapping, I was only able to identify one concrete 
case where a Lao hotline call (from Lao family members in southern Laos) 
resulted in assistance in Thailand (from a Thai NGO). Through follow-up 
interviews with the Thai NGO, it became clear that it had pre-existing 
relationships with the Lao-based international NGO (which helps explain 
how the cross-border referral was made). The Thai NGO believed the rea-
son why the call was made had in part to do with the fact that their Lao 
NGO counterpart was trusted by local villagers in Laos due to the NGO’s 
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long-established presence in the area. This suggests that the necessary trust 
in calling a hotline is grounded in pre-existing familiarity with an organisa-
tion and not confidence in abstract service provision.
In 2018, another migrant hotline mapping was undertaken. The number of 
organisations that formally claimed to run hotlines relating to Lao migrants 
had notably declined to one, although several organisations (including gov-
ernment departments) distributed phone numbers for general information 
on labour migration. Otherwise, not much had changed.3 Hence, Lao hot-
lines appear to be yet another example of what I have alluded to elsewhere 
in this book: as with safe migration interventions more broadly, hotlines, in 
a Lao context, constitute a form of programmatic nothingness: no meaning-
ful assistance takes place.
How are we meant to interpret such dismal, inept service (non)delivery? 
One may suggest that this is an example of aid organisations engaging in 
donor-friendly aid where hotlines’ visceral appeal eclipses any rigorous 
attention to outcomes, resulting in sloppy implementation. Such an expla-
nation is a bit of a strawman. Although Lao hotlines are far from “hot,” 
it is too easy to explain this away as “bad aid.” In 2018, we also surveyed 
hotlines relating to Myanmar migrants which shows that despite many sim-
ilarities with Lao hotlines (such as the dominance of requesting informa-
tion as opposed to actual assistance), important differences are apparent. 
Although precise prevalence is hard to gauge, many Burmese migrants call 
hotlines, something that was confirmed through surveying both Thai- and 
Myanmar-based hotline operators, as well as in interviews with migrants 
and migrant groups (see Chapter 9).
From an operational point of view, it is also worth noting that not all 
hotlines are dilettantish and perfunctory. Thai authorities have over the 
years invested heavily in their 1300 hotline number which from an oper-
ational point of view easily dwarfs any of the Mekong-based hotlines run 
by foreign aid agencies (despite highly optimistic, self-congratulatory mar-
keting by certain NGOs). During fieldwork, I had the opportunity to visit 
the 1300 hotline headquarters to see it in action. Their office is located in 
Bangkok. It employs seventeen staff which includes full-time translators for 
Khmer, Burmese, and English languages. In addition, they have a volun-
teer roster comprising 102 translators for more than twenty other languages. 
Volunteer translators can be hooked up to a call remotely on a needs’ basis. 
The 1300 hotline is not migration or trafficking specific, and pertains to a 
range of social problems (such as sexual and domestic violence). At the time 
of the interview (in 2018), they received approximately 300 calls per day of 
which the majority only require information provision.4 Based on my obser-
vation of activities at the day of the visit, I find this claim plausible.
In the last year, 50 calls were related to suspected human trafficking cases. 
As far as I am aware, the 1300 government hotline is the only one with actual 
ability to respond immediately anywhere in Thailand due to the fact that it 
links into the Thai State’s bureaucracy across all provinces and districts. 
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Such operational capacity is far greater than any other NGO-run hotline 
that I am aware of (despite bold marketing claims from certain NGOs). Yet, 
regardless of administrative efficacy, hotline calls – even the Lao ones – have 
important effects, which we will now explicate.
When hotlines go wrong: Assistance as spatial governance
What happens in the relative few cases where migrants call hotlines request-
ing immediate assistance? The following case, retold to me by a hotline NGO 
officer, exemplifies how hotline calls can quickly unfold in ways which com-
plicates the very meaning of assistance within safe migration aid delivery:
A Lao underage domestic worker, Dao, contacts an NGO hotline for 
migrants. It is unclear how Dao knows the number. Dao explains to the 
hotline operator that she is in a highly abusive situation which includes 
physical confinement. It turns out that Dao has been with the household 
since she was thirteen. She has been there for three years. Some back-
and-forth calls are necessary over several days to establish what is going 
on and how the NGO can best assist. Dao can only call whilst pretend-
ing to shower in order to ensure nobody can listen in on the call. Due to 
Dao’s confinement the NGO is unable to act alone. The NGO decides 
to contact the police given the seriousness of the situation. In the end, 
with the collaboration from the police, the NGO rescues Dao from the 
house. Yet, the police interpret the situation rather differently to the 
NGO. Rather than seeing Dao as a victim of labour abuse, confinement 
or human trafficking, the police consider Dao an illegal migrant who 
has violated the Thai immigration act resulting in Dao’s deportation.
The NGO is tragicomically implicated in an outcome which goes at log-
gerheads with their own intentions: increased, punitive migration policing 
(through deportations), as opposed to addressing Dao’s abusive labour sit-
uation. During my fieldwork, I came across similar cases. Three out of the 
eleven hotline operators interviewed in 2013 alleged deportations took place 
as a result of hotline referrals. A similar trend was identified in interviews 
with hotline operators in 2018. For example, the main government hotline 
operator in Thailand alleged they usually receive hotline calls from the 
general public (as opposed to migrants themselves) who suspect trafficking 
cases (commonly relating to prostitution). The hotline operator’s manager 
reported to me that upon investigation, the police commonly concluded 
that these were not trafficking cases. As police would often detect irregulari-
ties relating to sex workers’ immigration status through their investigations, 
deportations ensued. The fact that other practitioners within the trafficking 
and safe migration sector, such as Robert (see Chapter 2), openly critiqued 
hotlines for augmenting deportations, suggests that deportations resulting 
from hotlines calls are common.
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These cases exemplify what migration scholarship has noted for some 
time: the spatial and institutional expansion of border control (Anderson 
2012; Andersson 2014; Fassin 2005; Feldman 2011a; McNevin et al. 2016). 
Just as private airline operators and universities have become extended arms 
of border control, migrant hotlines serve a similar function.5 This is para-
doxical, given that safe migration and anti-trafficking programmes, includ-
ing the ones referred to above, are usually highly critical of border control 
policies. Yet, the same organisations – perhaps unwittingly – alter their own 
humanitarian ethos into its opposite: rather than ameliorating migrants’ 
despondency, the hotline awkwardly blends compassion with repression 
(see Fassin 2005). Blurring protection and border control does not merely 
contribute to how the state co-opts humanitarian praxis (Fassin 2005; 
McNevin et al. 2016; Tazzioli and Walters 2016) but also what de Genova 
has called deportability (De Genova 2002), that is how state-sanctioned pre-
carious migration status facilitates subjugation of the labour force (a point 
we shall return to below).
During fieldwork, I had the opportunity to speak with aid officials who 
either ran, or were supportive of migrant hotlines. I would point out what 
to me seemed to be an obvious paradox: at times, hotlines produced depor-
tations, as opposed to substantive assistance (and justice) for migrants. 
Sometimes, reactions were defensive. For example, Sonia, who works for 
a UN agency that funds hotlines, was quick to distance her organisation’s 
potential culpability. “We only support governments” she said, adding “it’s 
ultimately the governments who must take charge here.” Using her organ-
isation’s formal status as a financial and technical provider of aid to the 
national government is clearly a way for Sonia to abdicate agency; a “hid-
ing of the self in our relations with others” (von Ufford, quoted in Mosse 
2011, 18). Yet, other aid officials appeared genuinely surprised by my allega-
tion of deportation-prone hotlines, as if they had never thought about the 
possibility of its occurrence.
The ways in which counter-intentional effects of hotlines become obscured 
for the people who implement and fund them relate to the importance of 
both social distance and deliberate ignorance within chains of aid delivery 
(Feldman 2011a; van Ufford 1993). Many aid officials are both socially and 
physically withdrawn from the aid they provide, something which hotlines – 
being a de-territorial and de-personal technology – arguably exacerbates. 
At the same time, as hotlines hinge on what is quantitatively visible to the 
operators (e.g. number of hotline calls) as opposed the broader context of 
callers, hotline aid delivery can endure regardless of the effects. As such, 
hotlines are arguably technologies of bad faith; their persistence derives 
from the deliberate ignorance they help produce.
This is not to say that unintentional effects are always imperceptible. The 
possible risk of deportations resulting from hotline calls is fully acknowl-
edged by some aid practitioners. As one representative from a Thai NGO, 
Boonchu, told me “working with police [on rescues in relation to hotlines] 
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is better than nothing.” He elaborated that “in order to avoid arrest and 
deportation of the migrant we refer to the new trafficking law”. This way, 
Boonchu alleged, they were able to redirect police interventions away from 
deportation towards providing actual assistance. Arguably, such cases can 
be considered “success” as hotline calls may indeed result in assistance for 
migrants. But as Dao’s case illustrates, NGOs may also be powerless to 
alter such situations should the police decide to interpret the case differ-
ently. Regardless, such cases underscore service providers’ dependency on 
on-the-ground presence, which we will now turn to.
Helping by distance and the problem of negotiation
Hotline calls are not limited to information sharing or emergency response. 
Several organisations also provide what resembles “self-help” advice, where 
NGOs provide over-the-phone coaching in situations where they cannot 
physically reach the migrant. Such approaches resemble direct assistance in 
that the advice is in response to actual specific cases, as opposed to general 
information regarding labour and migration entitlements and obligations. 
Although this dramatically broadens the spatial reach of an aid organi-
sation, the lack of physical co-presence also comes with its challenges, as 
retold by an outreach worker, Ma Soe, from one MRC on the outskirts of 
Bangkok.
Mg Hla Win, a migrant worker, approached Ma Soe during an outreach 
session at a local temple that is frequented by many labour migrants. Mg 
Hla Win told Ma Soe that he had problems at the cold room food processing 
factory where he worked. The top joint of his little finger was severed due 
to a work accident. Rather than the employer covering the medical bills, 
the employer told him that the medical cost ought to be covered through 
an insurance scheme through the company, even though Mg Hla Win 
already had Social Security Office (SSO) membership.6 Mg Hla Win further 
explained that he had already called a migrant hotline for help (an NGO had 
previously distributed hotline cards during a visit to the factory). The hot-
line, which was run by an NGO, advised him to directly contact SSO. But, 
this advice was impractical as Mg Hla Win could not speak Thai. He then 
asked if the NGO could send a field officer to assist him. As the NGO did 
not have any field staff, they could not assist Mg Hla Win in a direct man-
ner. Instead, the NGO called the company where Mg Hla Win was working, 
requesting them to accompany Mg Hla Win to the SSO office. However, this 
angered the factory management, resulting in Mg Hla Win being threatened 
with termination if he continued seeking external help.
Whilst discussing the case with Mg Hla Win at the temple grounds, Ma 
Soe was puzzled why the factory insisted on lodging the claim through a 
private insurance company, given Mg Hla Win’s SSO membership. The 
arrangement was unsatisfactory for Mg Hla Win as it burdened him with 
a double payment to the SSO and the insurance company. After some 
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further discussion, Ma Soe accompanied Mg Hla Win to the factory human 
resources department to clarify the issue. As the company had already 
threatened Mg Hla Win with termination for bringing in outside assistance 
from an NGO, Ma Soe, who herself is from Myanmar, pretended to be Mg 
Hla Win’s auntie in order to avoid inflaming the situation further. During 
the meeting, it became clear to Ma Soe that the company’s reason for insist-
ing on utilising the private insurance company (as opposed to SSO) was to 
avoid the rising premium that would result from lodging the case.
After the meeting, Ma Soe clarified to Mg Hla Win’s what was going on. 
“I explained to Mg Hla Win’s that to curb the rising cost of the SSO instal-
ments, the company did not wish to report the accident to SSO. Actually, 
it is against the law and if he wanted compensation from SSO, we would 
have to file a case and fight for it.” In the end, Mg Hla Win decided against 
pursuing the case further, Ma Soe explained, as he did not want to further 
escalate the situation out of fear for his employment security. Ma Soe was 
scathing of the hotline operator who attempted to help Mg Hla Win over 
the phone. “When an NGO establishes a hotline without employing the field 
staff to assist migrants individually,” Ma Soe said, then this can leave “the 
employee in great trouble if an employer wishes to hide something which is 
abnormal or not aligning with the existing laws.”
Ma Soe self-representing as an “auntie” to the company both underscores 
the limitation of formal complaint mechanisms and important performative 
aspects of assistance seeking. In practical terms, it is difficult for NGOs 
to interact with employers directly as this can result in retaliatory action 
against the employee. Instead, NGO officials, such as Ma Soe, resort to 
masquerading as Mg Hla Win’s relative in order to assist him. Despite the 
intervention from two different organisations, none of them were able to 
alter Mg Hla Win’s despondency. When two different organisations fail to 
assist a migrant with a claim that appears firmly within stipulated rules 
and regulations, one cannot help but speculate that this will only reinforce 
the abject asymmetrical power relations between the employer and the 
employee. At the same time, we need to attend to a central point Ma Soe 
raises regarding migrant assistance: the importance of localised, specific 
understanding of individual cases and spatial co-presence with migration 
assistance provision.
Outreach
The previous section made three important points regarding hotlines. First, 
despite a discourse professing safety in migration, hotlines can expose 
migrants to danger (e.g. deportation). Second, such risks remain insuf-
ficiently acknowledged (at least formally) due to many hotline operators’ 
bureaucratic indifference. Third, the feedback provided by those assisting 
from “afar” affirms the operational importance of having an on-the-ground 
presence in order to secure helpful outcomes for migrants. This may be 
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why many safe migration programmes have opted for alternative modes 
of assistance. In contrast to hotlines, community outreach privileges face-
to-face encounters with migrants, through either training sessions at com-
munity offices, MRCs and migrant language schools, or field visits where 
migrants congregate (factory dormitories or Buddhist temples frequented 
by migrants). Outreach work typically serves a twofold purpose: providing 
labour migrants with advice on labour law, visa, work permit processing, 
and various other forms of practical advice on labour migration, coupled 
with direct assistance relating to underpayment, worker compensation 
claims, and other labour law violations. In addition, some programmes also 
provide various forms of work-related training opportunities (commonly in 
the form of Thai language schools).
MRC1 is one programme which provides such outreach services. MRC1 
operates under the auspices of a large UN agency and enjoys strong collab-
oration with Thai labour unions. During my second visit, MRC1 invited me 
to observe a training session with Khmer migrants. Santi is one of the key 
facilitators of the training. He has worked for MRC1 for a few years. As we 
arrived a bit early, my research assistant and I have the opportunity to speak 
with Santi regarding the role of MRC1 and the services they offer migrants in 
the area. MRC1 have for some time worked closely with Thai Labour Unions 
and used them as a conduit to access labour migrants. Yet, this proved a 
challenge. For example, in recent times MRC1 had attempted to support 
both Thai and Migrant workers on collective bargaining agreements. But, 
employers typically outsource migrant workers to a sub-contracting com-
pany. This made access difficult, Santi explains. In addition, it remained a 
challenge to convince Thai labour unions to align themselves with migrant 
workers. Hence, MRC1 had to find other ways to recruit attendants for their 
training. To do so, MRC1 pay migrants 100 Baht for transport fee and pro-
vide them free lunch. This is the only way to get migrants to attend, one of 
Santi’s colleagues explains. In order to boost attendance numbers (in part 
due to pressure from MRC1’s donor to meet attendance targets), MRC1 pro-
vides an additional 500 Baht to participants who can recruit other migrants 
to come along. Santi and his colleagues express some reservations regarding 
the training that their donor wants them to provide. For example, MRC1 
has provided paralegal training for migrants in the past, but “what’s the 
point teaching immigration law when the law changes all the time anyway.” 
It is better, Santi and his colleagues claim, to teach migrants more tangible 
skills, such as today’s topic “saving and income management.”
The migrants arrive while we speak with Santi and his colleagues. It is 
time to start the training. Some twenty Khmer migrants are present in the 
room. They all work at a nearby noodle factory. Many of them, Santi tells 
us, have been in Thailand for about three years. The average age, we are 
told, is twenty, though many of them appear quite young. The training pro-
ceeds. Language problems are apparent early on. As MRC1 rarely deals 
with Khmer migrants, most of their training material is only available in 
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Thai and Burmese. Although all the participants understand verbal Thai, 
they cannot all read the instruction manuals. Yet, Santi proves to be skilled 
trainer, carefully pausing the training in order to check that the partici-
pants understand the training material’s advice on saving skills. He inserts 
several jokes along the way to ensure the session is good humoured and to 
sustain the participants’ interest. As the training proceeds, Santi advises 
on various strategies concerning how savings can be productively used 
for the livelihood of the migrants and the families. Although funded by a 
different agency, Santi’s training resembles parts of Ma Thida and MLC’s 
pre-decision training in Myanmar (see Chapter 4).
As the session progresses, I could not help wondering why the train-
ing required financial and material incentives for participants to attend. 
This stood in stark contrast to other programmes, such as the Myanmar 
Migration School (see Chapter 1), where migrants paid to attend (through 
tuition fees). Furthermore, how could MRC1 know the migrants’ moti-
vations for joining in? Did they attend to learn new skills, or earn extra 
income as “professional attendees?” Why had not more efforts been made 
to conduct a Khmer-specific training? Despite a well-prepared training cur-
riculum and Santi’s strong facilitator skills, the session’s objectives seemed 
disjointed from its target beneficiaries. Above all, the session provided lim-
ited opportunity for MRC1 to learn about the specific challenges and needs 
the migrants themselves faced. In short, the training session resembled what 
was observed in Chapter 4: programmatic imperatives (e.g. meeting targets 
for training attendees) take precedence over context-specific assistance. 
However, not all of MRC1’s activities take this form. MRC1 implements a 
range of training sessions and outreach services where Santi and his staff 
would travel to meet with migrants rather than the other way around.
Reaching out: Dormitory visits and the problem of scale
A few months passed. Santi calls my research assistant and I asking if we are 
interested in joining an outreach session amongst Myanmar factory work-
ers on the outskirts of Bangkok. We learn that Santi’s team has recruited 
a new Burmese outreach worker, Mg Ba Oo, with considerable experience 
working with Myanmar migrants. We readily accept Santi’s invitation. 
The following Sunday, my research assistants and I drive to the outskirts 
of Bangkok where Santi and Mg Ba Oo were running an outreach session 
within a migrant dormitory. The session had already started by the time we 
arrived. Around twenty people, with a rough equal split of men and women 
had gathered inside a tiny dormitory room, with several others listening 
into the conversation from outside the entrance door. We sit down amongst 
the migrants gathered right outside the entrance, just close enough to see 
and hear what is going on.
First, the participants signed a sheet for record keeping purposes, which 
we later learned was a donor requirement. Yet, this session differs from the 
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training session we had witnessed at MRC1’s office. It focuses on social secu-
rity under the labour law (despite Santi’s earlier mocking of such training). 
Yet instead of flipcharts, colour pens, and participatory exercises (which 
is ubiquitous in aid delivery), this session is conversational (rather than 
scripted), with ample space for attendees to ask questions. As the session 
takes place at the migrants’ dormitories, the participants receive no remu-
neration for attending the session.
Santi introduces MRC1 to the migrants, including its location. “If you 
want to meet us,” Santi says, “a good meeting point is the Elephant Crossing 
shopping centre,” Santi shares MRC1’s phone number. He explains that 
today they will discuss the importance of social security. “For example,” 
Santi says, “if you want to change employer you will need to know what 
to do.” Santi proceeds with explaining various social security entitlements 
under the Thai labour law. “The employer can only deduct 5% for the 
security fund.” A migrant immediately replies, “our employer deducts for 
other things.” Santi responds by affirming that this is not within the law. 
Several migrants are visibly surprised to learn this. Further questions are 
asked regarding the questionable deductions and how it can be addressed. 
“You have two options,” Santi says. He explains that the migrants can either 
approach the employer directly, or they can make a collective appeal going 
through MRC1, which may involve lodging a complaint at the department 
of labour protection and welfare (DLPW). Santi emphasises that joining 
together as one group is likely to gain more traction. It is also easier for MRC1 
to assist a group of migrants as opposed to numerous individual cases.
The conversation shifts to Burmese language. Mg Ba Oo takes over, con-
tinuing the theme of social security and entitlements under the labour law. 
He explains that salaries should be in accordance with minimum wage. As 
Santi, Mg Ba Oo emphasises that they need unity when they lodge com-
plaints. Furthermore, to be successful with complaints, it is important that 
they observe and record working hours. They can do so by, for example, 
taking a photo of their worktime card with their mobile phone, Mg Ba Oo 
advices. After every five hours, you must rest before overtime; otherwise, it 
is against the law, he explains. The migrants listen attentively whilst Mg Ba 
Oo speaks. At times, migrants’ comment, or laugh in despair, on how the 
law stands in stark contrast to their own circumstances.
As the session proceeds, more and more migrants ask specific questions 
pertaining to their own problems. Mg Ba Oo advises a migrant who had 
lost his passport that he should report this to the police and that it should 
only cost 100 Baht. Then, he must obtain a new passport at the Myanmar 
Embassy. The migrant explains that he has already gone to the Embassy, but 
they won’t help as he does not have a copy of the original passport. Santi, 
who is listening in on the conversation, suggests that this case is a good 
example of why it is important to have backup plans for documents. “Take 
a photocopy of your passport,” he said, “and share it with a few trusted 
friends via text messaging apps (such as viber) so you can access it later, 
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even if you lose your phone.” Mg Ba Oo explains: “If you lose your evidence, 
you have lost your chances.”
The difficulties with obtaining formal documents at the Myanmar 
Embassy digress into a discussion around brokers. Another migrant in the 
room complains that when he goes to the embassy, he has to wait forever, 
but he sees those coming with a broker being served fast. Mg Ba Oo advises 
them that “they should use brokers that are close to the embassy; they only 
cost 500 Baht; if you use a broker near where you live, they can cost you 
more than 10,000.”
Whilst the discussion continues, I notice a middle-aged lady who is sitting 
close to me and seems to struggle following the conversation (which at this 
point has switched from Thai to Burmese). Judging by her appearance, she 
looks Lao. After some quiet chit-chat, it turns out that she indeed is Lao. 
The lady, Vhon, tells us that many employers withhold workers’ passports. 
Vhon experienced this herself at her former employer, where her husband 
is still working. The factory, she alleges, demands a 5000 Baht return “fee” 
in order to hand back your passport. Vhon explains to us that another Lao 
friend of hers is dealing with this problem at the moment. While the infor-
mation session continues, we decide to move to her friend’s dormitory a few 
doors away from the training in order to discuss the matter in more detail.
Vhon and Da know each other from a paper factory nearby where they 
both previously worked. They are both from Southern Laos and have been 
in Thailand for a long time (20 and 10 years respectively). Da has a Thai boy-
friend. Yet, despite her migration experience and local connections, she has 
numerous problems with her employment situation. Da works at the same 
paper factory as Vhon’s husband. She has been there for over a year. The 
factory employs some thousand workers, nearly all of them from Myanmar. 
Only ten Lao migrants work there. All the Lao workers, except herself and 
Vhon’s husband, reside at dormitories within the factory compound. She 
tells us that although this is cheaper than her current rent (600 Baht rent 
plus water and electricity versus her current rent of 2000 Baht), she prefers 
this arrangement as the factory dormitories observe curfews (workers are 
not allowed to leave the compound at night) and restrict workers ability to 
receive visitors.
Da works Monday to Saturday from 8 am to 6 pm, which means her work 
hours include forced overtime (70 Baht per hour). Each time she receives her 
wages the employer deducts 400 Baht which allegedly is put into a “saving 
account.” They are told that the savings will be returned to the workers once 
they complete their contracts. The employer also possesses the workers’ 
passports. Da explains that the employer has also requested her handing 
over her Thai work permit card, something she refused. Instead, she agreed 
to them keeping a photocopy, she explains.
Da explains that when she commenced work at the factory, she showed 
them all her documents: passport and work permit, as well as a document 
evidencing discontinuation of work for her previous employer (which is a 
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legal recruitment for changing employers). Due to increased crackdowns by 
the Thai military government, the employer was keen to register Da, and 
advanced a 1600 Baht registration fee which was later deducted from Da’s 
earnings.7 It was through this registration process the employer ended up 
with Da’s passport. A compounding challenge for Da is her alleged allergic 
reactions (which include breathing difficulties) due to chemicals used during 
paper production.
Da is unhappy about the conditions at the factory. Two months ago, 
Da wrote a resignation letter, explaining she had to discontinue work due 
to pregnancy (which was a white lie). Her resignation was not accepted. 
Da is now unsure what to do as she is unable to leave the factory without 
risking a financial and legal limbo. As an experienced migrant, she knows 
that if she simply leaves the factory, she breaches her work permit condi-
tions, as employer’s written consent is required to exit a contract legally.8 
Furthermore, leaving the factory would also mean losing her accumulated 
unpaid wages from the factory’s dubious “saving scheme.” While speaking 
with her, she is, nonetheless, entertaining the idea of leaving the factory 
the following year. We suggest to Da that she should speak to the outreach 
team, something she agrees to. A bit later, Santi joins the conversation.
Da explains to Santi the various problems she is facing. Santi listens 
attentively to her story. Da tells Santi that she is uncomfortable approach-
ing the authorities. “Why would they listen to her,” she ponders. She also 
fears potential retaliation from the factory if she takes her complaints to the 
authorities. Yet, speaking with Santi provides some assurance. Santi sug-
gests a two-pronged strategy. He advises Da to submit another resignation 
letter to the factory the following Monday. He tells her to keep a copy of the 
letter as this would provide her with evidence that she has indeed resigned, 
regardless of how the factory responds to her resignation. Then, she should 
be able to leave after she receives her next wage as this would comply with 
the necessary notification requirements. Santi further explains that he 
can assist her with approaching the relevant labour authorities regarding 
the “saving scheme.” Santi tells Da that the employer’s conduct is clearly 
against the law as it supersedes the legally stipulated 5% deduction for the 
social security fund.
Yet, after some further discussion, Santi’s strategy appears to contain 
limitations. Upon further inspection of Da’s documents, it turns out that 
the deduction of 400 Baht from her wages only is receipted for one month. 
Hence, it would be difficult, Santi says, to challenge the company for illegal 
deductions for more than that particular month. Furthermore, the copy of 
Da’s work permit does not appear to be the correct one under the work 
arrangement Da was under the impression that she holds a work permit 
under the auspices of the MOU system. Yet, according to Santi, her papers 
do not reflect this. This will complicate Da’s ability to proceed with the 
resignation. Despite this hurdle, Santi points out that the withholding of 
Da’s passport is illegal and MRC1 could assist with this matter, even if this 
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would mean going to the police. Santi agrees to follow-up in a few weeks’ 
time to allow Da some time to think it over.
Two weeks later, we give Santi a call to get an update on the case. Santi 
explains that he had spoken to Da who had by then already moved away 
from the factory. The previous employer still possesses her passport. Santi 
says:
It is the fact that, Da was exploited [by the employer] on many fronts but 
she did not want to enter into a legal process against the employer. What 
she only wants is to have an employment. This is the real problem that 
many workers face, even Thai workers. It is because the system does not 
support them. This becomes a blessing to employers to the point that 
I, myself, cannot differentiate between [their working situations] and 
[situations of being] enslaved labourers.
Despite this grim comment, Santi tells us that they are still working on get-
ting Da’s passport returned. “So, let wait and see,” Santi tells us.
Let us consider the various dynamics of MRC1’s safe migration outreach. 
On the one hand, the outreach service I describe above is impeccable. Both 
Santi and Mg Ba Oo are highly skilled outreach workers with up-to-date 
knowledge of labour law and government processes. They are also skilled 
at conversing with migrants and hold a good understanding of their cir-
cumstances. They provide considerable advice to migrants which goes well 
beyond generic and scripted information. It is hard to see how they could 
have carried out their outreach session differently. Yet, the efficacy of their 
outreach comes with several challenges.
Scale is important for assistance. Santi and Mg Ba Oo both encourage 
collective action as this creates “safety in numbers” and affords traction. 
Although never mentioned by either Santi or Mg Ba Oo, scale also effec-
tuates an administrative convenience for MRC1 as a smaller number of 
larger cases are easier to assist than numerous individual cases. The pre-
dominance of Myanmar migrants means that both language and staff hir-
ing of MRC1 gravitate towards Burmese language and Myanmar migrants. 
Conversely, individual migrants, such as Da, are much harder to help. The 
stakes of taking individual cases forward are high, which results in Da 
deciding against making a formal complaint. Scale also has direct bearing 
on what we discussed in Chapter 3: how Lao migrants become invisible 
through safe migration assistance. Given the larger numbers of Myanmar 
migrant workers, outreach services are unsurprisingly tailored to those 
needs. Yet, this means that Lao migrants – despite their stronger linguistic, 
cultural, and social similarities with the Thais – are nonetheless excluded 
from services. If it was not for our presence, Vhon and Da may not have 
had any opportunity to obtain advice and help from MRC1 (indeed, MRC1 
would likely remain unaware of the presence of any Lao workers at the 
dormitory compound).
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MRC1’s outreach also brings to light how informal dimensions of assis-
tance relates in complex ways to how legal documents and administrative 
processes (such as passports and work permit processing mechanisms) 
are meant to effect safety for migrant workers. On the one hand, legal and 
administrative documents (e.g. passports, work permits, photocopies of 
timesheets, etc.) are required for complaints to gain traction. As Mg Ba Oo 
says, “If you lose your evidence, you have lost your chances.” We saw the 
precise same dynamic in the context of pre-decision training in Myanmar 
(Chapter 4) where the lack of receipts made it impossible for MLC to assist 
migrants who had been conned by unscrupulous brokers. At the same time, 
official documents also serve as instruments for administrative compliance 
which makes it arduous for migrants to succeed through these processes. To 
comply (such as replacing a lost passport), migrants must engage in admin-
istrative procedures (such as queuing at the embassy) that are difficult (if 
not impossible) to fulfil for many migrants. Most migrants would need to 
skip work – an act which would likely breach their work conditions – in 
order to allow time to process a new passport. The lack of receipts, even for 
fraudulent saving schemes, makes complaints difficult. Furthermore, once 
your paperwork is slightly out of step with formal guidelines, such as Da’s 
incorrect work permit, documents end up exposing migrants to risk (for not 
complying) as opposed to serve as conduits for successful grievances.
Rather than formal documents ensuring entitlements for migrants, such 
regulatory instruments (see Alpes 2017) become in practice an arduous, 
endless labyrinth of bureaucratic subjection which makes migrants easily 
non-compliant, and therefore potentially blameable. This does not only 
place Da in relations of precarity resembling neo-bondage (Alpes 2017; 
Campbell 2018; Derks 2010a). It also makes it impossible for migrants to 
navigate all this without external help. This is why Da was unable to pro-
ceed without extended advice from Santi. This is also why Mg Ba Oo ends 
up advising migrants on how to pick a “good broker.” In effect, despite the 
outreach session focusing on migrant workers’ formal entitlements (labour 
law and social security,) they both have to go “off script” providing infor-
mal forms of assistance which is beyond their programmes’ self-definition 
(as far as I am aware, no safe migration project formally proclaims advice 
on how to pick a broker as part of their programme intervention). Going 
beyond formal aid delivery is central to Santi and Mg Ba Oo’ outreach 
work, which is evident in successful compensation claim cases, which we 
will now turn to.
When complaints are successful
I do not know what happened to Da. Nor am I sure whether MRC1’s out-
reach work resulted in any substantive change for the majority Myanmar 
workers at the dormitory we visited. Yet, as we will see in Chapter 9, when 
larger groups of migrants’ band together, various achievements come about. 
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And individual migrants do at times have success when complaining to 
authorities. A range of MRCs, alongside a range of other programmes, offer 
specific case work support with both informal and formal appeals, typically 
relating to work accidents and underpayments. The following compensation 
case, administered by MRC2, sheds light on both the enormous amount of 
work required by MRC case officers and the various informal workarounds 
they employ in order to secure compensation.
Ma Kathy, a 21-year-old female labour migrant, works at an auto part 
factory. One day, Ma Kathy’s hand is squashed by a malfunctioning hydrau-
lic pump machine, resulting in her needing to amputate four fingers. Ma 
Kathy requests MRC2’s assistance with lodging a claim at the social secu-
rity office in the province. MRC2 also lodges the case at the local police sta-
tion as well as the DLPW office. Lodging the case to multiple offices serves 
as MRC2’s strategy in increasing the success of the case, as different arms 
of the government tend to carry out certain functions better than others. 
For example, whereas the SSO office responds to compensation claims, it 
lacks DLPW’s (with its labour inspection authority) leverage in pursuing 
non-compliant employers. Approximately six months later, the SSO office 
contacts Ma Kathy with an outcome of the case. MRC2’s case file states the 
following regarding SSO’s verdict:
According to SSO Letter dated 19th December 2013, SSO board of 
directors have decided that the employer is responsible for the loss of 
body parts of employee which amounting to 32% of total loss of body 
capacity and ordered the employer to pay the employee at the rate of 
monthly salary of 4,680 Baht into 64 months totalling 299,520 Baht as 
the compensation payment under Royal Compensation Act, B.E 2537, 
Clause 18 (2).
Subsequently, the SSO office calls in Ma Kathy (who is accompanied by 
an official from MRC2) and the employer to arrange for the compensation 
claim payment. The employer requests payments to be made in instalments. 
Ma Kathy agrees to this arrangement. With the SSO and MRC2 officers 
serving as witnesses, the employer agrees to pay Ma Kathy the full amount 
in instalments over 33 months, with the first payment to be made in March 
of that year. The agreement was signed by both the parties.
By the end of March, the employer fails to make any payment. An MRC2 
officer contacts the employer and negotiates the payment to take place by the 
end of April. April comes. Again, no payment ensues. The MRC officer calls 
the employer again to discover that his phone number has now been barred. 
MRC2 reports the incident to the SSO office, who, in turn, approaches 
the employer. Confusion becomes apparent between the SSO and MRC2 
regarding the liability of the case. Who is truly responsible for the accident: 
the auto-part factory where Ma Kathy worked, or the engineering company 
that leased out the hydraulic pump? The fact that the auto-part factory has 
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by now severed their contract with the engineering company complicates 
matters further. In any case, SSO cannot enforce payment directly as Ma 
Kathy does not hold SSO membership.
After further deliberations, MRC2 and Ma Kathy decide to file a law-
suit against the employer of the auto-part factory. MRC2 drafts a budget 
for the potential legal costs which they submit to their donor (and interna-
tional safe migration programme). The donor declines the request. As the 
donor only funds MRC2 on a one-year basis, they must acquit funds within 
this time period. As compensation claims often take long time to negotiate 
through the labour courts (often more than two years), the donor would be 
in breach with its funding regulations.
In the end, MRC2 staff, in liaison with a local Thai labour union, approach 
Ma Kathy suggesting they hire an external lawyer on a commission basis. 
Ma Kathy agrees. MRC2 assists Ma Kathy securing a lawyer who charges 
30% commission. In the end, the case is lodged at the provincial labour 
court, which rules in Ma Kathy’s favour. In the end, Ma Kathy receives her 
compensation, of which 30% went to her lawyer. The whole case took three 
and a half years.
The case demonstrates the discrepancy between a compensation claim 
ruling and the actual capacity to enforce it. Employers using a range of 
legal loopholes, including filing bankruptcy, is a common way to avoid pay-
ment, a point that was flagged to me in interviews by several Thai lawyers. 
Furthermore, such compensation cases require enormous resources both 
in terms of time and money. For this reason, many migrants decide against 
pursuing such cases (a point that is widely known amongst aid practitioners).
In this particular case, Ma Kathy is eventually successful with the com-
pensation claim. When considering how such “success” comes about, it is 
important to attend to the informal dimensions of the process. In the end, 
the case officer had to engage lawyers (on a commission basis) outside the 
programme as their donor could not fund court costs. The case heavily 
depends on the case worker as an intermediary to push the case forward. 
At the same time, the lack of formal status (in this case no membership of 
SSO) makes it harder for the government body to act on the case. Yet, going 
through the formal channels take time and raises the bar of success and 
evidence is commonly premised on positivist notions of evidence (copies of 
pay slips, etc.), which in practice results in many migrants deciding against 
pursuing cases. Hence, for this reason, many migrants prefer informal set-
tlements, which echo broader practices of informal dispute resolution in the 
region (Cheesman 2015; Munger 2015; Prasse-Freeman 2015a).9 Analogous 
to the outreach services discussed earlier, although documentary evidence 
improves chances of appeals, it also raises the bar for what kind of cases 
that can be taken forward. As this is commission-based, it means that a cer-
tain percentage will be paid to the lawyer resulting in a reduced amount of 
compensation to the migrant. In this sense, the migrant ends up settling for 
less than the original claim, a practice which seems to be common amongst 
Destinations 129
a range of NGOs that support migrants. For example, Migration Aid, which 
supports a large volume of migrants through both informal and formal dis-
pute settlements, claims to have a high ratio of success with their case load 
(approximately 80%), which echoes larger researcher findings in the region 
(Bylander 2019). Yet, most of these cases involve either commissions for law-
yers, or negotiated settlements which can sometimes be as low as 40–45% of 
formal stipulated rates (cf. Campbell 2018). Success, quite literarily, comes 
at a cost.
Conclusion
Gary’s observation at the beginning of this chapter turns out to be right. 
Legal documents do matter in how migrants are able to make complaints, 
though it matters in ways that are quite different to what Gary had in mind. 
Although migrants’ legal status leverages efficacious assistance provi-
sion, it can also – paradoxically – amplify difficulties for migrants (i.e. the 
employer withholding Da’s passport). Consequently, aid programmes often 
go off script, succumbing to informal practices in order to achieve positive 
outcomes for migrants, whether it depends on Boonchu persuading police 
officers to reinterpret migrants as victims as opposed to deportable “illegal 
migrants”, Mg Ba Oo coaching migrants on how to pick a “good broker” 
when processing documents, Ma Soe self-representing as a migrant work-
er’s “auntie” (as opposed to MRC officer) when approaching an employer, 
or MRC2’s decision to explore legal assistance outside their programme 
workplan.
The gravitation towards informal practices is not to say that legal docu-
ments and formal procedures do not matter. In fact, a key point this chapter 
has made is that informal practices and subjectivities are not oppositional 
to legal and formal praxis but are constitutive of one another. On the one 
hand, adhering to formal regulations (e.g. possessing passport and work 
permit) enables migrants to complain, but in order to do so, they must com-
ply with procedural and evidentiary requirements (e.g. copies of pay slips) 
which, in turn, limits their ability to move forward. This increases migrants’ 
dependency on external parties for assistance. Such dynamics structure the 
provision of aid assistance itself. Despite a nominal focus on regulation and 
law, aid agencies must frequently move beyond their prescribed intervention 
modalities.
Outreach workers, such as Santi and Mg Ba Oo, personalise law and reg-
ulation within a cultural context of patrimonial relations. The law becomes 
social relations. Yet, going off script does not mean that informal practices are 
replacing regulation, but rather, structures the interaction between migrants 
and aid providers in specific ways. As such, this chapter has extended the 
contours of a central theme that we have seen examples of in earlier chapters, 
which we will continue to explore in the next section of this book: how safe 
migration assistance constitutes forms of brokerage and brokering.
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Notes
 1. Although Boltanski argues that speech acts (as opposed to direct action) are 
a central mode of reaction to distant suffering, it is notable that hotlines blur 
this distinction. Hotline calls appear as action given that hotline operators are 
premised on assemblages of responses (rescues, file of complains, social work 
responses, etc).
 2. Official emergency numbers, such as Thailand’s 191 police emergency number, 
were excluded due to ethical and legal implications of calling them.
 3. A programme officer who worked for the only remaining NGO running 
a Lao-targeted hotline told me that they had provided this hotline number 
to another NGO who ran pre-departure training back in Laos. Despite this 
mechanism had been in place for two years, she was not aware of any calls that 
had resulted from this arrangement.
 4. According to the director, only 10% of calls require referrals where they rely 
on various Ministries as needed. Another 5% of their cases are followed up 
by their mobile team who does site visits. Hence, 85% of calls are informa-
tion-based. Although this distinction is recognised in interviews, this does not 
stop the centre to “count” such calls towards their hotline statistics.
 5. Airline companies risk fines for allowing embarkation of passengers without 
proper travel permits (such as visas). Some countries require Universities to 
register class attendance of international students as part of their visa require-
ment. Both the cases exemplify the institutional and spatial broadening of 
border control.
 6. SSO is Thailand’s official social security fund.
 7. It is unclear whether this fee is legal. At the time of the interview, the stipu-
lated fee for Lao workers through the MOU system was 14,000 Baht/452 USD 
(not 16,000 Baht/517USD), but as Ms B was not going through any agency it 
is unclear why the fee is paid. In any case, by Thai labour law, deductions of 
wages (beyond 5% for social security fund) is illegal. Also, after Santi exam-
ines her documents, Da appears to not be registered under the MOU system 
(in contrast to Da’s own understanding of her situation).
 8. The Thai labour law changed soon after this incident, which liberalised 
migrant workers’ ability to change employers. Migrant workers under the 
MOU system are still subject to strict rules which makes is difficult to change 
employers.
 9. Relatedly, it is noteworthy that NGO officials often told me that they have to 
build informal, personal relationships with local officials in order to gain trac-
tion with cases, a phenomenon that appear common within the Thai NGO 





7 On humanitarian spaces
I need to amputate your leg
(Thai medical doctor uses google translate on his smartphone 
to communicate with a Burmese patient)
Introduction
Prior to joining MRC1, Mg Ba Oo was active in a network comprising infor-
mal migrant associations which received occasional funding from an inter-
national safe migration programme. One other member of this network is 
Maung Thawdar. As Mg Ba Oo, Maung Thawdar is from Myanmar but 
with several years of migration experience in Thailand. Initially, working as 
an unskilled labourer, Maung Thawdar has gradually worked himself into 
a position as a healthcare worker in one of the Bangkok’s hospitals where he 
assists with translation. Maung Thawdar is one of the numerous Burmese 
translators that work within the Thai health sector, either through NGOs 
or directly employed by the Ministry of Health, which serves Thailand’s 
growing migrant population with healthcare needs.
When I first visited Maung Thawdar at his hospital, I was struck by how 
the physical configuration of his office expressed the Thai health sector’s 
relation with labour migrants. His office had an ambiguous status; although 
his healthcare ID card and office (with formal signage) indicate a formal 
incorporation into the healthcare system, it was nonetheless separated away 
from the main building, right near a shed of parked mopeds, adjacent to 
where some stray dogs were lurking in the shade of Bangkok’s hot sun. 
Hence, his office’s incorporation into the hospital seemed deprecate and 
half-hearted, yet represented a form of incorporation, nonetheless. Here, 
Maung Thawdar would meet health-seeking labour migrants in order to 
arrange for the necessary appointments, physical examinations, and surger-
ies within the main hospital building.
In the past, Maung Thawdar says, migrants from Myanmar had no legal 
documents. The hospital had to report patients without documents to the 
immigration authorities. Report and deport, that was the policy response, 
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he explains. But as migrants risked deportation, they did not dare going 
to the hospital. The result, according to Maung Thawdar, was immense 
suffering for sick migrants, even to the point of death. “But the rules have 
changed!” Maung Thawdar exclaims. “The government now allows undoc-
umented migrants to access the health system.”
As explained in earlier chapters, due to the increasing numbers of docu-
mented migrants in Thailand, many labour migrants possess health insur-
ance due to their legal status. Yet in addition, the Thai health system has 
in recent years adopted a liberal approach to healthcare provision, even 
allowing undocumented migrants and their defendants health treatment 
(Tangcharoensathien et al. 2017; Tuangratananon et al. 2019). Thailand is 
often lauded as one of the world’s leaders in how they provide health ser-
vices to its migrant workforce (Upneja 2016). Such liberal approaches to 
healthcare contrast with other responses we have explored earlier, such as 
hotlines, where assistance risks resulting in deportations. Undocumented 
status can also limit NGO’s operational space, as assisting undocumented 
migrants may in certain circumstances be interpreted as violating the law;, 
a point highlighted to me by NGO outreach workers who deal with labour 
dispute cases. Yet, the Thai health system appears to approach the question 
of legal status rather differently, a point that was confirmed to me by sen-
ior Ministry of Health officials as well as health workers, such as Maung 
Thawdar, who deals with migrants directly on a daily basis.
Hence, the health sector constitutes an operational space where migrants 
and service provision connect in specific ways.1 A central claim this chapter 
makes is that the health sector can usefully be understood as a humanitarian 
space which presents aid actors with leverage in how they engage migrants. 
As will become evident, a growing workforce of migrant translators, such as 
Maung Thawdar, is central to migration assistance. And it is impossible to 
understand this without an appreciation of how the health sector both ena-
bles and is enabled by a humanitarian ethos of human suffering which – to 
some extent – moves practice beyond the political and legal to the realm of the 
moral. As such, the health sector illuminates how migration assistance must be 
understood as an interface between actors and principles. This helps explain 
a scalar dimension within migration assistance, that is, “the spatial reach of 
actions” (Xiang 2013, 3). In what follows, we will explore the emergence of 
this humanitarian space and the ways in which it has enabled a meso-level of 
migration assistance work through health translators. However, first, some 
comments are required in terms of how health services are situated within 
humanitarian spaces and the operational space of safe migration governance.
Life, legitimacy, and humanitarian spaces
Historically, religious-moral spaces constitute the main geo-political 
form for humanitarian exceptionalism. Both past and present, churches, 
mosques, and temples serve as sites for refuge and asylum where religious 
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authorities protect migrants from arrest and deportations. In the Mekong 
region too, Buddhist temples have been – and continue to be – prominent 
heterotopic spaces where direct interference on temple grounds (such as 
apprehending suspected undocumented migrants) is unlikely as it disrupts 
Buddhist principles of moral equanimity – even amongst a Thai populace 
that holds rather hostile views towards migrants (International Labour 
Organization 2019). Hence, temples are unlikely targets for border control 
surveillance, and as we have (and will) see throughout this book, temple 
grounds are central congregating points for many migrants. The Thai edu-
cation system is another arena where the Thai authorities observe relative 
liberal approaches to immigration. Migrant and stateless children – regard-
less of their legal status – are entitled to attend Thai schools (Akiyama et al. 
2013; see also Lee 2014; Tuangratananon et al. 2019).
Whereas temples bring to light how corporeality relates to moral and 
transcendental qualities of human existence (i.e. karma), the education sys-
tem accentuates the unique status of the underage in relation to humani-
tarian ethos: how childhood rests on notions of moral purity (Lancy 2014; 
Montgomery 2008). In other words, they evoke spaces where life as such 
(Fassin 2009) – as opposed to agentic, existential, or political qualities of 
human existence – assumes particular significance. This connects with 
where this chapter started off: health services. Hence, health, education, 
and temples evoke life and the living in specific ways, which makes it possi-
ble to conceive of them as humanitarian spaces.
Health service provision is of particular interest as it reveals how what 
Didier Fassin has coined biolegitimacy and health service provision ties in 
with the mobilisation of migration assistance. Extending Foucault’s ana-
lytical explication of biopolitics, Fassin argues that the question of govern-
ment does not merely concern power over life but also power of life (Fassin 
2009). By exploring “…the construction of the meaning and values of life 
instead of the exercise of forces and strategies to control it” (Fassin 2009, 
52), one is able to interrogate a range of political and moral projects around 
the world, ranging from humanitarian aid, immigration control, and mili-
tary interventions. For instance, historical changes to how political asylum 
has been administered in France demonstrate how the legitimacy of asylum 
has shifted from testimony (based on asylum seekers’ claim of political per-
secution) towards medicalised and pathologised bodies (e.g. migrants who 
are allowed residence due to medical conditions, such as HIV Aids, that 
cannot be treated in their home country) (Fassin and Halluin 2005). Hence, 
biological supersedes political life in terms of its acceptability and traction 
as a source of claim making. By drawing attention to how life legitimates 
and is legitimated, it becomes possible to pay closer attention to how life is 
mobilised and valued differently in various contexts (bio-inequalities).
“Biolegitimacy,” Fassin argues, “has become a crucial issue in the moral 
economies of contemporary societies” (Fassin 2009, 50), and is readily 
evident amongst aid programmes that work with migrants in the Mekong 
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region. Echoing border control policies elsewhere in the world, the biologi-
cal body has increasingly become source of truth claims in trafficking cases 
(such as the use of skeletal X-Ways technology to determine age of alleged 
trafficked victims) and the ubiquitous usage of the term “trafficking survi-
vor” is quite telling of how the corporal body (as opposed to political agency 
of a migrant) has become a central locus within anti-trafficking discourse 
(Molland 2019a). At times, programme implementation engages in ritual-
istic acts that also denote a preoccupation with redeeming the living. I have, 
for example, witnessed trafficking workshops where a one-minute silence 
has been observed in respect for trafficked victims (see Molland 2019a). In 
what follows, we will consider more specifically how biolegitimacy in the 
context of health service provision relates to operational spaces for safe 
migration interventions.
Thailand’s healthcare services and labour migrants
“I need to amputate your leg.” A Thai doctor shows his smartphone screen 
to Denpo, a Burmese patient. By using Google Translate, the doctor con-
veys the grim news. This is how Denpo retells the story of his sordid fate 
that took place some months prior to me meeting him. A horrific workplace 
accident (his leg was badly injured when operating a defunct lawnmower) 
resulted in Denpo being taken to the hospital. In addition to the excrucia-
tion pain and trauma relating to losing his leg, he conveys the added stress 
of not being able to communicate clearly with the local hospital staff due 
to his limited Thai language skills. Indeed, whilst speaking to me, Denpo 
still remains unsure exactly why the leg had to be amputated. Still, the 
smartphone, Denpo says, did allow some minimal form of communica-
tion between him and the doctors (thanks to Google Translate). Whilst this 
exemplifies the creative ways in which smartphones are utilised in a migra-
tion context, it also underscores migrant workers’ healthcare and transla-
tion needs. It also points to migrant workers’ ubiquitous use of the Thai 
health system.
The numbers in Thailand are staggering. In recent years, more than a 
million migrants have sought health insurance, with even larger number 
utilising the Thai health system (Tangcharoensathien et al. 2017). Hospitals 
and health services in either border zones or areas with high concertation of 
migrants serve large number of labour migrants. Besides obtaining medial 
help due to work accidents, such as Denpo, migrants use the health system 
for a range of health services, including vaccinations, pregnancies, and a 
range of other medical needs. This is so much the case that public hospi-
tal signage often will include Lao and Myanmar language. For example, 
hospitals in Samut Sakon and Nong Khai have Burmese and Lao language 
signage, respectively. As such, health services constitute a key contact point 
between migrants and the Thai state which differs in important ways to 
other state agencies.
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Labour migrants encounter the Thai state in three ways. First, whether it 
is being through passport and visa processing, border crossings, or deporta-
tions, migrants are likely to encounter either police or immigration authori-
ties during their sojourns. This positions police and immigration authorities 
as central state agents in relation to migrants. As a large body of literature 
(Derks 2010b; De Genova 2002) and earlier chapters have demonstrated, 
this renders migrants – even with minor administrative irregulates in their 
paperwork – vulnerable to punitive responses (such as deportations). This is 
also why immigration and police agencies are deeply problematic as poten-
tial “protectors” (e.g. as in protecting trafficked victims), which help explain 
why migrants generally fear state authorities (Anderson 2012). As migrants 
are likely to evade (as opposed to seek) police and immigration authori-
ties for assistance, such state agencies are structurally poorly positioned to 
establish connections of trust with migrants.
Second, many migrants also interact with labour and social welfare 
departments either through labour inspections (to uncover abuse and 
undocumented migrants), or through employment-related entitlements and 
claims (access to social security fund, work accidents, wage theft, and other 
workplace-related conflicts). Although many of these services are set up to 
assist migrants (e.g. target welfare, abuse, and exploitation), they are in prac-
tice intertwined with the aforementioned immigration and border control 
priorities which pose problems for undocumented migrants in particular. It 
places migrants in an impossible situation where revealing employers’ abuse 
and malpractice also expose migrants to potential danger (e.g. charges of 
violating immigration law should documents not be of a satisfactory order). 
Earlier chapters have pointed out some of the problems this produces, 
including the difficulties with taking complaints forward (see Chapter 6). 
This also makes safe migration assistance delivery highly unstable. Not 
only do NGOs risk ending up exacerbating (as opposed to ameliorating) 
migrants’ despondency (such as the deportation of Dao in Chapter 6); it 
can also jeopardise aid programmes. As one MRC official told me, labour 
officials had made no secret to them that assisting undocumented migrant 
workers would in effect make the MRC complicit in assisting an illegal alien. 
Although local policy implementation varies in practice (Suphanchaimat 
et al. 2019) and many NGOs are able to bypass such problems by nurtur-
ing close (often personal) relations with local officials, it does point to the 
precarity of assistance within a context where it is arduously difficult for 
many migrants to maintain an unequivocal documented status. While I am 
unaware of specific cases where legal action has been taken against organ-
isations in a Thai context, it is notable how this mirrors a wider trend in 
global border control regimes where state authorities criminalise migration 
assistance by relabelling it as a form of “trafficking” (McNevin et al. 2016).
Thailand’s health services, the third main governmental body that migrants 
are likely to interact with, differ in that regard. Whereas undocumented 
migrants would risk being reported and deported when seeking health 
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services in the past, this has in recent years changed. In practice, NGOs have 
been able to establish relations with hospital that allows treatment regardless 
of status, as exemplified by one programme officer from a Thai NGO.
From our experience, when it comes to health, undocumented migrants 
risked [in the past] to be reported to the immigration authorities. But 
we had volunteers in the community They would provide assistance and 
accompany undocumented migrants when seeking health services to 
minimise the risk of being reported. If migrants go alone [to the hos-
pital], they may be reported to the police. We have worked with about 
ten migrant community-based groups (CBOs) who help undocumented 
migrants in this way. An interpreter and social worker go with the 
migrant.
Hence, NGO health outreach workers and translators in effect enable “human-
itarian corridors” which allow health access for undocumented migrants. It 
is notable how this resemble negotiated (as opposed to formal rule-bound) 
access which echoes how Boonchu (see Chapter 6) and his NGO depend on 
informal relations with state officials (i.e. police) in order to ensure police 
treat rescued migrants (resultant from hotline calls) as trafficked victims 
(with entitlement to care and protections) as opposed to illegal migrants (who 
are subject to deportation). Yet, over the years, the Thai Ministry of Health 
has, in contrast to other arms of government, become far more liberal in how 
it deals with uncommented migrants. Migrant healthcare services must also 
be understood in the context of an increasing formalisation of migrant sta-
tus. With the growing number of migrants obtaining semi-legal of fully legal 
migration status, they are progressively able to access the Thai health system 
in formal ways (based on medical health insurance). Despite these changes 
to migrant status, many migrants remain undocumented, or hold partial 
legal status (e.g. a valid passport but an expired work permit). Yet, since the 
early 2000s, Thai authorities allow (and actively encourage) undocumented 
migrants to obtain health insurance (Tangcharoensathien et al. 2017). As 
such, despite an official policy that is rather punitive towards undocumented 
migrants, the Thai state – through health provision – officially endorses (and 
seeks to incorporate) undocumented labour migrants.
Ministry of Health’ distinct approach to labour migrants, which has sev-
eral times been lauded as “best practice” in international media and com-
mentary (Upneja 2016), can be traced back to the pressing need to address 
infectious diseases. “The Bangkok floods back in 2011 was very important,” 
Maung Thawdar explains. Besides language barriers, migrants (who back 
then were largely undocumented) were also reluctant to access health ser-
vices due to their precarious legal status. Yet, the Bangkok floods forced 
many migrants to seek emergency medical care. At the same time, Maung 
Thawdar explains, the floods increased the risk of communicable diseases 
spreading, especially tuberculosis. Allowing migrants – regardless of their 
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legal status – to seek healthcare became a public health priority. Yet, the 
Thai Ministry of health was poorly equipped to deal with the situation. 
Without established conduits of trust between healthcare services and 
migrants, coupled with a glaring lack of translators (due to laws which pre-
vented government bodies from hiring foreign workers), migrants could not 
easily be incorporated into healthcare provision. Yet, the floods, Maung 
Thawdar says, forced migrants out of the woodworks resulting in a dramatic 
increase of hospital admittance amongst migrants. This opened a space for 
NGOs to provide (and pay for) health translators assigned to hospitals. This 
is how Maung Thawdar himself ended up working for the hospital. The 2016 
Alien Working Act, B.E. 2551 (No.3), B.E. 2559 allows government bodies 
to directly employ foreign workers as translators (Government of Thailand 
2008). Throughout my fieldwork, I could confirm that several hospitals now 
employ Burmese translators. As such, healthcare language translation has 
become somewhat of an unrecognised career path for people such as Maung 
Thawdar. Hence, the expansion of translators goes hand in hand with a less-
ened focus on reporting undocumented migrants to immigration author-
ities. Furthermore, in the greater Bangkok region, the Bangkok flood has 
been a pivotal catalyst for this change, according to Maung Thawdar.
Ministry of Health officials, NGO staff, and other translators con-
firmed this to me. Whereas undocumented migrants risked being reported 
to immigration authorities in the past, this has now lessened due public 
health implications, especially relating to communicable diseases. As one 
senior official from the Ministry of Health pointed out to me, even after 
the Bangkok floods, there are ongoing public health concerns relating to 
migrants and communicable diseases (especially tuberculous, leprosy and 
syphilis). This is also why it is now possible for undocumented migrants 
to obtain health insurance (Suphanchaimat et al. 2019). Refraining from 
querying (and reporting) immigration status makes it easier for health ser-
vices to reach migrants and migrants to come forward. Hence, from a health 
perspective, protecting migrants’ health intimately relates with protecting 
citizens’ well-being (i.e. the spread of infectious disease). Such tolerance is 
also reinforced by the fact that productive members of society are impor-
tant due to Thailand dependency on labour migrants. The importance of 
able-bodied migrant labourers for productivity is directly related to com-
municable diseases. As one NGO official pointed out to me, there has been 
cases of infectious disease outbreaks (e.g. diarrhoea) amongst factory work-
ers in the frozen seafood sector which has had an immediate detrimental 
impact on parts of Thailand’s export business. Aihwa Ong’s work on fem-
inised labour is instructive in drawing attention to how biological survival 
traverses labour and immigration regimes.
The politics of sheer life is emerging in Southeast Asia, where a vast 
female migrant population - working as maids, factory workers, or 
prostitutes - is regularly exposed to slave-like conditions. Feminist 
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NGOs invoke not the human rights of female migrants but something 
more minimal and attainable, i.e. biological survival, or “biowelfare.” 
The claims of a healthy and unharmed migrant body are articulated 
not in terms of a common humanity, but of the dependency of the host 
society on foreign workers to sustain a high standard of living. NGOs 
invoke the ethics of reciprocity or at least recognition of economic sym-
biosis between migrant workers and the affluent employers who feel 
entitled to their cheap foreign labour. Where citizenship does not pro-
vide protection for the migrant worker, the joining of a healthy body 
and dependency on foreign workers produces a kind of bio-legitimacy 
that is perhaps a first step toward the recognition of their moral status, 
but short of human rights.
(Ong 2006, 504)
Hence, a concern with “herd protection” (i.e. public health) intertwines with 
biological notions of labour utility and migrant’s moral status. In this way, 
a concern with migrants’ health supersedes legal principles (i.e. an undoc-
umented migrant receiving medical care as opposed to being deported). At 
the same time, how communicable diseases contribute to an incorporation 
of migrants into the Thai health system echoes Michel Foucault’s exposition 
of how the management of leprosy (based on exclusion) transformed into a 
governing logic based on exclusion during the plague (Foucault 1977). As 
such, migrant health provision presents an important form of governmen-
tality. Yet, such practices do not automatically emanate from either discipli-
nary power or changing humanitarian principles grounded in health-specific 
notions of the living. They require operationalisation by social actors.
Health access and health volunteers
The Bangkok floods, Maung Thawdar explains, did not merely provide 
an impetus to assign translators to hospitals. In order to gain migrants’ 
trust, outreach work was essential. Maung Thawdar’s role as translator 
also involves entering migrant communities in order to explain migrants’ 
entitlement to use health services, regardless of legal status. “First they 
didn’t believe me,” Maung Thawdar said. “So, I had to persist with my 
outreach.” For two years, Maung Thawdar carried out outreach work on 
a weekly basis. Gradually, migrants dared to come along to the hospital. 
Once migrants could see that others could seek healthcare without any form 
of retribution, others followed. During this time period, Maung Thawdar’s 
employer (a Thai NGO) was able to expand their work to five other hospitals 
in the same province.
This kind of outreach work is now actively encouraged by Thai health 
authorities and NGOs alike. One recent study estimates that in migrant-
dense provinces, such as Tak and Samut Sakon, at least 1500 migrant vol-
unteers work in this capacity (Sirilak et al. 2013). In addition to translators 
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who work within the formal healthcare system, such as Maung Thawdar, 
numerous translators serve within informal migrant groups, often on a 
volunteer basis. Indeed, health needs have contributed to the proliferation 
of informal self-organising migrant groups. Besides language translation 
during hospital visits, they take on an active role in negotiating access to 
healthcare services for migrants.
Ko Thein Phay is one such health volunteer. Through one of the 
greater-Bangkok’s many migrant associations, he employs his impeccable 
Thai language skills to good use through his translation assistance for fellow 
migrants in need of hospital care. “Despite many years living in Thailand, 
the language skills of most migrants are still very poor,” he says. “They 
dare not speak to authorities, to the healthcare personnel, or to the nurses 
in the hospital.” Ko Thein Phay explains that some migrants request his 
company when attending the hospital. Many migrants face abuse by hos-
pital staff, Ko Thein Phay alleges, when they don’t fully understand what 
is being said. Hence, Ko Thein Phay mediation is not merely linguistic but 
also addresses the power imbalances between medical staff and migrant 
workers. The mediating role of translators, such as Ko Thein Phay, is also 
central to medical costs.
As alluded to earlier, settlement of medical bills has become easier for 
many migrants, given that many of them (but far from all) either access the 
official social security system or possess health insurance. In cases where 
migrants do not hold either social security membership or health insurance 
(which is common amongst undocumented migrants), medical costs are 
often pooled through informal migrant groups. At the same time, health 
translators are often instrumental in bargaining the cost down, or even 
facilitating write-offs, which the following examples illustrates.
Ko Htay, who is a member of another migrant group (which is funded 
indirectly by an NGO), provides a glimpse of how hospital payments are 
managed:
The hospital fee is a big burden for the migrants. For example, one preg-
nant migrant thought she could give birth with a 5,000 Baht budget. But 
it turns out that she needed operation and the cost became 15,000 Baht 
(sometimes it can be as high as 25,000 – 50,000 Baht). She could not 
pay. Then the hospital refused to proceed. The pregnant women con-
tacted us for assistance. We only had 2,500 Baht from our NGO and our 
association only has a budget of 2,500 Baht per case for our members. 
So, I took the 5,000 Baht and went to the Hospital for further negotia-
tions. At the hospital, a unit called “Community Social Support” assists 
patients in financial stress. I had to present the case, stating we had 
known this migrant for long, it is true that the migrant’s financial situa-
tion is poor, that our association can only afford 5,000 Baht towards the 
medical costs and thus request for write-off for the remaining balance. 
The write-off was approved. I learned about the existence and function 
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of this “Community Social Support” from the NGOs who trained us 
in the health assistance field. Because of our NGO’s training we could 
make use of the aid provided by the “Community Social Support” 
office. I was very surprised to learn that many poor Thai people do not 
know the existence of this service.
In other cases, translators take a more active role on coaching migrants in 
order to either reduce fees or secure write-offs. Maung Tawdar explains his 
approach thus:
Normally, patients are expected to pay [for hospital fees]. If the patient 
does not have money, the relatives will assist with payment. I advise 
relatives to not visit whilst health services are sought, especially when 
the patient is being discharged. This way, I can tell the hospital this 
person has no relatives, nor any money. Then the hospital will interview 
the patient. But as translator I can speak on the migrant’s behalf. This 
way the patient does not have to pay any fee as I know what information 
they should provide [to avoid payment]. The hospital checks if the per-
son has any social support (relatives or employer). If both the employer 
and family do not appear then this shows the patient has no connec-
tions. And, if no address exist it is not possible for forward the bill.
In effect, Maung Tawdar helps conceal patients’ social capital which ena-
bles either reduction of fees or write-offs of hospital bills. It is, however, not 
possible to overuse this method as this may raise suspicion by the hospital 
administration. “I always check if the patient is in real trouble,” he says, 
before employing this strategy.
All of this should not be interpreted too rosy. Both translators and 
migrants report cases of sloppy healthcare provision and discrimination 
in hospitals towards migrants. Despite the commonality of either reducing 
medical fees or provide write-offs, settling payment can also compromise 
migrants. One hospital translator reported to me cases where a hospital 
would waive birth delivery costs in exchange for the pregnant patient sign-
ing a consent form to undergo sterilisation as part of the caesarean pro-
cedure. Such practices arguably constitute forced sterilisation. Anyone 
familiar with Foucault’s work will recognise how such practices collapses 
the distinction between “make die and let live” and “make live and let die;” 
that is, the merging of biopower and sovereign power (Foucault 2003, 239–
264). Another Thai NGO informed me that they still come across cases 
where migrants’ passports are withheld until full acquittal of hospital bills. 
Hence, despite an increased liberal healthcare service for migrants, con-
tinued need for navigating healthcare services relating to both language 
translation and the settlement of hospital bills results in healthcare volun-
teers and translators becoming acquainted with a range of other challenges 
migrants face.
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Expanding humanitarian spaces
The increasing use of health translators opens up an operational space for 
aid organisations which facilitates engagement on other migrant-related 
problems (such as sub-standard work conditions in the context of work acci-
dents). Such work can take on specific spatial qualities. Several Thai NGOs, 
and even some informal migrant assistance groups, can house migrants 
regardless of legal status. The need to house migrants typically takes place 
when migrants are unable to work due to either work accidents, illness, or 
other forms of dismissal. Housing undocumented migrants can potentially 
be risky, as it could result in charges of harbouring illegal aliens. Yet, such 
harbouring can become possible on humanitarian grounds. Kanya, a senior 
official of a Thai NGO, explains their experience thus:
We had a drop-in centre where we housed migrants who were ill or had 
an accident. These migrants had no relatives and nowhere to go. They 
could stay for 3-6 months at this centre. We would send a letter to the 
provincial health authorities. In the past we had incidents where police 
would show up to arrest migrants at the centre. We consulted a Thai 
lawyer regarding our case. The legal advice we received was that this 
was not against the law as our hospitality was based on humanitarian 
grounds – the migrants where either sick or injured – and the fact that 
we did not attempt to conceal them. After further negotiations we man-
aged to make the police come around to our point of view. Now, police 
even send sick migrants to us!
Such arrangements are common. Another large Thai NGO, Migrant Health 
Cooperative (MHC), who provides similar services, confirmed this. Their 
Director informed me that they provide shelter for any worker who faces 
labour violations, forced labour, or trafficking. Their stay, the director 
explained, is conditional upon them having a legal case that is in the process 
with the courts of Ministry of Labour. This arrangement is tolerated by the 
authorities. Just as Kanya’s NGO, MHC receives migrants from police and 
they actively cooperate with authorities on compensation cases. In practice, 
many of these instances relate to health as they deal with work accidents 
and compensation claims.
In effect, NGOs’ ability to house undocumented migrants constitutes het-
erotopic spaces where a moral imperative to provide immediate healthcare 
supersedes the law (see Fassin and Halluin 2005). Two important points 
stem from this. First, such arrangements do not purely result from human-
itarian principles (although important). Just as translators fill a gap in 
healthcare provision, NGOs harbouring injured and sick migrants in effect 
take off pressure from authorities. Hence, it constitutes an administrative 
convenience.2 Second, – and this is important – health interventions allow 
NGOs and migrants to move beyond them. Caring for migrants, whether 
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through temporary housing or translation assistance, expose NGOs and 
migrant assistance programmes to associated problems that migrants face, 
such as employers’ culpability in work accidents and migrants’ health and 
welfare (due to poor working conditions). As Kanya told me, an important 
reason for assisting migrants with work accidents was not merely to attend 
to their bodily suffering but also to use compensation cases as a medium to 
assert pressure on government to address work conditions. In other words, 
migrants’ bodies, in the form of illness or physical injury – connect with both 
the regulation of workplaces and claim-making against state authorities.
“When we assist migrants with health problems,” Kanya says, “they 
also ask about legal rights, passports and visa problems.” In fact, “this 
is how safe migration came up in our work,” Kanya explains. “When the 
case is serious, we will refer the case to a relevant organisation.” Kanya 
exemplifies how their health work progresses into central concerns within 
safe migration discourse: work conditions. There is no coincidence that 
several of my informants point to how their work on labour abuse and 
working conditions originated within the health sector. This also means 
that health outreach workers and translators become acquainted with a 
range of administrative matters relating to migrants beyond health. For 
example, Ko Htay role as a translator has brought him into criminal cases 
which, in turn, has enabled opportunities to develop useful contacts within 
Thailand’s Department of Special Investigations (DSI, Thailand’s equiva-
lent of the FBI). We will further explore the significance of such brokerage 
practices – both analytically and empirically – in Chapters 8 and 9.3 It is 
important to note that although it can often be challenging for health-based 
aid programmes to seamlessly transcend beyond a specific health focus as 
it blurs their formally stipulated roles and mandates, there is nonetheless 
ample evidence of how migration health becomes a spring-board for labour 
activism, which we will now turn to.
Medicalised bodies and virtual testimony
The financing of medical costs and addressing migrants’ welfare needs (such 
as in labour abuse cases) are not merely mediated by translators and NGOs. 
The use of smartphones and social media have become increasingly important 
to how the body becomes a vehicle for claim making. Mg Arkar, a migrant 
housed by Migration Aid (see Chapters 5 and 8), exemplifies how migrants 
utilise smartphones and social media in order to address their despondency.
Mg Arkar migrated to southern Thailand in 2013. Since the advent of his 
arrival in Thailand, he has experienced various problems relating to under-
payment and unexplained dismissals forcing him to continuously change 
jobs. Despite these problems, Mg Arkar and his wife were able to gradually 
obtain legal papers. Despite their legalised status, this was of little help to 
what was to come. Events took a turn for the worse on 24 September 2015. 
Whilst working on a construction site in Krabi, Mg Arkar and some of his 
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co-workers were badly electrocuted. “There was no regulation at the con-
struction site,” Mg Arkar tells me, “with no systems for anything and dust 
everywhere.” There were old electric wires at the site, but it was unclear 
if they were switched off or not. The accident happened when he inserted 
iron rods through the construction pole moulds. The rods touched the eclec-
tic wires, causing electrocution. Mg Arkar suffered excruciating pain and 
burns to most of his body.
Some of Mg Arkar co-workers sent him to the local hospital where he 
stayed in an intensive care unit for 17 days. He was eventually discharged 
and stayed home after that. He was in a lot of pain. The employer did not 
pay him anything. He had to use his own money to cover bills. Yet, with 
limited savings, he quickly ran out of money. In desperation to mobilise 
funds for his medical bills, one of his friends – who is savvy with computer 
games – assisted Mg Arkar with uploading images of Mg Arkar in the hos-
pital to Facebook pleading for help. It worked. The Facebook post spread 
fast and was shared more than 2000s times. Amongst several of the com-
ments various people made on the post, one person suggested that they 
should contact Migration Aid. This is how Mg Arkar and his wife were able 
to seek shelter (and received help) from the NGO. At the time of my meeting 
with Mg Arkar, he had undergone several surgeries. Still, he was suffering 
immensely. His burns were still badly affecting him, to the point where he 
was unable to use both his hands even for rudimentary tasks. Despite the 
accident took place nearly two years ago, his wife still had to spoon-feed 
him due to his burns. For the time being, Mg Arkar and his wife resided 
at Migration Aid’s compound whilst they received assistance with medical 
costs and (hopefully) successful compensation claims against the employer.
I will leave aside for now how we may want to understand Mg Arkar’s 
accident in relation to safe migration programmes ability to assert protec-
tion, social justice, and safety for migrants (does Migration Aid’s assistance 
with healthcare and compensation demonstrate aid programmes’ leverage 
or deficiency in improving migrant workers’ work conditions?). What is of 
analytical interest in this context is how social media serves as a medium to 
mobilise donations, and advice for assistance, which builds on pre-existing 
sociality of broad-based exchange in a Myanmar context (see Chapter 3). At 
the same time, sharing images and stories of bodily suffering also serves as 
a form of witnessing: the structural violence that is projected onto migrant 
bodies become visible to large online audiences. Such witnessing can at 
times connect directly to NGO’s advocacy work that addresses migrant 
worker’s work conditions and basic welfare needs.
Ma Myo Myo, who works for a Burmese migrant association, explains 
how migrants employ their injured bodies, smartphones, and social media in 
order to build momentum against abusive employers. In 2010, a major conflict 
erupted between an employer and nearly thousand Burmese employees at a 
fishnet factory. The employer confiscated the migrants’ passports in order to 
forge the documents for the purpose of bringing in more workers. The wages 
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were low, and work supervisors exerted violence onto the workers with the 
use of wooden sticks. The factory compound was guarded by armed guards. 
Some workers at the factory were able to obtain Ma Myo Myo’s organisa-
tion’s phone number. This enabled stealth reporting on the migrants’ prob-
lems via text messages. Ma Myo Myo’s organisation realised that the case 
was serious. Ma Myo Myo requested the workers to take pictures of any 
evidence relating to forced labour practices (this included supervisors phys-
ically punishing workers, weapons held by security guards, and passports 
with forged pictures). These images were forwarded to labour authorities. In 
the end, Ma Myo Myo’s organisation, in cooperation with other NGOs, was 
able to intervene in the case with the assistance of authorities.
We will return to the significance of social media of workers activism in 
a later chapter, including how such interventions can backfire. What is of 
importance to us here is how pictures of injured bodies are elevated as a 
form of testimony, where – to paraphrase Fassin – the truth from the body 
affects action against unscrupulous employers and inhumane work condi-
tions (Fassin and Halluin 2005). As such, incidents like these connect to 
a long-standing anthropological attention to the relationship between the 
body, violence, and ontology (Appadurai 1998; Das 1998; Fassin 2011b; 
Taylor and Hinton 2002). Importantly, such images also furnish what we 
touched on earlier in this chapter: administrative convenience. Images of 
bodily harm carry more leverage than migrants’ verbal allegation of abuse as 
evidentiary material. In this sense, as a kind of counter-panoptical “weapons 
of the weak” (cf. Scott 1985), migrants are able to weaponise smartphones 
against employers.4 In addition to documents, bodies become central vec-
tors of legibility within a broader political economy of migration assistance.
Conclusion
This chapter has explored the role of healthcare services in relation to safe 
migration assistance. Although healthcare in itself is not central to safe 
migration discourse, this chapter has argued that the health sector is cen-
tral to appreciating how operational spaces are enabled for NGOs and other 
service providers in order to assist migrants. Migrants’ health-needs pro-
vide conduits for assistance where medical care (based on humanitarian 
principles) can supersede immigration and border control priorities. It is 
also here we see how life, in the sense of biological or pathological exist-
ence, becomes a source of claim-making. As such, biolegitimacy, whether 
in the form of protecting communities in the name of public health (due to 
infectious decease) or migrants’ life as such (in the case of hospitals accept-
ing migrant patients on humanitarian grounds), has been central for the 
emergence of translators and health volunteers. In this sense, the biolegiti-
mate (how life in itself is valued) merges with the biopolitical (regulation of 
populations) which epitomises how different regimes of health can just as 
much serve complementary functions (as opposed to the tensions between 
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humanitarian biomedicine and global health security as discussed by Lakoff 
2010) in how aid programmes advocacy for migrant health services align 
with the government’s focus of public health.
Furthermore, healthcare provision gets easily tangled with a range of other 
challenges that are central to safe migration discourse: workplace safety, sub-
standard work conditions, mistreatment of workers, and so on. The chapter 
has examined how migrants’ bodies become central to evidentiary mate-
rial and witnessing of suffering, often through the use of smartphones and 
social media. Finally, the chapter has canvassed a social dynamic that we 
have seen in earlier chapters and will be central to the remainder discussion 
of this book: how assistance is instrumentalised through intermediaries, a 
dynamic that became evident to me upon departing Maung Thawdar’ office 
right after the interview described at the beginning of this chapter. Whilst 
conversing with Maung Thawdar outside the hospital, I could not help 
noticing a young Burmese woman patiently waiting in his office. Initially, I 
assumed her wait for Maung Thawdar’s time was health-related. However, 
once I had finished my discussion with him, it became clear that the wom-
an’s visit to Maung Thawdar’s office was rather different. Upon leaving, the 
young woman asks Maung Thawdar regarding his connections with poten-
tial employers. Her current job as a domestic worker had not worked out 
for her; so, could Maung Thawdar help set her up with a new employer, she 
wonders? Why hospital translators help aspiring migrant domestic workers 
with employment opportunities is our subject for the next chapter.
Notes
 1. Although health is not prominent in safe migration discourse, several inform-
ants allege that safe migration partly derives from health interventions, 
especially HIV Aids (i.e. “safe sex”). Many NGOs work within the Thai 
health sector, although many of them do not self-identify as safe migration 
programmes.
 2. Maung Thwadar also pointed out that immigration authorities typically do 
not accept very sick migrants in detention.
 3. Ko Htay’s associated work within the health sector also comprises the man-
agement of deceased migrants. At times, this involves criminal cases where 
health official and police collaborate on forensic evidence. This has given Ko 
Htay leverage to intervene in cases of police inaction relating to suspicious 
migrant deaths.
 4. Smartphone and social media use as a form of counter-conduct seems a prom-
ising fertile ground for empirical investigations, especially in authoritarian 
political contexts. For example, it is notable how traffic accidents in Laos are 
now often filmed and even live streamed via Facebook. This has no doubt 
to do with the synoptic accountability this imposes on police officers. Traf-
fic accidents in a Lao context usually become a marketplace for buying out-
comes of the settlement: once police get involved, it becomes more expense for 
the concerned parties as all official involved expects a commission for their 
“investigations”). For a discussion on compensation claims in a Burmese 
context, see (Cheesman 2015).
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Brokers can make things happen for you.
(Senior UN official)
Some months had passed since the first meeting with Maung Thawdar. I was 
preoccupied with following the implementation of the one-stop service cen-
tres (see Chapter 5) and had little time to follow up on hospital transla-
tors such as Maung Thawdar. In an effort to consolidate legal pathways 
for labour migrants, the CI process was now interlinked with the Thai gov-
ernment’s issuing of work permits. With the registration deadline looming 
for migrants who wanted to convert their pink cards into CI documents 
and formal work permits, the one-stop centres were overfilled with queu-
ing migrants. The process also included health screening and the issuing 
of health insurance cards for migrants. Hence, Ministry of Health officials 
were at the frontline of migration management procedures alongside immi-
gration and labour officials. As it turned out, Maung Thawdar had recently 
been seconded to one of the one-stop service centres from his hospital. He 
invited my research assistant and me to come along to see how the process 
worked. We agreed to meet on the following Sunday. In another example of 
bureaucratic convolution, although the CI service counters (managed by the 
Myanmar authorities) would be open, the service counters managed by the 
Thai labour and health officials would be closed as it was a public holiday. 
Consequently, Maung Thawdar explained, there “will be few people around 
then … we will have time to talk.”
The following Sunday, my research assistant and I travelled to the one-
stop service centre which is located within a shopping mall on the outskirts 
of Bangkok. We meet Maung Thawdar at a nearby food court. When walk-
ing into the near-empty food hall, we spot Maung Thawdar together with 
a group of other migrant workers congregating around a table. We intro-
duce ourselves and chit-chat about the migrants’ work and experiences in 
Thailand. One of the male migrants, Maung Ko Ko, tells us that he currently 
had a temporary passport and was in the process of obtaining a new pass-
port. One of the other migrants, Ma Mie Mie, holds a pink card and was in 
the process of going through the one-step centre processing system in order 
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to obtain a proper work permit. Whilst we were speaking, I could not help 
but notice the passports and work permit documents that were spread out 
over the table where we were sitting. Puzzled why the migrants were present 
with their documents given that the service centre was half-closed, we lis-
tened to Maung Thawdar explaining the operations of the centre. The one-
stop centre involves a two-pronged process, he said. The first step provides 
migrants with a visa up to 31 March (2018); then a second step allows an 
extended visa up to two years (i.e. until 31 March 2020). This process only 
applies to migrants who hold a pink card or a temporary passport. Maung 
Thawdar elaborates. First, the migrant needs to obtain the CI document. 
This is all done at the mobile van outside, he explains. It is operated by a 
contractor on behalf of the Myanmar Embassy. Once that is done, the sec-
ond step is to obtain the new work permit which is referred to as a “smart 
card.” We all laugh at the fact that the Thai authorities have confusingly 
chosen pink-coloured cards, which makes it easily mistaken for the “pink 
card” which the Thai government is phasing out.
Maung Thawdar continues. The Thai government operates the centre 
and involves several line ministries. Department of employment is one of 
the main agencies involved, but so is health. This is where my role comes 
in, Maung Thawdar explained. All migrants are subject to a health check 
which involves a blood test (to check for TB) but also screening for “ele-
phant leg disease” (Lymphatic Filariasis) and other parasitic diseases. All 
migrants going through this process must take deworming tablets. The TB 
scan is also used to screen for narcotics.
While we sit and listen to Maung Thawdar explaining the process, it 
becomes clear how complex the “one-step” process is. In glaring contrast to 
the centre’s glib title promising speed and simplicity, the process, which we 
explored in Chapter 5, involves multiple steps with perplexing rules relat-
ing to different forms of employment. While Maung Thawdar explains the 
over-engineered bureaucratic process, it slowly dawns on me why the other 
migrants are present. Despite the government’s upbeat rhetoric of a stream-
lined one-stop process, the reality for most migrants is that they depend 
on others to guide them through the process. With his intimate familiar-
ity with the system, Maung Thawdar had taken on the role of doing just 
that, something he confirmed to us later on. At the end of our conversation, 
money changed hands between him and the migrants. Maung Thawdar, 
it turned out, was not simply providing health-related migrant assistance 
under the auspices of safe migration programming, he was also operating 
as a work-permit broker.
Migrant assistance as brokering
The previous chapter explicated how biolegitimacy enables an opera-
tional space for migration assistance within the Thai health sector where 
language translators play a central role. Maung Thawdar is one amongst 
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numerous hospital translators which exemplifies how health interventions 
enable a broader humanitarian space for migration assistance. Yet, as 
alluded to above, his role goes well-beyond linguistic translation pertaining 
to healthcare. This chapter investigates how – in contrast with a Weberian 
legal-rational rule-bound practice – migrant assistance comprises various 
forms of interpersonal reciprocity which depend on intermediaries within 
a grey-zone of migrant assistance. To put it simply, migration assistance 
and brokering are two sides of the same coin. Yet, the role of brokers in safe 
migration is highly paradoxical. As we have seen in previous chapters, safe 
migration discourse often professes that traffickers and brokers constitute a 
potential threat to orderly, safe migration. Consequently, formal safe migra-
tion activities do either implicitly or explicitly, seek to eradicate extra-legal 
forms of assistance, yet – as this chapter will explicate – they are in practice 
depended on informal intermediaries and practices.
The role of brokers and brokering practices has surfaced throughout 
the book, ranging from how legal migration pathways, such as the MOU 
system and the CI process, breed labour brokerage (Chapter 5); how safe 
migration outreach workers at times recommend how to pick a “good bro-
ker” (Chapter 6); U Ba Sein’s revelation that his migrant school unintend-
edly produce brokers (Chapter 1); and – as we saw in the last chapter – the 
pivotal roles of Burmese language translators as intermediaries of migrant 
assistance. Yet, the focus in this chapter takes on particular significance. 
Although a large body of literature explores the role of brokers in migration, 
the focus tends to centre on what we discussed in Chapter 5: social actors 
that act as intermediaries in facilitating transport and documents (pass-
ports and work permits) for labour migration (Chee et al. 2012; Lin et al. 
2017; Lindquist et  al. 2012; Shrestha and Yeoh 2018). Yet, little scholarly 
attention has been afforded to migration assistance itself as a form of bro-
kering practice within aid delivery. This neglect is curious as it is precisely 
within the anthropology of development where most academic mileage has 
been made on the study of brokers (Lewis and Mosse 2006).
This chapter explicates the role of brokers and brokering practices within 
safe migration programme implementation and consider the analytical 
challenges this poses for how we both understand aid delivery in relation 
to brokers, but also how moral opposites – assistance and exploitation – 
are brought together. This, in turn, relates to how an operational space of 
assistance is enabled. Hence, beyond pointing to how assistance and bro-
kering fuse, the chapter divulges how a counter-intentional effects of pro-
gramme interventions are produced through different modes of visibility 
and hiddenness which allows dichotomous practices to become one. In what 
follows, we examine brokers both as an analytical category as well as an 
emic category of ascription. We will consider why labour migration bro-
kers become migrant assistance outreach workers and vice versa, and how 
brokerage is ubiquitous within safe migration praxis. But first, a few points 
need to be made regarding the concept of brokerage itself.
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Revisiting the anthropology of brokerage
Brokers can be productively compared with patron–client relations. Patrons 
and brokers are both analytically actor-centric with emphasis on how trans-
actional relations (that are often face-to-face) are central to social practice 
(Lindquist 2015a). Yet, the two are distinct in terms of control over resources:
Most generally, the broker is a human actor who gains something from 
the mediation of valued resources that he or she does not directly con-
trol, which shall be distinguished from a patron who controls valued 
resources, and a go-between or a messenger, who does not affect the 
transaction.
(Lindquist 2015a, 870)
Hence, in contrast to patron-client relations (which are premised on dyadic, 
vertical, yet reciprocal relations), brokers are middlepersons who “trade on 
gaps in social structure” (Stovel et al. 2019, 141). And it is this attribute which 
make brokers both valuable yet morally dubious. On the one hand, broker-
ing underscores mediation of social, economic, and political relations. Yet, 
at the same time, brokering is associated with profiteering, rent seeking, 
monopolisation of information and various gatekeeping roles, as well as (at 
times) highly abusive practices (Gorman and Beban 2016; Stovel et al. 2019). 
This renders brokering highly ambiguous in terms of trust:
Given that a broker—due her greater access to information, control 
over resources, or structural power—has a clear opportunity to gain 
at the expense of either or both of the groups for whom she is broker-
ing, how does she maintain the trust necessary to continue brokering 
between them? Thus, broker’s dilemma stems from the tension between 
the personal ties that make brokering possible, and the gains—of profit, 
of status, or of power—that result from the brokering role. If brokers 
fail to effectively manage these gains, they risk undermining the very 
relationships that keep them at the centre of potential transactions and 
interactions.
(Stovel et al. 2019, 154)
As will become evident, this tension makes migration assistance not only 
highly ambiguous but helps explain how brokering easily transposes 
between migration assistance delivery and extractive labour recruitment.
Brokers emerged as a central anthropological focus in the context of 
decolonisation. At the time, modernisation theory served as the central heu-
ristic device for examining how societies mediated this change (Bierschenk 
et al. 2002; Lindquist 2015b). Social actors that served as mediators between 
different social domains (such as between urban and rural areas, and local 
populations and elites) became empirically visible to anthropologists given 
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their ethnographic fieldwork methods. In this sense, brokers have var-
iously been understood as filling a gap due to either dysfunctional insti-
tutional practices (e.g. “weak states”) or other forms of discrepancies in 
social intercourse (Lewis and Mosse 2006). Later, theoretical influences in 
economic anthropology, and particularly transactionalism, consolidated 
anthropology’s focus on brokers (Barth 1967; Lindquist 2015a).
In recent years, ethnographic attention to brokers has witnessed 
somewhat of a renaissance within a wider interest in neoliberalism. 
Development aid and labour migration have emerged as central areas of 
focus (Bierschenk et al. 2002; Mosse et al. 2002; Rudnyckyi 2004; Stirrat 
2008). Arguably, David Mosse’s work on development aid workers as a 
form of brokerage is amongst the most influential scholarly contributions 
(Lewis and Mosse 2006; Mosse 2005a). Extending transactional analyses, 
Mosse draws on a Latourian actor-network theory emphasising the role 
of translation. “The differentiation of practical interests around ‘unifying’ 
development policies or project designs,” Mosse says, “requires the con-
stant work of translation…which is the task of skilled brokers (managers, 
consultants, fieldworkers, community leaders) who read the meaning of a 
project into the different institutional languages of its stakeholder support-
ers.” (Mosse and Mosse 2004, 647) The focus on meaning-making practices 
is understandable given the aid sector’s heavy reliance on textual resources. 
However, this forces the analysis to be overly concerned with discursive 
dimensions of brokerage (translation, meaning-making, and interpreta-
tions of success). This has limited analytical purchase for what follows as 
the way brokering intertwines with altruistic migration assistance is just as 
much about obfuscation of meaning and relations. A collective bad faith of 
willed unintelligibility is just as important as meaning making within safe 
migration assistance.
The other key strand of brokerage research, unsurprisingly, pertains to 
labour migration (Shrestha and Yeoh 2018). In order to open the “black box” 
of migration (Lindquist et al. 2012), the study of brokers has become an entry 
point for examining migration infrastructure, that is, the complex web of 
persons, objects, and practices that move migrants (Lindquist et al. 2012). 
This analytical move is germane as it pushes analysis away from a common 
critique of broker-scholarship: methodological individualism (Lindquist 
et al. 2012). Yet, this body of research tends to limit analysis to social actors 
who mediate between migrants and employers. Although altruistic dis-
courses are recognised, the role of aid agencies and migration assistance is 
usually absent. Indeed, the two domains are considered socially separate. 
One of the few explicit juxtapositions of aid delivery and migration brokers 
is made in Johan Lindquist’s evocative ethnography of labour migration 
in Indonesia where NGO outreach workers and labour migration brokers 
curiously share the same linguistic label in Indonesian language. “Petugas 
lapangan,” Lindquist writes, “namely the informal labour recruiter and the 
NGO outreach worker… are both important actors in the contemporary 
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regime of transnational migration from Indonesia, but… have nothing to 
do with one another in practice, and, indeed, are often found in different 
kinds of locations” (Lindquist 2015b, 163). It may well be that Lindquist’s 
informants indeed operate in separate social universes. Yet, it is puzzling 
how the connections between them are not explored further, given the 
fact that it is precisely the NGO-world where so much ethnographic mile-
age on brokers has been made. What follows explores precisely how safe 
migration assistance and brokerage embody the same social universe and 
quite frequently, as in the example of Maung Thawdar, embody the very 
same person. As will become evident, the blurring of labour brokers and 
migrant assistance are conduits for the kind of analysis Lindquist seeks, 
which “consider the broker as an ethnographic entry point that illuminates 
broader contexts and processes from a particular position of mediation.” 
(Lindquist 2015a, 874)
Helpers as brokers
In Chapter 5, we were introduced to Siriwan, a licensed broker who through-
out my fieldwork battled the new regulative requirements for licensed 
recruitment agencies, introduced by Thailand’s Ministry of Labour. During 
one of my visits to her office I ask her how she identifies herself. She makes 
no qualms about the fact that she is a broker (nai na) but also claims to be 
a humanitarian. She describes to me her involvement in assisting several of 
the refugee populations along the Thai-Myanmar border with food dona-
tions. Siriwan, therefore, managed to balance multiple roles and identities.
Siriwan (her adopted Thai name) came to Thailand as a migrant in 1994 
ending up working in the seafood processing sector. In addition to long 
hours of arduous work filleting fish, she made time for studying Thai lan-
guage in hope that this would help her obtain better employment in the 
future. On occasion, immigration officials would visit her workplace. They 
would commonly ask if any of the workers spoke Thai and could facilitate 
translation during their visit. One day, Siwiran offered to serve as translator, 
a role she would undertake on several subsequent occasions. This intro-
duced her to several aspects of immigration and labour regulation but also 
assistance mechanisms relating to health and work conditions. It also intro-
duced her to a range of officials working with migrants from both govern-
ment and the Thai NGO sector.
Eventually, these connections led to ad hoc employment with an NGO as 
a court-case translator relating to compensation claims. This reinforced her 
familiarity with migration policy frameworks and labour migration laws. 
Furthermore, this exponentially increased her social capital as her work 
brought her close to both migrants and officials. She soon became involved 
in helping migrants with getting their passports, and subsequently started 
charging money for her service – 20 Baht per passport. She stayed on with 
the NGO for a few years.
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In her role at the NGO, Siriwan also became acquainted with officials at 
the Myanmar Embassy. As she did a lot of case work, (compensation claims, 
workplace accidents, and visa troubleshooting), she was ultimately afforded 
a formal status acting on behalf of the Myanmar Embassy in a range of 
migration assistance cases (see Figure 8.1). This was particularly useful in 
dealing with repatriation cases as it allowed her legal authority to escort 
migrants across the Thai–Myanmar border. She claimed to have done this 
work for free.
Siriwan alleged that she helped a lot of migrants due to her consolidated 
experience and her wide range of contacts, both within the Myanmar and 
Thai state bureaucracies. She shows me large document files of cases she 
has solved. One includes a case of two young Myanmar domestic work-
ers who had been underpaid. “I negotiated a compensation sum with the 
employer of 30,000 and 48,000 Baht, respectively, despite them both being 
Figure 8.1  Siriwan’s endorsement letter, allowing her to act on behalf of the embassy 
in migrant assistance cases.
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undocumented,” she boasted. While the girls were eventually compelled to 
return to Myanmar, they did receive their compensation claims, Siriwan 
explained. Underscoring her success with such difficult cases, she says, “in 
order to work in this business you must know big people” (phu nyai). Her 
office’s décor reinforced her claim. Her office walls are liberally ornamented 
with photos of her meeting and greeting with a range of officials from the 
Thai political elite. “One of my current advisors is a senior person within 
the Thai military” she says, adding “If you don’t know big people you can’t 
move forward.”
After years of carefully greasing the patrimonial wheels of the Thai 
bureaucracy, Siriwan now runs a licensed recruitment agency which imports 
large number of labour migrants into Thailand from Myanmar. Her com-
pany is legal, but as we learned in Chapter 5, she is currently struggling to 
keep afloat due to the new regulations from Ministry of Labour. During 
our conversations, it becomes clear that she has become highly critical of 
the NGO sector which previously employed her. In our conversations, she 
frequently juxtaposes labour recruitment brokers and NGO officials. NGOs 
“need cases” in order to gain an income (i.e. donor contributions) and are 
therefore just as unscrupulous as brokers, she proclaims. She insinuates 
dubious NGO conduct by the way of hinting at poor pay. “My NGO sal-
ary was only 4500 Baht with frequent overtime,” she complains. “When I 
became a broker, I could also help migrants. NGO’s image is all about help-
ing. I am now a broker, but I can still help.”
Extending her claims, Siriwan further argues that “NGOs are also a form 
of broker,” given their dependency on foreign funding. “But NGOs don’t 
help anyone.” The way Siriwan explicates her role as a broker and former 
NGO official is premised on an inversion of the good and the bad, the help-
ful and the unscrupulous. Contrary to common understandings, she claims, 
brokers are good and NGOs bad. Such reversals are also reflected in her 
employment trajectory, which she alleges is uncommon. “I am the only per-
son I know who has moved from an NGO to become a broker,” she said. 
“But you have a lot the other way around.”
Brokers as helpers
According to Siriwan, plenty of NGO outreach workers are former labour 
migration brokers. One such person is U San Tint. His role as a former bro-
ker only became apparent to me over time, due to my repeated visits to the 
NGO where he works, Migration Aid (an NGO we have explored in earlier 
chapters). During one of our many visits, U San Tint reveals that he used 
to work as a carry (a broker specialising in transporting migrants). The dis-
closure was curious, given that we had previously attended Migration Aid 
staff meetings where U San Tint served as a language translator for Thai 
staff, where brokers were frequently discussed as a key reason for migrants’ 
numerous problems. I was interested in knowing more about U San Tint’s 
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past and asked if we could discuss this further. U San Tint agreed on the 
condition we met outside Migration Aid’s office.
A few weeks later, in the blistering hot Bangkok sun, we met in a neigh-
bourhood within an industrial zone where many labour migrants work. The 
area houses some 10,000 Myanmar migrants, mixed with Mon, Burmese as 
well as several other ethnic groups. The streets and adjacent housing com-
plexes are full of migrants from Myanmar. When walking down the narrow 
alleyways, a mixture of Burmese food and chatter fills the air. One could 
easily mistake it for a suburban part of Yangon. We decide to go to a nearby 
shop as we can speak in private over lunch. When we walk inside, U San 
Tint boasts that he is wearing a cap as a disguise “because I work on human 
rights.” We order lunch. While we wait for our food, U San Tint begins 
his account of how he became a carry (a transport broker) and before later 
becoming an outreach worker for an NGO.
U San Tint is the eldest of six children. His father was a taxi driver and 
his mother worked at a market. He left Myanmar for southern Thailand 
about twenty years ago. After one year, he moved to the outskirts of 
Bangkok. There he met a friend, which led him to relocate to another prov-
ince nearby. He tried a job in construction which paid him 20 Baht per day. 
Subsequently, another migrant helped him find another job. Back then, he 
said, all migrants were undocumented. His new job was industrial prawn 
farming. The work was dangerous and involved diving despite electricity 
wires being close to the water. He ended up having a major dispute with 
his employer and left after one year. He returned to Myanmar. While he 
brought gold with him on his return journey, this was confiscated from him 
by the police on his return.
After some time in Myanmar, he once again returned to Thailand. He 
ended up working in food processing inside a large frozen storage facility. 
He worked there for three years. When he returned to Myanmar for a visit, 
the employer asked him if he could bring more workers. He ended up bring-
ing two of his siblings, two cousins, and a brother in-law. By the following 
year, he had gained experience in bringing in people to Thailand. He began 
requesting money for this service. He charged 5000 Baht per head. The 
problem was that people did not pay and simply ran away once they arrived 
in Thailand. This was a serious problem for U San Tint as he often had to 
advance other cost as the migrants had no money.
Due to his Thai language skills, his boss also asked him to manage the 
Burmese workers. He then started bringing in more migrants, around 25 
each time. He established connections with the Thai police. He charged 300 
Baht per person, plus 500 Baht for the van driver. “Then all would be ok,” he 
explains. The driver would deal with the police during transport. This was 
the situation 15–20 years ago. He decided that for a 5000 Baht investment, 
he wanted 10,000 Baht return.
“How do you secure your payment,” I wondered? Making migrants pay 
was an ongoing problem. In order to enforce payment, he took photos of 
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the migrants he brought in, recording their names, home village, and details 
about their families. This way, he would be able to threaten them if they 
didn’t pay (something he ended up doing). While he explained that he did 
not actually have the resources to trace family members of migrants, he was 
hopeful that it would work as a threat. “Did it work?,” I asked. U Sant Tin 
shook his head. “No!” (laughter). “I would then try other methods.” Happy 
to elaborate, he explained that this included beating people up, or some-
times he would clear debt by having sex with female migrants. He built con-
nections with “hooligans” and the police, allowing him to threaten workers 
who did not pay him. His reliance on the police worked as the arrangement 
was reciprocal. In return, he would assist police with translation when the 
police wanted money from migrant workers.
“You have to be friendly with police, immigration and bus drivers,” he 
says. He bribed officials at checkpoints. “Was prior contact with officials at 
the checkpoints necessary?” I ask. “Over time, I became friends with lots 
of police officers,” U San Tin explains, “but no pre-established relationship 
existed with checkpoints.” To the contrary, he tells us, “when approaching 
the checkpoint, I never presented myself as a broker, but as an ordinary fel-
low migrant within the group.”1 Then, he demonstrates to us (also through 
bodily gestures) how he would bribe. He would put his hands in a “wai” 
and say something along the lines of “we migrate, we have a hard time.” 
He would then ask the officer to please let them through and offer “their 
only savings” as a bribe. According to U San Tint, this works as a treat. 
“Everybody loves money,” he says. “In my ten-year career as a broker, I 
never experienced a police officer declining a bribe” he laughs. “That is my 
skill … the skill to be friends with others.”
Even arrests became opportunities for expanding his operations as a bro-
ker. He explains how the arrest took place due to him miscalculating the 
patrimonial linkages amongst police officers. “There was a chain of people 
connected amongst the police that I did not know of,” he says. Nevertheless, 
the unfortunate arrest turned out to become “an opportunity to make friend 
with the police!” U San Tint giggled. His skills as a broker contributed to 
an ever-increasing thickness of social relations which, in turn, reinforced his 
broker dexterities. Over time, U San Tint says, he developed some skill in 
knowing how to bribe the police.
Say, if there are three officers, I would first identify the one with author-
ity. I would then give money to that person. But if he was uncoopera-
tive, I would approach the subordinate and try to convince that person 
(with the anticipation of bribes) to speak to the boss on his behalf.
Despite U San Tint’s apparent success as a broker, he was looking for ways 
out of his profession. The work could be dangerous. At one point, he was 
arrested for human trafficking, which was a much more serious charge. He 
was later on threatened at gunpoint in connection to a botched smuggling 
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operation involving police officers. “Anything you get from water you lose 
in water,” U San Tint exclaimed. If the police think you stab them in the 
back, he said, then you are in real trouble. There are financial downsides 
too, according to U Sant Tint: “unclean money doesn’t stick long.”
Over the years, U San Tint became acquainted with a few outreach pro-
grammes involving local NGOs working on health amongst migrants. “I 
was quite well-known in the migrant community,” U San Tint says, and 
“this was useful for NGOs as I could access various people.” Over time, this 
has turned into a formal role for U San Tint. He has stopped working as a 
broker, he alleges, and now devotes his time working for a local NGO relat-
ing to health, compensation claims, and other forms of problems migrants 
face. U Sant Tint’s local status has also proven highly effective for the NGO 
in order to recruit migrants for various training sessions relating to safe 
migration. As the NGO paid some 100–200 Baht for attendance as well as 
top-up money for migrants who could recruit others to attend, this became 
a lucrative business for U Sant Tint which neatly merged NGO-led migrant 
assistance with commission-based brokerage.
“If you don’t enter the tiger’s cage you will not get the cub”
U San Tint and Siriwan’s double roles as brokers and migrant assistance work-
ers are far from unique. Ko Htay, who we introduced in the previous chapter, 
does not only assist with health claims; he is also a highly experienced pass-
port and work permit fixer. As such, he is similar to Maung Thawdar who 
used his experience in health work as a launchpad into document brokering. 
Ko Thein Phay, another passport broker introduced in Chapter 6, volunteers 
as a translator relating to healthcare cases (especially pregnancies) through 
one of the numerous Myanmar migrant self-help groups.
Although NGOs and Government bodies appear unaware of the dou-
ble-roles of many of these individuals, this is not always the case. For exam-
ple, the director of Migration Aid, U San Tint’s employer, is cognisant of U 
Sant Tint’s shady past. Why, then, do brokers become attractive for NGOs? 
It was Siriwan who was the first one to shed some light on this conundrum. 
“If you don’t enter the tiger’s cage, you won’t get the cub,” she tells me. 
Intrigued by her poetic response, I ask her to elaborate. “If we only work as 
NGO we would not know. But brokers know.” She elaborates further. If you 
want to understand what is taking place on the factory floors, in the migrant 
dormitories and on the streets where migrants live, you’ve got to engage bro-
kers, Siriwan alleges. Within the murkiness of semi-legal migration status, 
precarious work conditions (with scrupulous employers), predatory officials 
(police), and intimidating labour recruiters, the ability to access and assist 
migrants requires particular skills and positionalities. Brokers fit that role 
perfectly.
Later in my fieldwork, U san Tint and I had the opportunity to discuss 
how his previous role as a broker had influenced how he carried out migrant 
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assistance work. “The key benefit [for the NGO] is that I can easily identify if 
someone is good or bad,” he tells me. “This is useful when you are assisting 
people.” He pulls up a notebook from his bag. He opens it and shows several 
pages to me. They are full of name lists that are colour-coded. I keep records 
of all phone conversations, he tells me. In meticulous detail, he records the 
date, the name of the person spoken to, and the general topic of conversa-
tion. He highlights bad people and good people in different colours. Green 
equals good; orange equals bad. “This is a habit I have developed since 
I was a broker,” he explains. The ability to build and maintain relations 
across a wide span of people straddling migrants, NGO personnel, police, 
health and labour officials as well as a range of other brokers is premised on 
U San Tin’s ability to “read” people. “I can go anywhere, and I can make 
connections with both brokers and police.” “It is this skill that I have,” U 
San Tint says, “to make friends.” And making friends interrelates with the 
multiple roles and functions that brokering takes. I asked U Sant Tint to 
free-list all the different kinds of broker roles he has served. “Ah, it takes so 
many forms,” he tells me. He pauses for a bit. After some deliberation, he 
itemises his broker roles as follows:
• Translator for police
• Informer to the police
• Escorting migrants to hospital
• Sending money (remittances)
• Assist in cases relating to expired passports
• Assist with compensation claims
• Provide participants for NGO training
His multiple identities even apply to his formal status. When he talks to an 
employer, such as in a work compensation claim, he will use the NGO office 
phone. He showed me his identification cards. He had one as a staff member 
for the NGO and another for the police (in his role as translator). He used 
the cards depending on what suits the situation. Ironically, it is the formal 
status working for an NGO which contributes to his ability to operate in 
such multiplex manner, which helps explain why some brokers end up work-
ing with migrant assistance programmes. “Working for an NGO has advan-
tages” Siriwan told me, as it provides you with a legal status and therefore a 
level of safety and protection. This way, Siriwan, exclaims, “everyone wins.”
Although part of U San Tint’s work relates to obtaining various informa-
tion to build work compensation claims through formal complaints mech-
anism, migrant assistance extends well into informal modes of working. 
“Some good brokers ask for advice,” he tells me. “For example, if a worker 
is arrested without a pink card, what to do? I will ask what the police is 
charging. They may say 3000 Baht. I will then advice to negotiate it down 
to 1000.” The art of negotiating a bribe easily transposes from U San Tint’s 
former role as a migrant broker to a migrant assistance worker.
160 Safety mediated
Migration assistance as brokerage
Maung Thawdar, Siriwan, U San Tint, and Ko Thein Phay share one thing in 
common. They self-identify as brokers in relation to their role in migration 
assistance. Through our conversations, either the Thai word nai na or the 
Burmese phrase carry (transporter) or boisa (broker) were used without any 
qualms. Indeed, none of them saw their double roles as problematic. Being 
part an entrepreneur profiting from transposing spheres of sociality (as 
explicated in Fredrik Barth’s seminal transactional analysis 1967) and part 
a Weberian bureaucrat interlocking regulatory migrant formalities, they 
are at the same time echoing a moral economy of assistance (Scott 1977). As 
other parts of this book and other literature have observed (Lindquist 2015b; 
Missbach 2015), brokers are a well-known social category in any migration 
context in the Mekong region. Yet, brokering goes well beyond the conduct 
of social actors who self-identify as brokers; for instance, consider U Sant 
Tint’s aforementioned example of remuneration for NGO training becom-
ing an opportunity for brokerage. This phenomenon is partly recognised in 
the migration assistance sector: some NGOs have discontinued providing 
financial benefits for workshop attendance for this reason (though many 
others, such as MRC1’s training described in Chapter 6, continue with this 
practice). Yet, removing financial incentives does not necessarily remove 
brokering practices within safe migration workshops.
One NGO official who provides training for migrants on topics ranging 
from compensation claims, visa and work permit procedures, and labour 
law told me that in his estimate, at least 60% of the attendants either were 
brokers, or ended up working as brokers as a result of the training.2 The 
reason why these training sessions either produced or skilled up brokers 
is simple: when worker rights, labour law, visa processing, and healthcare 
insurance are covered in class, this is precisely the kind of information that 
is useful to brokers. A Thai official working for another large international 
NGO reported to me a similar problem in their work on peer education 
amongst young migrants, a popular strategy amongst NGOs working with 
migrants worldwide (Alcock et al. 2009). After several years employing expe-
rienced migrants as peer educators under the auspices of safe migration and 
anti-trafficking interventions, local staff discovered that at least one of their 
peer educators had graduated to become “a trafficker.” “We cried when we 
realised this!” the NGO officer said. Despite academic writings highlighting 
this possibility several years ago (Molland 2012a), the fact that this came as 
a surprise to NGO workers is telling of something else: aid agencies’ obliv-
iousness of how safe migration interventions can become complicit in pro-
ducing the phenomenon it wishes to eliminate: unscrupulous brokerage.
But, the conundrum is both broader and deeper than this. I would often 
hear aid officials juxtapose their work with migrant brokers. “They [brokers] 
are helping too,” they would say. “Brokers should not be demonised in a 
broad-brush fashion.” Yet, a distinction between migration assistance groups 
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and (good) brokers, NGO officials told me, was that brokers had the added 
benefit of providing actual work for migrants. NGOs were not employment 
intermediaries, and that is why migrants gravitated towards brokers. Yet, 
throughout my fieldwork, the practice of several NGOs and smaller migrant-
based groups contradicted this claim. One morning whilst hanging about in 
Migration Aid’s office, a group of stranded migrant workers appeared. They 
had been cheated by a broker. It made me curious how Migration Aid would 
handle the situation. After conversing with some of Migration Aid’s staff, it 
became clear that the circumstances made it too difficult to chase the broker. 
Their efforts would concentrate on lining the migrants up with work in a 
nearby factory. Although rarely acknowledged as a formal objective of their 
work (some exceptions exist), connecting migrants with employers becomes 
a residual service which stems from the social position of the NGO. This is 
precisely what Maung Thawdar did when he offered a job to an aspirational 
domestic worker as part of his health translation service at his hospital at the 
end of the previous chapter.
In some cases, the NGOs become complicit in farming out workers to 
workplaces that are – by admission of the NGO – highly exploitative. One 
afternoon, I was sitting together with Ma Ni (see Chapter 3) who is the 
manager of one of the numerous small-scale migrant groups, which in this 
instance is funded by an International NGO. While we discuss the range of 
assistance and migrant services they provide, Ma Ni explains the difficulty 
with assisting “MOU deserters” (Burmese: MOU-Pyay), that is, migrants 
who have run away from their workplace under the auspices of an MOU 
contract. When they come to us, Ma Ni explains, they have often aban-
doned their workplace. But, the MOU system does not allow for that, she 
says. Either they have to return to the employer or return to Myanmar. Ma 
Ni tells me that in practice that many of them don’t want to pursue either 
option. Such workers are in effect undocumented as they are in breach 
of their MOU contract, Ma Ni explains. Many factories will not take on 
undocumented workers as it is illegal and risky. “These migrants are des-
perate.” Ma Ni explains to me that the only places left for them are small-
scale textile factories, iron and metal shops as well as rubber factories. They 
accept any type of worker regardless of their migrant status. She explained: 
“I tell the migrants to go to these places.” She described the work in such 
places as “dangerous work” where salaries are below the minimum wage.
In effect, Ma Ni lines up despondent migrants for workplaces that she 
knows are both dangerous and below legal minimum standards. Although 
Ma Ni alleges that she does not charge any commission for such introduc-
tions, one would otherwise be hard-pressed to explain how such migration 
“assistance” differs from willed recruitment into exploitative employment. 
This constitutes what many government and aid agencies (including the 
one that funds Ma Ni’s project) would describe as human trafficking. Yet, 
despite my delicate probing on this point, Ma Ni seemed unable to recog-
nise how her assistance had turned into what her organisation attempted 
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to work against: labour exploitation. From the migrants’ perspective, she 
tells me, having any job – even an exploitative one – is better than nothing. 
Therefore, why not help?
Brokers and helpers
Is Ma Ni exposing migrants to safety or risk? Given that Maung Thawdar’s 
assistance with formal documents – in exchange for a commission – ensures 
the speedy delivery of legal migrant status, should this be considered a form 
of migrant protection or extortion? After all, what is the principled differ-
ence between how Siriwan aids migrants under the auspices of being an 
aid worker as opposed to a licensed broker? And what are we to make of 
the efficacy of how U San Tint draws on his broker experience in asserting 
negotiated outcomes for migrants’ welfare; is this ultimately a form of abuse 
or help? The way in which assistance and brokerage bleed into each other 
makes it difficult to answer these questions. Similarly, their double roles as 
brokers and officials operating under the auspices of safe migration assis-
tance delivery are interlaced, as are the outcomes of their conduct. Risk and 
safety, protection and extortion, and help and abuse are conjoined. How can 
we account for the social grammar that underpins these merged relations 
and practices?
Consider, for example, how U San Tint assists with negotiating down 
the price of bribes for migrants. It results in two important outcomes for 
the migrant: the cost is significantly reduced, and they avoid more serious 
trouble (arrest and deportation). At the same time, the police receive a cut 
nonetheless (although not as much as initially hoped) and U San Tint’s 
translation assistance eases police’s communication with migrants. In 
addition, U San Tint achieves multiple things: in addition to a (possible) 
financial kickback (migrants often provide a financial “gift” for the favour 
for such assistance), it also becomes an opportunity for U San Tin to rein-
force social relations with migrants, other brokers, and officials. A satisfied 
migrant worker due to a well-negotiated bribe helps reinforce U San Tin’s 
reputation as a “good broker,” yet at the same time, the encounter helps 
grease the reciprocal wheels with police officers. In the words of Siriwan, 
such arrangements ensure that “everybody wins.” It is within this logic we 
need to grasp the phenomenon where brokers are helpers and helpers are 
brokers within safe migration as this is central to how we understand the 
social and institutional significance of their ubiquity. Here, it is instructive 
to juxtapose brokers with formal aid assistance.
Several shared characteristics are notable regarding Siriwan, U San 
Tint, and other actors who engaging in brokered assistance. First, their 
social position stems from their own background being migrants. Their 
knowledge of migration and migration infrastructure is experiential, 
based on ongoing, situated embeddedness within migrant worlds. Both 
Siriwan and U San Tint explain to me their roles in contrast with my status 
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as a university lecturer. “One must learn from real life experience, rather 
than only from a classroom, at a University, or Facebook or a computer,” 
Siriwan tells me as “in contrast with Ajarns (lecturer/teacher) like you” 
U San Tint says, “I have learned from experience.” Hence, in methodolog-
ical terms, both brokering and assistance can be considered homologous 
to ethnography.
Second, their practices bring together social actors that are otherwise 
considered socially separate and oppositional. After all, police, employers, 
state agencies are often thought of as “enemies” of migrants. Third, interde-
pendency between social actors structures their social position and practice 
(e.g. police exchange translation for leniency with how migration cases are 
managed). Exchanging money or favours is both how cases are “solved” but 
also what gives the brokers their reputation. Fourth, although their prac-
tice engages laws and regulation, the key point is not skills to produce an 
ordered, rule-bound practice, but rather how to navigate hypercomplex reg-
ularity frameworks. Brokers are rule-benders, not rule-(re)producers.
Note how different this is from formal migration assistance work, which 
is aimed at Weberian technical rationality with rule-bound policies (which 
contributes to siloed bureaucratic practice) aimed at formalisation (which 
makes extra-legal intervention – such as assisting undocumented migrants – 
difficult) where knowledge is premised on positivist data (surveys, question-
naires) and abstract prescriptive intervention modalities (see Chapter 4 on 
pre-departure awareness raising). Yet, a range of immediate challenges that 
migrants face – ranging from police extortion, to well-connected employ-
ers withholding salaries – cannot easily be addressed through formal aid 
assistance. These are precisely the problems MRC1 and MRC2 faced in 
their outreach work (see Chapter 6). In effect, brokers and brokerage bridge 
a void that formal assistance cannot fill. Informal assistance provided by 
brokers, in contrast to formal assistance, has considerable spatio-temporal 
elasticity. As Ko Htay once told me, brokers “dance according to the light,” 
adapting to whatever the situation requires to get things done. At the same 
time, migration assistance, which is often funded through foreign aid, is 
socially removed from migrants. Expatriate aid officials become depend-
ent on chains of programme delivery, whereby international organisations 
fund local partners which, in turn, engage local actors in order to access 
migrants. In this sense, it is unsurprising that migration assistance that 
moves through the complex chains of donor-recipient relations ends up 
resembling broker practices.
Analytically, all of what has been said so far is not new. The way in 
which brokers straddle social domains premised on inter-personal and 
reciprocal – as opposed to scripted and abstracted – relations within context 
of institutional ambiguity has been widely pointed out in literature on bro-
kers (Bierschenk et al. 2002; Lindquist 2015b, 2015a; Lindquist et al. 2012; 
Molland 2012a). What is of anthropological interest is how the ubiquity of 
broker and brokerage practices can be reconciled with migration assistance 
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given that safe migration’s discursive opposition to it. The answer, I sug-
gest, has to do with how brokered assistance constitutes a play of the visible 
and invisible.
As my fieldwork progressed, I had several conversations with aid officials 
working for international safe migration programmes regarding my hybrid 
informants who mixed migration assistance and brokering. My revelation 
was met by surprise and in some cases disbelief, despite the fact that some 
of them were funding activities which included migration awareness raising 
training which became “broker schools” (see Chapter 1). In stark contrast 
to brokers’ ability to connect across social divides, expatriate aid workers 
were notable for their social disconnection from the migrant worlds’ they 
were aiming to intervene in (Feldman 2011a).
At the same time, some aid officials – especially Thai and Burmese – would 
be aware of brokers within safe migration aid delivery. The presence of bro-
kers within the ranks of migration assistance was both known and unknown. 
The simultaneous visibility and invisibility of brokering is reflected through 
subject positions. As we have seen above, in some cases, brokers constitute 
a recognised social category which is part of social actors’ self-definition. 
Both Siriwan and U San Tint are clear about who they are: brokers. At the 
same time, a range of brokering practices take place that are not recognised 
as such, and appear to unfold behind the back of individuals who act them 
out. As far as I am aware, Ma Ni does not see herself – or is seen by others – 
as a broker in terms of who she is and what she does. Yet, as argued above, 
her conduct is clearly within the realm of brokering, with possible nefarious 
results. Brokering manifests itself both through explicit social identities and 
conduct as well as through its (unacknowledged) counter-intentional effects. 
Paradoxically, the organisations that knowingly employ former brokers do 
so in order to make migration world visible, knowable, and accessible. Yet, 
at the same time, the use of brokers in safe migration assistance remains 
formally unacknowledged. It is not part of the formal self-definition of 
safe migration. The role of brokers and brokerage in safe migration service 
delivery conceals just as much as it reveals.
In this context, it is instructive to revisit David Mosse’s influential work 
on brokers in aid. Rather than translation and meaning, it is rather the 
obfuscation of meaning that is central to brokering within migration assis-
tance. In this sense, brokerage lubricates a collective bad faith where it 
becomes possible for aid assistance to resemble what it claims to oppose. 
Similar to how anthropological scholars demonstrate how the fairtrade 
movement does not transform markets but the reverse (rather than achiev-
ing “ethical markets” fair-trade programmes are perfected expressions of a 
neoliberal logic), a similar reversal is evident in safe migration. In a broader 
sense, whereas as safe Migration Aid delivery aims at formalising migra-
tion mechanisms to ensure safety, in practice, it heavily depends on – and 
produces – informal practices. And brokers and brokerage encapsulate this 
process so well.
Brokers, migrants, and safety 165
Conclusion
This chapter has explored the role of brokers and brokerage in light of safe 
migration aid delivery. Rather than constituting separate social worlds, this 
chapter has detailed how brokers and assistance are heavily intertwined. It 
is not unusual for NGO outreach workers to hold previous roles as migra-
tion brokers, and the reason for why aid agencies end up employing former 
brokers can be explained in light of the social positional skill-set they hold 
in order to gain access to (and trust) within migrant communities. Hence, 
safe migration assistance depends on and produce brokering practices. At 
the same time, the chapter has pointed to how brokering practices serve as 
a form of bad faith, where safe migration interventions both depend on, yet 
disassociate itself from brokered migration assistance. Hence, rather than 
translation of meaning and discourse, obfuscation and disarticulation are 
central to brokered safety. Yet, regulation of labour migration and migrant 
assistance cannot simply be reduced to a question of brokers. An analytical 
problem with brokers and brokerage resembles a common critique of patron 
client relations. Although they are easy to point to empirically – the medi-
ation of social relations across social domains – one is left wondering how 
much analytical power brokerage entails. After all, an analytical construct 
that explains too much explains too little. To make our analysis of brokers 
useful, it is instructive to consider how brokerage connects to institutional 
dimensions of migration assistance. Whereas this chapter has examined 
this relation in contrast with formal aid assistance, the following chapter 
will consider how brokerage is situated within informal migrant associa-
tions and the broader context of migrant sociality.
***
A few weeks had passed. My research assistants and I are back at the one-
stop centre carrying out a survey amongst the migrants who are queuing 
up for their new smartcards (see Chapter 5). While we were carrying out 
our survey, I happened to spot Maung Thawdar escorting a small group of 
migrants through the labyrinth of queues, forms, health check stations, and 
processing counters. It was hard to tell whether he was acting in his role as 
a formal health worker servicing the health screening counter within the 
centre or acting in his capacity as a broker. Despite all the efforts by the 
Thai and Myanmar governments to eliminate brokers within the registra-
tion process, brokers and brokerage remained omnipresent.
As previous chapters have shown, migration assistance comprises 
international donors, UN agencies, government bodies, NGOs, as well 
as numerous informal migrant groups amongst Myanmar migrants (see 
Chapters 2 and 3). Through our surveys of migrants at the one-stop centre 
(see Chapter 5), it also became clear to us that migration assistance went 
beyond both formal aid delivery and brokers. Within our survey, we asked 
migrants “Have you ever been in contact with an organisation that assist 
166 Safety mediated
migrants in Thailand?” Of all the 54 migrants surveyed, six had not had any 
contact with any organisation. In addition to the Myanmar Embassy (two 
responses), three others had been in contact with Migrant Assist Migrants 
(MAM), a Myanmar migrant assistance group whom we encountered in 
Chapters 4 and 5. Many more were familiar with MAM through Facebook. 
Notably, not a single migrant reported having had any contact whatsoever 
with a safe migration project implemented by a UN agency or a formally 
recognised NGO. Informal migrant self-help groups, such as MAM, that 
exist outside development aid funding structures were far better known 
than the well-funded formalised aid groups. The next chapter explains why.
Notes
 1. It is worth noting that this anecdote contradicts common claims within 
anti-trafficking discourse: that traffickers and police collude. In this case, 
“traffickers” are not even visible to police.
 2. The reason he could tell was that participants would often ask specific ques-
tions unrelated to their own circumstances.
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We are almost like a government in exile.
(Migrant Assistance Monk)
In the early morning sun, a few hundred people are energetically prepar-
ing for the morning Buddhist festivities celebrating Vassa; the advent of 
the Buddhist lent. Dressed in their best attire (women wearing beautiful 
Burmese sarongs and the men dressed in white shirts and Longyi), they 
line up for the procession whilst awaiting the arrival of the monks. The 
organisers of today’s event, one of the numerous religious-based Myanmar 
migrant groups, know of our arrival in advance. The reverent head monk 
had requested if I would kindly agree to take part in the ceremony itself, 
one of the organisers tells me. Agreeing to this invitation, they provide 
me with the necessary paraphernalia – a Burmese Gaung baung (a tradi-
tional headdress) and an offering bowl – and instructions for how to walk 
in the procession.
Whilst waiting for the monks, we converse with bystanders. The dor-
mitory complex was three years old; my research assistant and I learn. 
Everyone who lives here work nearby, mostly in car-part factories. All are 
from Myanmar, except a small number of Lao and Khmer residents. One 
of the organisers explains that the reason why the Buddhist procession is 
held at the dormitory. As the reverent head monk is a migrant monk he does 
not reside in a Temple, we are told. Finally, the monks arrive in two vans. 
We meet and greet with a polite wai. The head monk gives me a green offer-
ing bowl. Accompanied by music, the procession commences. I walk right 
behind one of the community elders who carry a Buddha statue on a tray. 
Behind us walks another man with another offering bowl. Then, the monks 
follow. As we slowly walk along the procession line within the compound, 
residents place their offerings in the bowl that I am carrying. Our offering 
bowls quickly fill up with money, household items, and rice donations. Two 
men assist with emptying the offering bowls as they fill up during the proces-
sion. As I am carrying the main offering bowl, I am getting a good insight 
into what people donate. In addition to household items (soap, dishwashing 
detergent, biscuits, and snacks), every single resident donates at least one 
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20 Baht note. Some offer as much as 100 Baht (approximately 3.2 USD). 
As they have to offer the same amount to all the monks, the accumulated 
donation – 100–200 Baht – is not an insignificant amount for poor migrant 
workers, considering the minimum daily wage in Thailand is around 310 
Baht. The procession takes perhaps half an hour and is followed by a 
Buddhist sermon.
The Migrant Assistance Monk
Within a Buddhist Southeast Asian context, the ceremony I describe 
appears conventional both in content and form: laypeople provide offerings 
to a procession of village elders and monks followed by a religious sermon. 
Although the ceremony resembles Buddhist religious practices in Myanmar, 
both in terms of attendance (laymen and monks alike), music, and attire 
(Buddhist dresses/sarongs), the whole event is far removed from the tem-
ples of Myanmar as it takes place at labour migrants’ dormitories at the 
outskirts of Bangkok. In collaboration with expatriate Myanmar monks, 
migrant workers have in effect created a Burmese mini-cosmos in Thailand. 
As this chapter will explicate, such forms of sociality are central for mobilis-
ing support for numerous informal social organisations that assist migrants 
in Thailand. The Migrant Assistance Monk is one central actor in bridging 
migrants and migrant assistance work. The monk carries out such ceremo-
nies quite often. Some ceremonies draw huge crowds of several thousand 
migrants which provide a platform for mobilising financial resources as well 
as serving as a potential platform for deliberating migrant welfare concerns.
Later that afternoon, we were invited to the Migrant Assistance Monk’s 
residency. Rather than living in a temple, he has his own condo in another 
part of Bangkok. The Migrant Assistance Monk came to Thailand as 
a political refugee as part of the 1988 student protest movement. He has 
been in Thailand ever since. In 2005, he became involved in assisting labour 
migrants from Myanmar, which has now become a central part of his daily 
activities, ranging from negotiating work accidents, underpayment and dis-
missal cases, as well as aiding with a range of other problems migrants face 
(such as road accidents and hospital admissions).
The Migrant Assistance Monk alleges he deals with approximately seven 
cases per day when he is not away on other religious affairs or sermons. 
This statistic is backed up by our own observations when visiting him in his 
condo where he receives several visits from migrants. One case relates to a 
broker who had scammed a couple for a huge amount of money. Another 
relates to a lady needing help locating her husband who has been caught up 
in a raid at a factory. A third involves mediating in a bitter divorce. While 
the monk hears the cases presented to him, he brings up his mobile phone. 
The broker-case is an ongoing investigation, we learn. He is texting one of 
the Thai police officers who is working on the case. His phone is his office. 
Besides communication via phone and text, the phone is also a document 
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library where photos of case-related evidence are kept (passports images 
and court documents that relate to different cases). His phone is also his 
main broadcast to his constituents (some 30,000 Facebook followers).
Alongside underpayment and compensation claims, another common 
reason migrant seeks his help has to do with extortion by patrolling police 
officers. As is well known amongst migrants and migrant assistance groups 
alike, some police officers opportunistically stop migrants on the street. If 
the migrant cannot produce their formal documents, the police will extort 
a bribe. The police will take the migrant to the police station expecting a 
3–5000 Baht “fee” from the migrant, the monk explains, which forces the 
migrant to call a relative or a friend to pool money. Yet, as the monk is 
well known, migrants who have been caught by the police will call for his 
help. “I make my way to the police station,” the Migrant Assistance Monk 
explains. “I pretend I don’t’ know about the bribe,” he says with a smile. He 
explains that he will tell the police that this migrant is a student of his and 
that he is a good person who does not get drunk or cause conflict. He will 
then give the police between 1000–1500 Baht for the trouble. This strategy 
always works, the monk explains, as Thai police does not dare argue – let 
alone negotiate a bribe – with a monk.
The monk’s symbolic capital is no doubt handy in such situations as it 
allows him a negotiation space which straddles Myanmar migrant commu-
nities, Thai officials, and even Thai employers whom he from time to time 
approaches on behalf of disgruntled migrants. His social status as a monk 
also serves as a connecting point between formal authority (he regularly 
collaborates with the Myanmar Embassy on migrant assistance cases) and 
migrants. The religious ceremonies described earlier are key events for such 
connectivity. Although many of these ceremonies take place in the grater 
Bangkok area, events are also organised elsewhere across Thailand.
This chapter contends that informal migration assistance, exemplified by 
the monk, supersedes the operational space and scalar potential of formal 
migration aid delivery by UN agencies, governments and NGOs. As can-
vassed in the organisation network map in Chapter 2 (see Figure 9.1), and as 
the following pages will expound, the Migrant Assistance Monk is only one 
small part of a larger web of social actors that engage in informal migrant 
assistance. And one of the main ways such actors are connected is through 
donations. As is common with other religious donations, money and gifts 
are intended for the monks’ daily needs. But for the Migrant Assistance 
Monk, a surplus of gifts allows redirection of food, household items, and 
cash to be used for his own migration assistance activities (such as financ-
ing payments to the police), or as donations to other migrant groups, such 
as migrants assist migrants (MAM) (see Chapters 5 and 8). He also allows 
migrant groups to speak to his followers during religious events, enabling 
a space to speak directly to migrants regarding migration issues. Hence, 
the monk contributes to an enabling environment where informal migrant 
groups can reach thousands of people during religious events for awareness 
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raising purposes – a scale that UN agencies could only dream of within 
their own activities.
Whereas the previous chapter explored how brokers and brokerage con-
stitutes an important informal dimension of safe migration assistance, this 
chapter extends this perspective by examining migration associations that 
operate largely outside formal development and government backing. As will 
become evident, not only is the Migrant Assistance Monk unusual in that 
monks rarely extend their activity beyond the Sangha (the Buddhist monas-
tic order) into worldly affairs. The monk’s conduct, as well as his collabora-
tion with other migrant self-help associations, such as MAM, contrasts with 
formal safe migration programmes that are funded by the UN agencies and 
NGOs as his operation is not premised on a Weberian technical-rational 
operating order. The monk, alongside a range of other migrant assistance 
groups (that are often run by migrants themselves), carries out activities that 
are not “rendered technical” in the forms of logframes and other operational 
procedures (Li 2007). As evident above, the monk conducts his business 
through face-to-face relationships where his personal prominence is central 
to how migrants’ problems are settled through mediation. Both the monk’s 
support and the support for the monk derive from old and new forms of con-
nectivity: smartphones and social media, coupled with established forms of 
social reciprocity, gift giving (such as through religious festivals) and moral 
economies (cf. Scott 1977). Yet, due to the mediated character of such prac-
tices, it also renders migration assistance highly unstable.
All of this is not to suggest that informal actors, such as the Migrant 
Assistance Monk and MAM, are entirely detached from formal agencies 
and international aid. For example, Migration Aid served as an MRC under 
the auspices of a UN funded project, whilst – as will become evident in this 
chapter – collaborating with MAM on certain occasions. Yet, both discur-
sive and social disconnections between formal and informal actors exist. 
Throughout my fieldwork, international aid officials (of whom most are expa-
triates) remained unaware of the existence of both MAM and the Migrant 
Assistance Monk despite their widespread fame amongst Myanmar migrants. 
Conversely, although safe migration is important to many international aid 
programmes, it is discursively peripheral to local actors such as MAM and 
the Migration Assistance Monk, although Migration Aid’s Thai Director 
was well aware of a safe migration discourse both in English and Thai lan-
guages as part of their funding emanated from safe migration programmes.
In what follows, the chapter explicates how a range of informal migrant 
groups achieves operational space. In addition to the Migrant Assistant 
Monk and MAM, we will examine other assistance groups which emulate 
labour unions and rhizomic modes of organising. Finally, the chapter shows 
how these modes of assistance cannot be fully understood without paying 
attention to migrants’ and migrant assistance groups’ emergent social media 
use. As will become evident, social media amplifies how informal assistance 
groups both extend yet become antagonistic to the state, which renders safe 
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migration highly volatile. Before proceeding, I need to emphasise that expli-
cating informal migrant group’s operational abilities does not imply that 
their work is necessarily successful or superior to formal aid delivery. What 
concerns us is how safe migration is produced; not whether safe migration 
produces success.
Migrants assist migrants
As described above, religious festivals generate surplus household and mon-
etary gifts that are donated to migrant assistance groups. Once such group 
is MAM which we tangentially learned about in Chapters 5 and 8. Three 
migrant workers from Myanmar established MAM in 2014. The head of the 
organisation, U Htay Ko, had previous background from another migrant 
assistance group, while the two others previously worked as volunteer out-
reach workers for local Thai NGOs. Despite being a young group, they 
were by then already processing considerable volumes of migrant assistance 
case work.
When I first met MAM in 2016, they were processing wage theft and work 
accident compensation claims for approximately hundred migrant workers 
which implicated five local factories. Their collaboration with Migration 
Aid was central to this process. MAM had something that the Migration 
Aid did not: strong connections with Myanmar migrants. In the province 
where they were based, MAM had contact with some 90 informal migrant 
associations, which also included collaboration with “good brokers,” such 
as Mg Thaung (see Chapters 5 and 8). In addition, MAM had by then 
already established an impressive social media presence providing them 
with unprecedented broadcast to migrants. When I first met them, they had 
some 56,000 followers on Facebook which ballooned to nearly one million 
at the end up my fieldwork in 2019. Conversely, Migration Aid enjoyed a 
position that was unattainable for MAM: being a formally registered Thai 
NGO, they had the necessary skills, credibility, and legal status to negotiate 
and process work accidents, underpayments, and abuse cases through the 
Thai government bureaucracy. As mentioned in Chapter 6, Migration Aid 
had some success with such cases, yet the collaboration with organisations, 
such as MAM, was important in order for Migration Aid to gain access and 
trust in order for migrants to come forward.
Patron–client relationships such as these were no secret. Local gov-
ernment bureaucrats and police were well aware of such arrangements. 
However, MAM did not solely rely on this affiliation in order to operate. 
One of the MAM’s founding members – Ko Thet Oo – who himself was a 
migrant worker, maintained an official status as a volunteer with another 
Thai NGO (later to be elevated to a salaried outreach worker). His NGO visa 
status allowed him (in contrast with many other migrant workers) to legally 
cross provincial borders, which has important implications for MAM’s spa-
tial reach.1 In addition, MAM had established strong relationships with the 
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Myanmar Embassy’s labour attaché which had its own recognised mandate 
(by the Thai authorities) to aid labour migrants. These relationships ena-
bled MAM to operate with the full knowledge of authorities despite a lack 
of any legal organisational status in Thailand.
MAM’s financing mirrored its informal status premised on patrimonial 
relations. Although some donor funding may have trickled down to MAM 
via their relationship with Migration Aid (who received considerable vol-
umes of foreign aid), most of their funding was generated separately from 
both the Thai and international formal aid sectors. Midway through my 
fieldwork, MAM split from Migration Aid, which left them solely depend-
ent on three sources of funding. Besides the aforementioned religious dona-
tions, such as from the Migrant Assistance Monk, MAM actively requested 
funding from migrants through social media and at other public events. A 
third source of funding came through the success of their own case work. 
When securing compensation claims, they made sure to point out to the 
lucky migrant that a donation would be appreciated.
The severing of ties with Migration Aid and the sole reliance on dona-
tions from migrants themselves had important implications for MAM’s 
modus operandi, explained by U Htay Ko as follows:
Funds from donors are of course always welcome, as long as no strings 
are attached. But we cannot accept the kind of funds that will restrict 
our activities. Many funds are for “not to do something.” But, we cannot 
accept such “not to do something” funds. In this way, we are different 
to other NGOs, CBOs, and Trade Unions. We do not rely on a specific 
donor and are therefore more independent. Some organisations must be 
registered with provincial mayors, who can then scrutinise their activ-
ities. If the mayor thinks they are doing something he does not like, he 
can dismantle them. So, if any “irregularities” exist with the mayor, do 
you think the NGO will dare reveal it?
For MAM, conventional donor funding does not merely limit activities in 
terms of what may be pleasing to the “political ear”: practical operational 
reasons explain why MAM evade formal funding, as explained by Ko Thet 
Oo thus:
I used to work for a health project with an NGO where we ran shelters 
for homeless migrants with tuberculosis, HIV and Malaria. Yet, through 
my work it was clear that many other migrants are in distressed situ-
ations who lose their jobs due to work accidents. We could not bring 
such migrants to the shelter as they were not eligible. So, NGOs have 
limitations.
Hence, for MAM, severing ties with Migration Aid was in part due to 
frustration with upward donor accountability. By only seeking funds from 
Informal assistance 173
migrants – as we saw in Chapter 3, Myanmar has a widespread established 
practice of community-based donations – they freed themselves from 
bureaucratic red tape which enabled considerable operational flexibility.2 
How MAM chose to respond to cases could be decided on the fly and did 
not need to observe bureaucratic categorical imperatives. The fast-paced 
nature of MAM is something that many migrants commented upon both 
through their social media accounts but also through independent inter-
views I conducted with migrants. Indeed, the separation from Migration 
Aid took place within a context of MAM’s operational expansion, which 
included establishing a shelter for distressed migrants (which at the time 
housed up to several hundred people) despite lack of any legal or formal 
operational status.3 MAM’s brisk reputation due to their non-bureaucratic 
operational style was part of a larger ecosystem where their operations, 
social media presence, and various patrimonial relations with other NGOs 
and state bodies underpinned yet (as will become evident) undermined their 
momentum as an informal migration assistance group. However, such a 
flexible operational space can be achieved in different ways. MAM is far 
from the only migrant self-help group. Below I will consider two other 
groups: Myanmar Migration Help (MMH) and the Migrant Network (MN).
Myanmar migration help
My research assistant and I are sitting inside MMH office, which is another 
organisation run by current and former Myanmar workers. Approximately 
ten minutes into our interview with the director, Daw Thandar, a van parks 
outside. Some thirty young disgruntled Myanmar migrant workers enter the 
office. Something is clearly afoot. It becomes clear that they are involved in 
a dispute with their employer and came to seek help. My research assistant 
and I tell Daw Thandar that we can pause the interview and step aside so 
he can deal with this case. She agrees. After a little while, a group of Thai 
government officials enter the room. Then, another man, whom we later 
learned was the employer, joins the meeting. While the meeting goes on, we 
discretely step outside as we do not wish to disturb or complicate matters.
Whilst the meeting progresses, we converse with another staff member. 
She explains that this sort of thing happens often. MMH becomes a medi-
ator between employers and employees. Sources of tension echo the ones 
described in Chapter 5. Migrants end up working for different employers 
(often under poorer conditions) to what is stipulated in the contracts they 
sign up for during recruitment in Burma, she explains.
After an hour, the meeting ends. The officials and migrants leave. We 
recommence our conversation with the director. She explains to us that 
the migrant workers alleged that the employer did not follow the law. The 
case had been ongoing for some time. Today, they came to ask for assis-
tance. Their wages had not been paid on time, the director explains, so they 
requested that the employer and a representative from local labour office to 
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come together and have a dialogue here today to settle the matter. “So, the 
workers requested the meeting,” I query? “Yes, the workers ordered (Thai: 
sang) me to do this, so I told the government and the employer to come,” the 
director confirms.
Both MMH and MAM are often called upon to mediate between employ-
ers and migrant workers, and appear similar to practices that have been doc-
umented in other parts of Thailand (Campbell 2018). Such activities strongly 
emulate labour union activism: supporting labour migrants through repre-
senting cases of underpayment and other forms of exploitation to employers 
and authorities, which at times may even involve strikes comprising hun-
dreds (and in some cases thousands) of migrant workers (Migrant Labour 
May Get Longer Permits 2018; Zaw Zaw 2017b). Yet, all of this takes place 
despite of the fact that labour migrants are not legally allowed to unionise 
outside Thai labour unions. As such, MMH modus operandi is of particular 
interest in how it emulates labour unions. In contrast with MAM, which 
relies on donations and informal commissions from successful compensa-
tion cases, MMH derives funding from its monthly membership fees.4 At 
the time of the dispute meeting described above, MMH boasted 5000 mem-
bers which contributed to their ability to runs offices elsewhere in Thailand. 
Instead of relying on a range of patron–client relationships in lieu of infor-
mal status, MAM has managed this “in house:” a Thai person is formally 
heading the organisation, which allows them to operate legally. Yet, all pro-
ject staff are from Myanmar.
All this takes place – including the membership-based structure of 
MMH – with the full knowledge of local employers and government offi-
cials. This raises broader questions of how organisations, such as MAM 
and MMH, can operate – not only with lack of formal status – but also in 
ways which are clearly at loggerheads with both employers and the govern-
ment, and which may amplify political sensitivities given the widespread 
criticisms of Thailand’s poor record on labour standards and human traf-
ficking. The meeting described above encapsulates the conundrum: why 
do government officials and the factory employer allow MMH to medi-
ate the dispute with the workers? How can the meeting’s outcome (i.e. the 
employer having to agree to back pay the workers) be explained given 
the broader hostile political and legal environment where a lot is stacked 
against migrants?
A starting point for answering this question may be to canvass the var-
ious options at hand for both the local labour officials and the factory 
owner. From the perspective of the employer, having a meeting at the fac-
tory itself would be undesirable as this could easily lead to an even stronger 
mobilisation amongst other workers who may opt to join in resulting in 
unruly cat strikes. At the same time, the labour officials may be reluctant 
to have some thirty migrant workers coming into their offices. As such, 
MAM’s office is a lesser evil for both the employer and labour officials. As 
Daw Thandar explained to us, “the reason our organisation can make that 
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happen [mediation meetings] is because the government recognises us, as we 
are located in the area and are useful in how we work with employers and 
employees.”
Throughout my fieldwork, I would often hear officials from MMH, 
MAM, and other organisations explain their relationship with govern-
ment and employers in such terms: “we help each other,” or “they need 
our help.”. Bringing in organisations like MAM and MMM to negotiations 
may appear as amplification and mobilisation for workers’ rights, but at 
the same time, it does something else: it brings order and helps streamline 
negotiations amongst antagonistic parties. This is precisely how U Htay 
Ko explained why authorities tolerated MAM’s migrant shelter despite 
lack of any permission. When they assist migrants, they must collect var-
ious forms of evidence as this is necessary in order to have success with, 
say, compensation claims. “When we collect evidence on cases,” U Htay 
Ko alleges, “we actually help authorities doing their work on labour abuse 
cases.” Police and labour authorities, U Htay Ko explains, are after all 
under pressure to show they act on cases. Emphasising how they were, in 
a sense, doing the work for the government was also how MAM had been 
able to continue running their shelter. “The military, the police and labour 
inspectors have all come to our shelter trying to close it down,” U Htay Ko 
explains. “But when they come, I simply ask: well, do you want to take care 
of them all?” U Htay Ko knows that the authorities hold limited capac-
ity (and will) to directly deal with hundreds of stranded labour migrants. 
Hence, the authorities end up tolerating MAM’s operations (though, as 
we will see later, limits apply to such tolerance). Daw Thandar pointed to 
similar dynamics. Bigger factories, she alleges, are more comfortable with 
their presence as it makes it easier for big companies to settle disputes. For 
employers and local government alike, MMH’s activities means “we are 
useful to them,” Daw Thandar explains.
Although employers, migrant labourers, and government bodies are argu-
ably in structural opposition, both MAM and MMH demonstrate that they 
are also in relationships of interdependency. What would otherwise consti-
tute a chaotic and uncontrollable situation of protest (and potential care) 
for both government and employers is brought within acceptable parame-
ters due to the works of MMH and MAM. Hence, migration assistance is 
underpinned by relations that are both oppositional yet inter-dependent. It 
is important to note that such relations are rather common amongst Thai 
NGOs (Munger 2008, 2015) and reflect broader neo-patrimonial relations 
between non-state and state actors in the region (Baker and Milne 2015). 
Yet, the fact that migrant groups hold a particular precarious position (due 
to their migrant status) makes them analytically interesting in how networks 
of migration governance are shaped. These are not merely patron client 
relationships; they point to how informal actors animate temporal and spa-
tial dimensions of governmental reach. This is exemplified by semi-formal 
migrant networks which we will now turn to.
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The migration network
The activities described thus far are premised on organisational structures. 
Both MAM and MMH are groups with an internal hierarchy comprising 
leaders and various subordinates coupled with a division of labour. They 
are what in development aid parlance would be labelled Community-Based 
Organisations (CBOs). Despite their informal status, they nonetheless emu-
late organisational structures of NGOs and (in the case of MMH) Trade 
Unions. During my fieldwork, it became clear to me that other migration 
assistance groups resembled rhizomatic networks as opposed to hierarchi-
cal, organisational units.
One of these networks is formal (that is, it holds a registered status), well 
known, and takes the shape as a consortium of both Thai and International 
organisations. However, parallel Myanmar-specific networks operate with-
out any formal status. The Migration Network (MN) emerged in the early 
2000s. MN is centred around the greater Bangkok region and encompasses 
neighbouring provinces. This network was initiated by an international 
donor in the early 2000s in relation to refugee work along the Myanmar-
Thai border. Over the years, the networks’ focus gradually embraced labour 
migration assistance for migrant workers. The original donor has now 
discontinued funding. During my fieldwork, another international donor 
had taken on funding these activities under the auspices of an explicit safe 
migration discourse. The network also collaborates with formal NGOs. 
The leader of the network Daw Hla May, who herself came to Thailand 
as a political refugee in relation to the 1988 student protests in Myanmar, 
described their group to me in English as a “mirror network” which emu-
lates and collaborates with Thai NGO migrant networks. Similar to MAM 
and Migration Aid, such relationships were one of mutual inter-dependence: 
the network provided Thai NGOs with direct conduits into migrant com-
munities; in return, the network benefitted from their collaboration with 
Thai NGO networks as they could formally present cases to Thai author-
ities and advocate on their behalf. The involvement of their international 
donor also provided a similar form of cover. Yet, the relationship was rela-
tively loose: the donor only funded specific small-scale activities on a case-
by-case basis (such as financial resources to cover travel for outreach work 
for the network) which in part can be explained by the delicacy of funding 
non-registered entities for international donors. In addition, the network 
did not solely depend on funding from their donor; they were also, similarly 
to MMH, a membership-based network, with annual fees.
The Bangkok-based network was made up of around twenty individu-
als from around ten different Myanmar migrant groups. Some members 
are ordinary migrants. The way in which the network interlays between 
Myanmar migrant groups and their international donor is crucial to under-
stand the network’s operations. On the one hand, the international donor 
funds a range of local migrant associations and their activities. This includes 
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language schools, training centres, and various forms of assistance (work 
permits, compensation claims, and health-related assistance). As such, 
activities are conventionally structured around CBOs. Yet, the migrant net-
work, which is made up of individual members from many of the associa-
tions, operates in parallel to these activities.
This raises the question: why is it necessary for individuals from estab-
lished migration associations to form and additional network in order to 
assist migrants? This seeming duplicitous arrangement was explained 
by Daw Hla May as follows: “When you work for an NGO or CBO,” she 
explained, “you are only focusing on one area. So, when you work in one 
community, you can’t connect with another community. But with a net-
work, you can share information broadly.” Hence, Daw Hla May’s Migrant 
Network emerged out of a similar problem identified by Ko Thet Oo and U 
Htay Ko above: how formal organisational mandates prevent operational 
flexibility. Yet, in contrast with MAM and MMH, Daw Hla May’s net-
work links community associations that cannot easily collaborate laterally. 
Although never mentioned by Daw Hla May, this arrangement, no doubt, 
did depend on considerable goodwill and “willed ignorance” from the asso-
ciation’s main donor (See van Ufford 1993). This way, the network channels 
case work, especially relating to labour protection and health. In addition, 
they also work on advocacy through the formal Thai network.
In cases where they engage government officials, such as working on a hos-
pital case, they will work under the auspices of their donor NGO. Hence, the 
network allows fluid operations outside bureaucratic red-tape and hierarchies. 
Referrals allow the network to expand their spatial reach. If network member 
X located in province A comes across a case relating to province B, a simple 
phone call or text message to another network member located in province B 
is all that is needed to make that other network members act on the case. The 
network also expands their expertise. For example, Ma Nii, whom we learned 
about in Chapters 3 and 8, has considerable experience with healthcare 
assistance for migrants and therefore commonly receives referral from other 
network members due to her expertise in dealing with health cases. When 
the network comes across cases that require legal expertise, they typically 
escalate the case to the Thai MN. The fact that members of the network are 
themselves migrants means that they are also able to provide context- specific 
advice that are often based on their own migration experiences.5
Through such arrangements, MN avoids a range of well-known chal-
lenges common to formal aid delivery. Whereas formal aid delivery has 
difficulties with information sharing and cooperation (i.e. referrals) due to 
competition over resource and even beneficiaries, often due to polycentric 
funding arrangements (Stirrat 2006a), MN receives funds based on specific 
cases. Coupled with membership registration fees, they limit structural 
impediments to case-sharing arrangements. Donor upward accountability 
is similarly reduced through such practices. Yet, MN also relies heavily on 
cooperation with government authorities in order to operate. In this regard, 
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MN is remarkably similar to both MAM and MN. As the next section will 
explicate, not only do organisations such as MN, MAM, and MMH depend 
on the government in order to operate; the government depends on them.
Governing with a head but no arms and 
legs: Oppositional inter-dependence
My research assistant and I are sitting together with U Htay Ko and Ko 
Thet Oo at Migration Aid’s office compound. This is early on in my research 
where MAM and Migration Aid worked closely together. While we converse, 
we can see a car parking outside the office. Many migrants are present in the 
office compound. Besides receiving assistance from MAM and Migration 
Aid with various work-related problems, the crowd suggests something else 
is going on. The MAM members excuse themselves and say they must attend 
to the arriving guests. As it turns out, they are officials from the Myanmar 
Embassy wishing to familiarise themselves with MAM’s work. My research 
assistant and I are invited to join the meeting. The crowd outside separates 
on both sides of the short alleyway into the property to make way for the 
two-man delegation. They are both from the Myanmar Embassy’s labour 
attaché. U Htay Ko and Ko Thet Oo together with Migration Aid’s Director 
welcome them as they all walk into the main meeting room in the office 
compound. A few other associates of Migration Aid and MAM join the 
meeting, alongside a few migrants who are currently seeking help (all of 
them with amputated arms and legs due to work accidents). The meeting 
commences, switching frequently between Thai and Burmese, where two of 
Migration Aid’s staff members assist with translation.
The main representative from the labour attaché informs the meeting that 
he has been given full authority to help but he kindly requests to contact 
him through formal channels in writing. “We are willing to help in every 
case,” he says. “Because we cannot do this kind of work ourselves, we are 
willing to support and collaborate with the work you do.” The Thai Director 
responds “we need to work with MAM and their network. We need to sup-
port MAM and we need to work with Myanmar [recruitment] agencies so 
as to know where they send workers to. So, I would like to ask you to help 
coordinate with agencies to introduce us so that we can work with them.” 
The head of the labour attaché responds affirmatively, adding that “we are 
not happy with the work of recruitment agencies.” The kind of malpractice 
amongst recruitment agencies (as discussed in Chapter 5) was no doubt a 
shared concern for all parties in the meeting.
U Htay Ko and Ko Thet Oo explain how MAM assist workers and the 
various kinds of problems migrants face, including debt bondage situations 
due to dysfunctional MOU contracts and the difficulty for migrant with com-
pensation claims. “victims who are in the court process need help” U Htay 
Ko says. “In the future, we need collaboration with the government office and 
to help with cases after the labour dispute is settled.” The head of the labour 
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attaché replies: “I will do my job at best. I want to visit MAM to learn how 
many staff you have, how much funding you have. We want to help you. When 
accidents happen to workers, if you need some supporting documents from 
embassy to help with the process, we are willing to issue them.” The head of 
the attaché promises “full collaboration between the Embassy and MAM.”
Afterwards, the embassy officials go outside and mingle with the crowd. 
The head of the attaché speaks with one worker who has been underpaid 
250 Baht per day – as opposed to the legal minimum of 310 Baht – for six 
years. Yet, the employer was only willing to pay for two years. Then, a photo 
session follows where the two labour officials stand side by side with work-
ers who had lost limbs in work accidents. MAM later uploads the photos 
to their Facebook account, which serves as a form of witnessing relating 
to harmed bodies as well as underscoring MAM’s legitimacy as a credi-
ble migrant assistance provider given their ability to connect incapacitated 
labour migrants and Myanmar officials. Whilst this was unfolding, we hap-
pen to stand next to one of the Migration Aid’s Myanmar outreach workers, 
who says to us quietly “we will have to wait and see,” implying that the 
meeting is perhaps more about appearances as opposed to substance.
Yet, in the following days, the labour attaché seemed to act on its promise. 
MAM posted on their Facebook account an official letter from the Embassy 
which provided them with the necessary authority to escort migrants to 
the border. In a similar fashion to how Siriwan (Chapter 8) could act as an 
extended arm of the Embassy, these letters allowed MAM to expand their 
operational space as it permitted them to cross provincial and (in the cases 
of repatriation of migrants) even national borders.
In 2016, only two labour attaché officials served at the Myanmar embassy. 
This expanded to five in 2017. Yet, even with five officials, their capacity 
to deal with migrant assistance work was severely limited due to the size 
of the migrant population. Similar to how Myanmar organisations can 
work in patron-client relationship-type arrangements with Thai NGOs, the 
Myanmar Labour attaché served a similar function: it allowed informal 
groups to operate, even with full knowledge of Thai officials, despite their 
informal status. The arrangement was also useful to the Myanmar Embassy. 
Given their limited manpower, they were in practice entirely dependent on 
these groups to fulfil a range of functions relating to migrants. Indeed, as 
one member of MN told me, “the labour attaché has a head but no arms and 
legs.” The spatial connotation of the metaphor should not be missed. Despite 
the attaché’s formal authority to assist migrants, they have no meaningful 
capacity to do so. Hence, informal migrant groups serve as extended arms 
and legs of the Embassy which in effect expand the spatial reach of both.
The relationship I here describe resembles spatialised dimensions of the 
state as discussed by Ferguson and Gupta (2008). The migrant associations’ 
relationship with the Myanmar Embassy vertically elevates them “above” 
migrants due to their associated authority with the Embassy. In many 
respects, organisations like MAM become “seen like a state” (Timmer 
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2010) in how they emulate state functions. These relationships also appear 
as encompassing as it allows migration assistance to – in principle – take 
place anywhere. If we adopt a conventional definition of scale – “the spatial 
reach of actions” (Xiang 2013, 3) – the instrumental utility of these arrange-
ments becomes clear. The heads, arms, and legs of migration assistance are 
not merely discursive assemblages of state mimesis. They enable substantive 
assistance to take place.
The co-dependent relations between the labour attaché and migrant 
assistance groups were multiple. For example, MN members did not merely 
act as outreach workers for the embassy; they would also assist with trans-
lation, especially of laws and regulations (something they also did for Thai 
NGOs). In return, the embassy endorsed documents required for social 
security claims, which the network in turn could translate from Burmese 
into Thai. Hence, these groups bridged information flows between Thai 
NGOs, the Myanmar Embassy, and Thai authorities. Such practices resem-
ble brokerage, as discussed in previous chapters, but differ in how it depends 
on associations (as opposed to individuals) and is driven by the need for 
an operational space (as opposed to a direct material or pecuniary profit).
Yet, just as the volatile and ambiguous role of brokers and brokerage, the 
legs, arms, and head of migration assistance were also precarious as they 
posed problems for organisations such as MMH, MAM, and MN. For exam-
ple, a key reason why migrants supported MAM (who financially depended 
on migrants’ donations) was due to their punchy and edgy approach to 
migrant assistance. This involved activities that could be interpreted as crit-
icisms of authorities. Calling out unscrupulous brokers and repeated advo-
cacy in order for migrant workers to be compensated due to underpayment 
and poor workplace safety are all arguably a critique of the state’s failure to 
regulate work conditions. In many cases, MAM would directly and publicly 
criticise authorities for failing to assist migrants. Indeed, as we have seen in 
Chapter 5, MAM had been a vocal critic of both recruitment agencies and 
the CI centres. MAM had to maintain such an oppositional role to maintain 
its credibility amongst migrants. As such, MAM could not only strive to be 
“seen like a state” (Timmer 2010) for programmatic authoritative credibility 
but had to simultaneously mark their separation from both the Myanmar 
and Thai state. Hence, in order to maintain momentum, they faced an 
impossible task: they had to maintain an oppositional stance towards the 
institutions (such as the labour attaché) which they depended on. Yet, it is 
impossible to appreciate these dynamics without a careful attention to the 
role of smartphones and social media, which we will now turn to.
Migrants, assistance, and the smartphone
Throughout this book, we have seen several examples of how both migrants 
and aid agencies engage social media. Although many labour migrants are 
relatively poor, the accessibility and affordability of smartphones means 
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that, as with the broader society in general, social media usage and smart-
phone uptake are ubiquitous. Practically, all migrants I encountered in 
this research either possessed or had access to a smartphone. Free social 
media-platforms and text messages applications are widely used (Facebook, 
Viber, and Line are amongst the most popular).
At first glance, social media use can seem trivial and leisurely. Using 
smartphones as a devise to listen to music, follow news regarding local 
celebrities, and engage in casual chit chat and gossip with friends and fam-
ily appear common. Indeed, the fact that Lao migrants say lin internet or 
lin Face (i.e. to “play internet” and “play on Facebook”) is suggestive of 
the recreational disposition of smartphone use. As within western socie-
ties, smartphones and social media use in Mekong countries, including its 
poor migrant workers, has become routinised and normalised. Yet, such 
“data doxa” (Smith 2018) also connects with highly instrumental ways 
that migrants and migrant assistance agencies employ social media and 
smartphones.
We have already seen examples of this throughout this book: How Mg 
Arkar (Chapter 7) utilised his smartphone to take and upload photos on 
Facebook of his injured body in order to seek financial support for hospital 
bills, and Santi (Chapter 6) advising migrants to use their smartphone to 
take a photo of their passport and work permit. Migrant language schools, 
such as the Myanmar Migrant School (Chapter 1), demonstrate how social 
media connects migrants regarding advice on jobs and other migration 
issues. Even state agencies incorporate migrants’ social media use in migra-
tion management, such as the CI centres’ acceptance of house registration 
documents being provided via smartphones (see Chapter 5). Social media 
and smartphone use are also central to claim-making, demonstrated by Ma 
Myo Myo’ organisation utilising migrants’ photos of bodily injuries as evi-
dence in labour dispute cases (see Chapter 7). As social media serves as a 
form of witnessing, where migrants’ misfortune cast light on governments’ 
inability to control substandard work conditions and addressing various 
forms of malpractice, it also serves as a latent source of critique.
As such, the smartphone is not politically neutral. Being a polymedium, 
it weaponises migrants to both record and communicate information in 
unprecedented ways. Arguably, smartphones and social media counter 
“zoning technologies” (Ong 2004) and other subjugating practices which 
aim to limit migrants spatial and social reach, as they bridge and connect 
migrants in newfound ways.6 Given migrants’ dependency on brokers (a 
theme that has resurfaced throughout the book), it is notable how social 
media potentially reduces the need for intermediaries in communication 
(Dijck et al. 2018). The ubiquitous use of smartphones and social media 
applications entails an enormous scalar potential in terms of producing, 
collecting, and dissemination information amongst migrants. It is precisely 
this which is what organisations, such as MAM, are tapping into. In this 
sense, social media and smartphones embolden migrants (and migrant 
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assistance groups) in ways which can usefully be thought of as forms of 
counter surveillance, or counter-conducts.
The various ways MAM utilised smartphones and social media were 
apparent from the first time I met them in 2016. In stark contrast to formal 
international NGOs and UN agencies, of whom many invested considera-
ble amount of foreign aid money into developing trendy apps, MAM relied 
solely on their own smartphones (cheap Android phones) and free social 
media applications (Facebook, Viber, and Line), requiring no operational 
budget. Similar to the phone-based assistance I described in Chapter 6, 
MAM employ similar approaches. However, instead of relying on phone 
calls, they combine this with text messaging apps which also allow fast and 
easy exchange of documents, pictures, and geolocations.
Mg Khin, one of the U Htay Ko’s colleagues showed on his phone to 
me how this works in practice. Just a few days earlier, Mg Khin received 
a message from a distressed domestic worker via the text messaging app 
Line.7 Mg Khin received a Line message explaining that she was in serious 
trouble. After some messages going back and forth, it became clear that the 
domestic worker could not leave the household. In order to assist, Mg Khin 
requested her to share images of herself (so they would know what she looks 
like), her employment contract (if she had one), her passports and other 
documents, photo of any bodily injuries, as well as (if possible) photos of the 
employer and the broker who had recruited her. He also asked her to share 
her address. As it turned out, she had no idea where she was. Given this, 
Mg Khin asked her to share her geolocation (which is possible due to Line’s 
embedded GPS location abilities, see Figure 9.1 on next page). Mg Khin told 
me that this information allowed MAM to launch a rescue of the domestic 
worker in collaboration with Thai police.
We already know from Chapter 6 that there may be serious unintended 
effects of such rescues (such as deportations). Yet, MAM appears to reduce 
such risk in similar ways to Boonchu (see Chapter 6), that is, by aligning 
themselves with known police officers whom they have built up strong 
relationships with (which again is another example of the importance of 
informal, social relations in order to assist migrant workers). Hence, vir-
tual interventions (social media apps and smartphones) go hand in hand 
with mediated, informal relationality to achieve outcomes. Furthermore, it 
should not be missed how such actions expands MAM’s operational space.
At the time of my conversation with Mg Khin, MAM would receive 
around twenty assistance requests per day (which would later exponentially 
grow as MAM’s social media presence matured). Yet, MAM’s usage of Line 
is miniscule in comparison to how Facebook increasingly became a central 
platform for their activities. Although MAM may enjoy one of the largest (if 
not the largest) social media presence amongst labour migrants (with more 
than a million followers), they are far from alone. Another central migra-
tion activist, who was associated with a Thai NGO, enjoyed more than two 
hundred thousand followers on Facebook during my fieldwork. And others, 
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such as the aforementioned Migration Assistance Monk and the Myanmar 
Migrant School, both have several thousand followers. All of these actors 
easily dwarf any social media following any UN agency or established main-
stream NGO has achieved (despite often considerable financial resources 
spent on media strategies).8
Over time, MAM’s use of Facebook evolved into an ecosystem. Frequent 
Facebook updates on government regulations relating to migrants, reports 
on successful compensation claims, and exposé of dubious conduct by bro-
kers (and even officials) became essential to cement MAM’s credibility as a 
pseudo-official actor. Facebook also served as a conduit to mobilise financial 
funds (deriving from donations) which helped fund MAM’s activities which, 
Figure 9.1  Line messages requesting MAM’s assistance. A photo of MAM officer, 
Mg Khin, line message thread with the domestic workers. The sub-
ject-header of the message reads: “a problem with employer’s house.” 
The following correspondence reads: Mg Khin: “Call me;” Domestic 
worker: “yes;” followed by domestic worker sharing her geolocation 
multiple times.
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in turn, produced further opportunities to provide Facebook updates. Yet, 
this circular process amplified tensions between MAM’s need to be aligned 
yet oppositional with state institutions, which we will now explore.
Safeguarding migration through Facebook
Whilst carrying out fieldwork, MAM’s Facebook posts served as a vir-
tual parallel universe with continuing everyday commentary on migration 
issues, including posts like this:
About 44 migrants working for Sanook Factory, Yen Lom District, 
Nong Thani Province, were dismissed due to company closedown. 
They were compensated only 1,000 Baht each for company closure. The 
owner… told the migrants “you can go to complain anywhere, I don’t 
care.” The migrants requested MAM’s assistance, who reported the case 
to the Ministry of Labour and the Department of Labour Protection 
and Welfare (DLPW) of Nong Thani Province. MAM and authorities 
called the employer and discussed the workers’ rights. The employer 
acknowledged the compensation requirements according to the Thai 
Labour law and agreed to pay the full compensation… The migrants 
received a total of 877,000Baht in compensation after MAM’s support 
and intervention.
Facebook posts like these, with accompanying thirteen photos of the 
affected migrants proudly showing bundles of 1000 Thai Baht notes, serve 
as a virtual amplifier of MAM’s daily activities. With MAM’s enormous 
Facebook following, both malpractice by employers as well as MAM’s out-
reach work become visible in ways that would have been impossible only a 
few years ago.9 One of the most frequent forms of Facebook updates would 
relate to migrants’ compensation claims, such as the one below:
Myanmar Migrant worker Mg Nyan, aged 25, lost his right hand in a 
work accident and had to take refuge at the MAM’s distressed migrants’ 
centre for over 10 months. He has now received an accident compensa-
tion totalling 511, 881 Baht after MAM and Migration Aid followed up 
his case.
Other posts provide warnings relating to alleged scams by brokers.
Special Announcement for Myanmar Migrants
On 05 January 2018, the Ministry if Labour (MOL) has issued an 
announcement on formal registration of Migrant workers in Thailand. 
This announcement includes the registration for new undocu-
mented migrants. However, on 09 January 2018, the MOL has issued 
another announcement revoking the previous announcement issued 
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on 05 Jan 2018. Thus, there will be no more registration service by the 
Thai Government for new undocumented workers. Please be informed 
that Thai Government’s current programmes for registration are only 
for existing workers in Thailand and no service is available for new 
undocumented migrants. Please do not believe in the offers from bro-
kers to register undocumented migrants; they all are frauds and scams.
Ko Thet Oo (MAM)
3336 shares
Such posts serve multiple purposes. They provide a form of witnessing 
in the sense that they make migrants’ problems and suffering visible to 
a large audience. At the same time, they serve as a marketing tool for 
MAM’s work. It reinforces MAM’s status as a credible actor in migra-
tion assistance and helps feed further migration assistance cases MAM’s 
way, which, in turn, results in more cases for MAM to work on and 
report on through Facebook. As discussed earlier in this chapter, MAM 
receives a lot of financing through donations as well as commissions from 
successful compensation claims. Hence, Facebook is integral to MAM’s 
operational logic.
Another audience for all this is employers, brokers, and even Thai and 
Myanmar state institutions who are responsible for regulating both work 
conditions and migration. As the two posts above suggest, reporting on 
work accidents and unscrupulous employers provides MAM with political 
leverage as they can cause considerable embarrassment to employers and 
brokers caught out in malpractice, or state agencies for failing to enforce 
laws and regulations. Yet, this also increases the risk for MAM as unfa-
vourable reporting can engender hostile reactions from authorities, brokers, 
and employers alike. This is why MAM often mentions, evidenced in the 
posts above, that they work in cooperation with authorities. The way MAM 
balanced sate emulation and contestation through Facebook posts is worth 
unpacking in some further detail.
Facebook: State emulation and contestation
In addition to Facebook updates on compensation claims and warn-
ing migrants against potential scams by brokers and employers, many of 
MAM’s Facebook posts echo formal government rules and regulation, as 
well as advice on how to process them. MAM’s close relations with both the 
Labour Attaché and various officials in the Thai government bureaucracy 
enable them to provide up to date, ongoing and context-specific informa-
tion relating to the CI process, various MOU regulations, and other formal 
procedures required by either the Myanmar or Thai authorities relating to 
migrants. In effect, MAM serves as a broadcaster of government regulations.
The scalar dimension of such posts is significant as it reinforces a 
state-centric encompassment as we discussed above. Even though MAM is 
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based in one province of Thailand, their Facebook presence provides them 
with a much wider audience well-beyond Thailand’s borders.10 Repeated posts 
that demonstrate MAM’s collaborations between both Thai and Myanmar 
state agencies (often accompanied by photos of MAM members and gov-
ernment officials either in discussions, meetings, or shaking hands) reinforce 
the kind of state emulation discussed earlier in the chapter. Furthermore, 
MAM’s Facebook presence is useful to the governments in how they dissem-
inate state regulation to migrants. This helps explain governments’ relative 
tolerance towards MAM. Hence, Facebook reinforces patrimonial relations 
between the state and MAM (cf. Baker and Milne 2015).
However, MAM’s seeming cosy relationship with authorities encloses 
inherent tensions. Governments (and others) can interpret repeated report-
ing on migrant abuse as an implicit critique of government failure to regulate 
labour migration. Yet, as many migrants have less than positive experiences 
with state authorities, evading critical commentary regarding the role of 
the state poses a credibility problem for MAM. Although Facebook pro-
vides MAM with a platform to strengthen and visualise their relationship 
with the state (which contributes to their status as a credible actor), MAM’s 
social media presence also provides an impetus to mark their separation and 
opposition to the state in order to sustain traction amongst their Facebook 
followers. We have seen earlier examples in this book where MAM would 
explicitly critique – via live Facebook streams – state authorities’ failure in 
curbing widespread abuse, bribery, and broker-proliferation at CI centres. 
Although MAM would often carefully mention their collaboration with 
state authorities when reporting on abuse in the MOU system (such as the 
posts described above), other posts give emphasis to the voice of migrant 
workers and the exploitation they experienced through MOU contracts. For 
example, on 17 January 2018, Ko Thet Oo livestreams the following from 
MAM’s migrant shelter via Facebook:
Ko Thet Oo: Mingalarbar [Hello] to you all. Today early in the morning 
at 2 AM on 17 January 2018, the MAM shelter received 16 MOU work-
ers whose contract agreements were severely violated by the brokers 
and employers. They come to the MAM centre on their own arrange-
ment and decision. MAM will now interview them about what kind of 
troubles they were in, how they come to MAM, and what they want 
to do next.
OK, you brothers came here by the MOU programme; which MOU com-
pany sent you here and for what kind of work?
Worker 1: We came to Thailand though the Naga Overseas Job Placement 
company in November 2017. Initially we were promised that we will 
get jobs at the ceramic plate factory in Sawadee province. But in real-
ity, we were sent to construction sites. The jobs were changed again 
and again four times. Finally the broker said if you can work, you 
work, I cannot take responsibility anymore.
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Worker 2: At the highway, we have to start to work at 7:15 AM and com-
plete at 6:30 PM. No overtime pay or rest days are provided. The 
wages were irregularly paid. In the last four days no money has been 
paid and we cannot work because we have nothing to eat.
Ko Thet Oo: What kind of contract regulation breaches did you face?
Worker 3: The whole contract is being breached. Firstly, we were never 
sent to the Ceramic plate factory. Instead, we were sent to various con-
struction sites. When we ask the broker about our work at the ceramic 
plate factory, the broker said the factory has already shut down.
Worker 4: I had an accident; a nail piercing my feet. Nobody takes respon-
sibility for treatment. I have to use the medicines that is brought from 
Myanmar. No hospital or doctor. Despite that, they were required to 
work. They said, if you do not work, there will be no pay.
Ko Thet Oo: How much you have paid the agency and how much is your 
total cost here?
Worker 5: We have to pay the recruitment company 300,000 Kyats 
[approximately 206 USD), the broker in Myanmar 120,000 Kyat. The 
broker here [in Thailand] 120,000 Kyat. The fee for passport process 
is 120,000Kyat. I heard they said they will deduct 7,000Baht [approxi-
mately 225 USD]. They have already deducted 2,900 Baht.
Posts like these are shared 1666 times, attract thousands of likes and hun-
dreds of comments from Facebook followers, and provide migrants with 
unprecedented abilities to directly communicate serious malpractice that 
take place within government-endorsed migration systems (the MOU sys-
tem) which are meant to offer safe migration pathways for migrants. Such 
posts make ripples through both migrant communities and political estab-
lishments in Myanmar and Thailand. Social media platforms pose novel 
challenges for governments as its operational architecture, including con-
ditions where content may be censored, is controlled by media companies 
(such as Facebook) as opposed to governments (Dijck et al. 2018). And as 
recent times in Thailand has demonstrated, the Thai state has had difficul-
ties controlling Facebook activities even relating to highly sensitive topics, 
such as Thai royalty (Thailand tells Facebook to remove content that insults 
the monarchy 2017). The quasi-independent nature of Facebook provides 
organisations like MAM with increased leverage.
MAM is well aware of the tensions they create. As Ko Thet Oo explained 
to me once, “As for the big labour brokers, [our posts on Facebook] make 
them lose their business and reputation. They hate us! They make threats 
by phone and attack our Facebook site.” Indeed, Ko Thet Oo’s Facebook 
account was subject to regular hack attempts and at times acidulous com-
ments on their Facebook posts suggested MAM had plenty of enemies. The 
Thai police, Ko Thet Oo told me, had openly informed him that they have 
several of his posts translated in order to keep an eye on migration issues. 
Ko Thet Oo also knows that several authorities in Myanmar, including 
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Aung San Sy Kyi’s office keeps an eye on his Facebook posts. Although this 
suggests state authorities’ use MAM as a panoptical proxy (which is argua-
bly the utmost example of MAM serving as an extension of the state), it also 
exhibits MAM’s actions to state authorities. As several of the earlier exam-
ples indicate, reporting on migration’s despondency goes hand in hand with 
reporting on state failure and malpractice. During my fieldwork, MAM’s 
relationship with their Thai NGO counterpart and the labour attaché dete-
riorated. Whereas MAM grew impatient with what they saw as restrictive 
arrangements of operations, MAM’s operating style had become too brazen 
(and outspoken) for both Myanmar and Thai officials’ liking. Being keenly 
aware of this tension, U Htay Ko said that “We always make sure the infor-
mation we provide is 100% correct,” as otherwise “wrong news would bring 
us death.” Yet, what constitutes correct information may be in the eye of the 
beholder. One morning when I visited MAM’s shelter, discussing migration 
issues U Htay Ko asks me:
I have one more point to ask your opinion. The point is; if the govern-
ment has complete laws and perfect implementation of these laws, they 
do not need assistance of any NGO. At the start NGOs appear and 
request the Government to assist or supplement in certain areas. But 
as the NGO works more and more in this area for many years, they 
have experience and they can define the government’s policies in cer-
tain areas as grey, blue or red. Then they start to criticise government 
for various inefficiencies. In this way they become the opponents of the 
government. What is your opinion? Professor, are the NGOs supple-
mentary to the government or are they opponents to the government?
I do not recall how I responded to U Htay Ko’s aporia, but as time passed, 
MAM’s own actions provided the answers. MAM’s relationship with both 
Myanmar and Thai authorities constituted a blend of an antagonistic rela-
tionship which brought together political opposition, extended governance, 
and inter-dependency. The forces that brought MAM into close relation-
ship with state authorities also became a source of frictions and tensions. 
Both Thai and Myanmar authorities, alongside some Thai NGOs who had 
worked with MAM in the past, grew increasingly impatient with MAM’s 
never-ending exposé via Facebook. As MAM’s Facebook following had 
grown to around a million followers, stakes were high. Counteraccusations 
ensued.11 In turn, MAM members ended up in serious difficulties relating to 
their visa status. Legal threats followed, which in the end culminated in Ko 
Thet Oo’s arrest towards the end of my fieldwork.
Although many migrant groups are less audacious than MAM, their 
informal role nonetheless denotes important underlying structural ten-
sions within informal migration assistance. Such tensions are not limited to 
MAM. For example, ongoing rumours flourished alleging some Myanmar’s 
recruitment agency association members paid labour attaché officials a set 
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amount for the number of migrants that were processed through the MOU 
system. Such payments would clearly compromise the labour attaché’s cred-
ibility as a neutral arbitrator when assisting migrants who frequently ended 
up with problems relating to recruitment agencies. This was vehemently 
denied by the labour attaché and resulted in serious friction between migra-
tion assistance groups. The allegations appear to have merit given that they 
became public and subject to legal proceedings (Zaw Zaw 2019). At the time 
of writing this book, MAM, alongside a range of other informal migration 
assistance groups, still carries on with their operations despite the various 
attempts to curtail their work. No doubt, the inter-dependency explored 
above works against any dismantlement of organisations such as MAM. 
What is of analytical significance is how social media is instrumental in 
providing an operational space for migrant assistance which at the same 
time amplifies the perilous patrimonial relations that are required in order 
for MAM’s on-the-ground operational space.
Conclusion
The Migrant Assistance Monk has just completed and advisory session with 
a group of migrants in his condo. We continued our conversation regarding 
his work and the plight of migrant workers in Thailand. “You know,” he said, 
“people like me, MAM and other groups, we are almost like a government 
in exile. Some four million Myanmar migrants in Thailand struggle and are 
often not protected by the Thai state. We [the Myanmar people] don’t have 
our own ministries [in Thailand]. So, we fill this gap.” The monk’s com-
ments divulge how political exile leaders like U Ba Sein (see Chapter 1) and 
himself have taken on migration assistance work in ways which emulate the 
state. This chapter has demonstrated how such state emulation is intimately 
related to operational space of informal actors in migration assistance. As 
we have seen, such actors comprise considerable scalar faculties in how 
they instrumentalise programmatic fields of action, which arguably super-
sedes formal safe migration programmes implemented by UN agencies and 
NGOs. This is underpinned by two forms of sociality: a moral economy 
of aid and donation-giving amongst migrant workers, coupled with ubiqui-
tous social media use. Three operational effects stem from this: it allows aid 
activities to expand spatially (through networks), it straddles institutional 
and legal binaries (the formal/informal/legal/illegal), and alters speed (cases 
can be acted on without being slowed down by bureaucratic red tape). An 
important effect of all this is that laws and regulations become socially ani-
mated through intermediary forms of assistance, a point we will revisit in 
the conclusion of this book.
Yet, all of this comes with two inherent challenges. Firstly, as migrant 
assistance is commonly premised on mediation, so are the results for 
migrants. As we have seen in this and earlier chapters, compensation cases, 
although often efficacious, are compromised in that settlements are often 
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less than officially stipulated (cf. Campbell 2018). Although this can usefully 
be interpreted as a form of recuperation – where migration assistance asso-
ciations are tolerated in order to co-opt latent union activism – it is impor-
tant to not underestimate the real transformative potential of such actions. 
For example, migrant associations continued social media broadcast of 
MOU malpractice appear to have contributed to governmental reforms of 
recruitment agency bank guarantees (see Chapter 7). This connects to a sec-
ond challenge. Mediated assistance intertwines with patron-client relations 
that are highly unstable (a theme we will return to in the conclusion). As we 
have seen, NGOs and state agencies are informal migration associations 
engage one another through forms of inter-dependency which at the same 
time brings out tensions due to the different positions of these actors. Social 
media, the chapter has argued, amplifies both inter-dependency (including 
state emulation) and the oppositional politics between these actors. As such, 
opposition and co-dependency are co-constitutive of one another.
Finally, the chapter has shown how social media strengthens connectiv-
ity between informal migrant associations and migrant communities. Yet, 
informal migration assistance denotes disconnection in a twofold sense. On 
the one hand, although organisations such as MAM carry out work that sits 
squarely within safe migration activities, they do not themselves engage with 
a safe migration discourse. Furthermore, despite the incredible social media 
presence by the Migration Assistance Monk, MAM, and others, expatriate 
aid officials who worked for NGOs, UN agencies, and donors that fund and 
implement safe migration are – as the network map in Chapter 2 demon-
strates – unaware of associations such as MAM and the existence of people 
such as Ko Thet Oo. The paradoxical co-existence of such (dis)connections – 
coupled with the unstable relations of informal migration assistance – are 
central to how safety is brokered through safe migration praxis, a point that 
will be further explicated in the conclusion of this book.
Notes
 1. As explained elsewhere in this book, a range of “zoning technologies” (Ong 
2004) are deployed to “peg” migrants to their workplaces. For example, up 
until the new labour law introduced in 2018, migrant workers with pink cards 
could not cross provincial borders from their workplace. Ko Thet Oo became 
exempt from such restrictions due to his different visa status. Importantly, this 
allows cross-provincial travel which is important for MAM’s spatial reach.
 2. One thing that MAM members never mentioned, but which is a likely addi-
tional reason for their decision to operate without formal funding, was that 
neither of the members had the necessary linguistic (i.e. Thai and English flu-
ency), or managerial skills and experience in order to negotiate external fund-
ing without significant help from a Thai NGO.
 3. Such informal migrant organisations are widespread in Thailand, including 
in border areas (Décobert 2016)
 4. MMH has also engaged in various collaborations with international organisa-
tions and union activists which no doubt has also been a source of funding.
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 5. For example, Ko Htay (see Chapter 8), who is part of MMN, advices migrants 
that if police request them to sign any documents that are in Thai, they should 
simply sign the document by writing “I don’t understand Thai” in Burmese 
language. This way, migrants secure themselves from scams, such as signing 
off on a letter confirming all their salaries have been paid. Ko Htay experi-
enced this ploy himself several years ago. Ko Htay, with the assistance of a 
Thai NGO, has successfully assisted migrants in local courts who have been 
victims to this scam.
 6. At the same time, the emancipatory potential of smartphones and social 
media should not be romanticised. As with any technology, it can be weap-
onised against purpose and there may well be unintended effects from their 
use. As one CBO outreach worker pointed out to me, a reason why police will 
usually not confiscate a migrant’s phone: the police officer depends on the 
migrants possessing their phone so the migrant can contact friends and family 
in order to mobilise sufficient funds to pay the bribe.
 7. Line is a highly popular text messaging app which is similar to Facebook and 
widely used in Thailand and Myanmar.
 8. Only towards the end of my fieldwork did some UN and NGOs gain traction 
with social media. This took place then they changed their strategy away from 
designing standalone apps, to utilising established media platforms, such as 
Facebook. Aid agencies appear to have not familiarised themselves with the 
most basic context of social media use amongst migrants. For example, many 
migrants prefer cheap SIM-card services, sometimes based on daily usage 
rates. Many migrants do not use their phone on weekdays while they work 
in factories (where phone use is often banned). Hence, many migrants only 
activate their phones on their day off, thereby minimising data usage. Such 
kind of social media usage means that they are carful with their data usage 
and unlikely to download additional apps beyond what is preinstalled. Many 
telecommunication operators provide Facebook with unlimited data plans 
which amplifies its usage.
 9. The use of social media for calling out injustice and expose corrupt officials is 
arguably an extension of long-standing complaint practices. As Nick Chees-
man has documented in a Myanmar context, even under military rule (which 
precedes internet connectivity), people employed a range of tactics to present 
complaints to authorities (Cheesman 2015). Also, radio broadcasts, such as 
BBC’s Burmese service predates social media as a platform for information 
dissemination outside government channels. Yet, the scale and ubiquity of 
Facebook usage amongst migrants appear unprecedented.
 10. When interviewing various government officials, NGO works and migrants 
in different parts of Myanmar (Mon State, Yangon, Shan State, Mandalay), 
nearly all either follow or are aware of MAM on Facebook.
 11. Throughout my fieldwork, I would sometimes hear other informants alleging 
MAM themselves where brokers, or resembled a “mafia” in how they alleg-
edly created their own forms of dependency between their service provision 
(e.g. assisting with visas and work permits problems) and their migrant con-
stituents. Serious allegations of misconduct were also made against individ-
ual members of MAM which resulted in court cases in both Thailand and 
Myanmar (which appear to have been ultimately unsuccessful). MAM vehe-
mently denied such allegations. It is difficult to assess the veracity of such 
allegations given that so many informants had vested interest in discredit-
ing MAM. Not only did MAM irritate migrant brokers and state officials; 
other migrant groups were clearly envious of MAM’s ascendant public profile 
within migrant circles (in party due to their enormous Facebook presence).
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The key thing is to regulate migration and remove the need to rely on 
a broker.
(Senior UN official)
“So who are these people?” Suzanna, a UN official whom I introduced in 
Chapter 2, has just ordered her dinner. Sitting in the leafy courtyard in one 
of Bangkok’s many backstreet restaurants, we are already well into our con-
versations regarding safe migration in Thailand and its neighbouring coun-
tries. I have just told Suzanna about MAM and Ko Thet Oo’s migration 
assistance work and enormous Facebook following. Suzanna reaches for 
her notebook in her bag, hands it over to me whilst saying with a smile “you 
have to write down the name of this person for me!” Suzanna’s organisation 
was not only assisting a range of safe migration-related activities but also 
worked on social media campaigns targeting labour migrants. Learning 
more, and possibly connecting with MAM, would be a golden opportunity 
for her safe migration programme, Suzanna explains.
Yet, the week before I happened to have met up with Ko Thet Oo and 
some of his colleagues who made it clear to me that, although they were 
more than happy for me to write about their activities, they preferred me 
using pseudonyms despite that fact that they were publicly known amongst 
both Thai and Myanmar governments, ran a public Facebook account, and 
gave interviews to both Thai and Burmese news outlets. For this reason, 
I politely tell Suzanna that I was not in a position to reveal MAM or Ko 
Thet Oo’s identity. If she really wants to know who they are, I tell Suzanna, 
she has plenty of resources at her disposal to find out as her organisation 
employs both Thai and Burmese staff. And should they not already know 
about MAM through their safe migration programme implementation, 
regardless of my own research activities, I wondered? Suzanna laughs, nod-
ding her head whilst recognising the irony of her own unawareness.
Suzanna’s ignorance regarding MAM echoes a theme that has resurfaced 
throughout this book: how expatriate aid officials are socially distant – and 
therefore ignorant – of how safe migration aid delivery unfolds at local levels. 
This disconnection is also made clear through the social network analysis 
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map I provided in Chapter 2, which shows few direct relations between inter-
national agencies and informal migrant self-help groups. As I have explicated 
in this book (see Chapters 4–6), the structuring of formal aid delivery clouds 
local context of safe migration praxis. This obfuscation, I suggest, is central 
to understanding safe migration aid delivery. Knowing too much – for exam-
ple that local implementation depends on NGOs employing former labour 
brokers as outreach workers – would complicate international aid agencies’ 
operational space. As such, safe migration aid delivery depends on ignorance.
As I have detailed in Part 2, safe migration discourse comprises impor-
tant temporal (anticipatory interventions) and spatial qualities (deterrito-
rialisation, spatial reversals, and “U-turns”) which connect to regulatory 
mechanisms (legibility and legal status) and behaviouralist discourses (i.e. 
migrants’ conduct). Yet, in practice, informal, mediated relations are cen-
tral to how safe migration and migrant assistance unfold, a theme we have 
explored in Part 3. The importance of informal actors and practices also 
helps explain why safe migration praxis is dominant amongst Burmese 
migrants (relative to Lao), given pre-existing forms of sociality relating to 
self-organising and self-help (see Chapter 3). This also helps explain the cen-
tral role of brokers (Chapter 8) and informal migrant groups (Chapter 9). 
As we have seen, informal migrant groups are widespread and facilitate 
an enormous amount of assistance provision for migrants, which often 
depends on, yet create friction with state agencies. This renders safe migra-
tion praxis unstable and unpredictable, a point that was highlighted to me 
by the Director of the Myanmar Migrant School, U Ba Sein (see Chapter 1). 
“MAM can be quite dangerous,” U Ba Sein once told me, pointing to how 
they could embolden migrants to protest, which would ultimately endan-
ger migrants; and even MAM itself. Towards the end up my fieldwork, U 
Ba Sein’s observation proved correct. The authorities’ patience with MAM 
seemed to have ran out, something that became evident during an unex-
pected fieldwork visit to a dispute settlement meeting between a group of 
disgruntled MOU migrants and a group of recruitment agencies. I retell this 
meeting in some detail as it brings to light the book’s central argument so 
well: how safe migration constitutes brokered safety.
The dispute resolution meeting
Although Myanmar recruitment agencies’ main operations take place 
in Myanmar, they also hold an office in Thailand. During fieldwork, my 
research assistants and I had the opportunity to visit their office. When we 
arrived, we could immediately see that the place had turned into a refuge for 
stranded migrant workers. At least 50 migrants were present. A large rice 
cooker was continuously steaming rice to aid the migrants with free food. 
The scene did not come as a surprise as we already knew from our research 
that a lot of migrants turned to this office for assistance. Upon arrival, we 
learned that our contact person was delayed. However, we were told that 
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a dispute resolution meeting was about to take place between a group of 
MOU migrant workers who had escaped from their workplace and their 
respective employer and recruitment agency. We were to our surprise invited 
to sit in as observers which allowed verbatim note-taking of the meeting.
Whilst waiting for the meeting to commence, we learn that the group 
of MOU workers had escaped their factory and sought refuge at MAM’s 
shelter for distressed migrants. Yet, this had backfired as authorities had 
recently clamped down on MAM’s shelter. Hence, the recruitment agency 
office – in collaboration with the Labour Attaché – had become an alter-
native informal sanctuary for various migrant with problems, such as the 
MOU workers in today’s dispute resolution meeting. Even before the meet-
ing commenced, we realised that the MOU workers’ case would be severely 
comprised as they have acted “illegally” in a double sense. They escaped 
their workplace leaving their passports behind (which under the MOU sys-
tem would technically render them in breach of their contract and migrant 
status) and sought help from MAM (which at this time was considered 
an illegal operation by local authorities).
After a little while, two representatives from the Thai recruitment agency 
arrive. Another man represents the Myanmar agency. The meeting com-
mences. The four migrant workers sit down on one end of the table, whereas 
the Thai and Myanmar recruitment agents are located at the other side of 
the table. At the end of the u-shaped table, sit four other representatives 
from recruitment agencies, symbolically occupying a neutral spatial posi-
tion between the opposing migrants and recruitment agencies. The Chair 
commences the session:
CHAIR: We will start the session with the testimony from the workers. So, 
tell us your story. Tell us one by one; please do not make many conflict-
ing stories.
MOU WORKER: I will answer on our behalf. We are MOU workers and we 
were sent to a Thai factory, a recycling plant, at the end of July. We 
work from 7am in the morning to 5pm in the evening. But when we get 
our wages, we were not given any overtime. We ask for overtime and 
the employer did not agree. The contract states we are supposed to sort 
paper and plastic, but in reality, we have to sort and carry heavy iron 
and metal pieces. What is mentioned in the contract and what is reality 
are totally different.
CHAIR: Is the name of the company different from the contract?
MOU WORKER: No.
CHAIR: If the company name is as per the contract, how come the type of 
work is different? We will check your official contract from your agent. 
Are you the representative of the Myanmar Agent?
MYANMAR AGENT: I am the director of the Sunrise Overseas Job placement 
Agency. I represent the company. Here is their formal contract submit-
ted to the Ministry of Labour.
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CHAIR: The formal contract states it is a “Recycling and Waste 
Management” facility. So, our question is when you were at the Labour 
Office [as part of the pre-departure training in Myanmar] to sign your 
contract, Did the labour officer tell you the job as “Recycling and Waste 
Management?” Did you really listen to the officer when he explained the 
description of work?
MOU WORKER: Yes, he did mention that it was recycling, but we thought we 
only had to handle paper and plastic. But here there are a lot of metal 
and iron pieces and they are very heavy.
CHAIR: Oh, recycling can be anything second-hand, it could be anything, 
from paper and plastic to metal and concrete. It is just your percep-
tion that recycling concerns with paper and plastic. That is your limited 
perception of the work you have to handle. You cannot say the job is 
different from the contract. You are working for the recycling factory 
as per the MOU contract. The name of the company is correct and the 
type of work is correct too.
MOU WORKER: The employer has two factories; one newly built. The metal 
pieces were loaded outside the new building. We have to carry these 
heavy metal pieces in the sunshine over to the other building. It is hot 
and the job is very tiring. No water is provided. We feel we are being 
used more than the contract says. We start work around 7am and finish 
at 5pm. We haven’t received any overtime pay. There is no translator so 
we cannot discuss our problems with the employer. The Thai recruit-
ment agency only appeared after one month. The whole month, we have 
to work in the sunshine, carrying heavy metal pieces.
THAI RECRUITMENT REPRESENTATIVE: Yes, the workers called us. But 
before we came in, we have to ask the employer. When we ask the 
employer, he said everything is ok. As the priority of the problem was 
low, we decided to come after one month. But when we arrived, the 
workers said they all would like to change employment because the 
work is not the same as stipulated in the contract. They told us they 
have no water to drink and they did not receive overtime.
CHAIR: The match between the job and the contract is already settled. It 
is my understanding that it is only the overtime claim left to settle. To 
claim for your overtime, do you have any concrete evidence? Such as the 
timecard?
MOU WORKER: Here is the picture of the timecard, we took the picture with 
our phones.
CHAIR: The timecard shows you stamped between 7:05 to 7:15 AM. You 
have to verify what you did do after you stamped your card. Did you 
start work immediately or did you just rest and eat to wait until 8:00 am?
MOU WORKER: We started work immediately.
CHAIR: Then they are eligible for one hour of overtime every day. Did 
you negotiate with the employer for that? [Thai agent] can you please 
verify?
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THAI RECRUITMENT REPRESENTATIVE: Yes, we made the request to the 
employer and the employer has agreed to pay one-hour overtime. The 
owner said the water facility was available in the old factory and they do 
not have time to install the water machines in the new one. But the work-
ers can walk to the old factory to drink water. Anyway, the employer is 
installing the water machines soon in the new factory.
However, the real problem is that the workers are set to stop working 
in this factory. The employer had already given us the agreement to 
issue the extra overtime pay. We have explained that to change jobs as 
an MOU worker is quite difficult and they have to go back home and 
wait for the next contract. We cannot process an employment change 
here as the employer had done nothing wrong to them.
Finally, the employer collected their passports and work permits to 
process the extra overtime pay. We told them that after they receive the 
overtime payment from the employer, we will escort them back to the 
border. That was in the morning. But by 3pm, the employer told us that 
the workers had disappeared. They left all their documents with the 
employer. That is very dangerous situation for the employer because 
he did not seize the documents, the documents were only required to 
process the payment. Thus, the employer decided to report the missing 
workers to the police.
CHAIR: It is the end for you [four MOU workers] if the employer reports 
the case to the police. Then you ran away to MAM without any 
documents?
MOU WORKER: We were in huge debt due to processing the MOU contract. 
We dare not go back home when we have no money in our hand. One 
employee at our factory told us that if the employer provides us with 
an exit-permit we can change jobs. At first, we planned to run to the 
Labour Attaché, but it was Sunday and they did not pick up the phone. 
So, we reached out to MAM.
CHAIR: There are two very important things you need to know: what the 
former employee said about getting an exit permit is only true for the 
normal migrant workers [i.e. migrant workers with legal documents 
outside the MOU system, such as pink cards or CI holders]. They can 
easily change their job if the employer issued them an exit permit. But 
you are MOU workers. The Labour Department allow the employer 
with MOU contract to issue the exit permit in five instances. They are:
1 The employer does not settle wages according to national minimum 
wage.
2 The employer does not pay any wage.
3 The employer physically assaults and punish the worker.
4 The employer is bankrupt.
5 The employer is dead.
Conclusion 197
Since you are not eligible for any of the above, the employer will never issue 
you the exit permit. MOU workers are generally not allowed to change 
employment if they have not completed the first two years of the contract. 
If you run away without any formal document, the police will consider 
you an undocumented migrant who have entered Thailand illegally. If you 
were caught by police on the way, MAM is not coming to bail you out. 
Because MAM cannot assist illegal workers. MAM also cannot feed you 
there for long too, if you are undocumented. You reached out to MAM 
on 16th, they sent you to us on 20th. This also means you burdened them 
[MAM}.
So, we will make the final ruling. The Thai Agent must go back to the 
employer and request the remaining overtime payment for the workers and 
also bring back their passports and work permits. As the employer had filed 
the case of desertion with the police, you cannot be re-instated anymore. 
Thus, you have to return to Myanmar and your Myanmar Agent will issue 
you a refund. Then you process another MOU contract to return to work 
here [in Thailand].
MOU WORKER: Oh, can’t you find another job for us? If the recruitment 
agency refunds, it would only be about 450,000 Kyats (325 USD). Our 
actual cost is around 1,000,000 Kyat (725 USD). We decided to leave 
because the work was too hard in the sunshine. If any job is in the shade, 
we are willing to work.
MYANMAR AGENT: I have a proposal. If they will not request for a refund, 
they will be sent back to Yangon free of travel cost by me. They have 
to wait in Yangon for about a month before returning with a new con-
tract without any extra payment. But the condition is, in Yangon for one 
month, I can give them a place to stay but they must find the food by 
themselves to eat. I cannot afford to feed them for one month.
CHAIR: Do you understand his proposal? If you do not process the refund, 
you will get a new contract free of charge in one month. By the way is 
that new job, really to work in the shade?
MYANMAR AGENT: We are about to finalise an MOU contract with a fac-
tory. It is a plastic hanger factory. They have to pack the hangers. This 
kind of job is normally in the shade.
CHAIR: For just a month, I think I can feed you at my home in Yangon.
MOU WORKER: Oh, we want to return to our homes for a short time and 
come back when the contract is ready.
CHAIR: In this case, can the agent give them 20,000 Kyat each as the travel 
cost assistance? Is this agreeable to all parties concerned? If everyone 
will agree, we will put the conditions in a written contract and everyone 
must sign.”
[The MOU workers, and the Thai and Myanmar recruitment agency 
officials agree.]
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CHAIR: OK, we close the case today. We hope everybody concerned are 
happy with the negotiated results. Thank You all.”
The Chair writes up the outcome in the meeting, which is shared with the 
Thai recruitment agency and read out to the migrants. They all sign the 
document. The meeting ends.
***
I end this book with recounting this negotiation meeting as it encapsulates 
the central argument of this book, that is, how safe migration constitutes 
brokered safety. The negotiation meeting demonstrates how formal migrant 
status and mechanisms (i.e. MOU migrants) intertwine with informal 
practices (the negotiation meeting). Despite the formal status of all parties 
(licensed recruitment agencies and MOU labour migrants), they all have 
vested interest in solving the case outside formal channels and avoid esca-
lation in order to prevent the involvement of Thai authorities (especially 
Ministry of Labour). Although the Thai employer could easily have settled 
the matter by allowing the MOU workers with an exist document (in order 
to change employers), this would in effect constitute considerable reputa-
tional damage for the agency, as releasing the workers would imply admis-
sion of malpractice, which, in turn, could jeopardise the agency’s bank 
guarantee under the MOU system (see Chapter 5).1 Nor would this work 
well for the migrants. Even if their MOU processing fees were returned to 
them, this would not cover the considerable amount of additional fees they 
had already paid to sub-brokers back in Myanmar (see Chapters 4 and 5). 
Hence, the Myanmar agency’s “solution” offering to waive the fees associ-
ated with re-initiating MOU contracts for the workers becomes a compro-
mise which allows a way for both the migrants and the agencies to conform 
with formal MOU regulations (neither party will be in breach of the rules) 
despite being negotiated outside formal dispute mechanisms (i.e. Thailand’s 
Ministry of Labour is not involved).
The negotiation meeting brings to light safe migration governance’s 
spatio-temporal qualities. Social actors are spatially reversed: it is Myanmar 
recruitment agencies – not Thai authorities – that end up mediating out-
comes, despite the meeting taking place in Thailand. Furthermore, as all 
parties have a vested interested in settling the case prior to it escalating to 
Ministry of Labour, they unwittingly mirror one of the safe migration’s tem-
poral logics: the meeting becomes a technology of anticipation (i.e. medi-
ating disputes before they escalate to formal authorities). Yet rather than 
pre-emptive action safeguarding migration, it helps conceal dubious bro-
kering practices. This also contributes to producing “success” (in the sense 
that no malpractice is formally taking place within the MOU system) and 
disconnection (as Thai authorities and aid officials, such as Suzanna, will 
remain oblivious to their occurrence).
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At the same time, the negotiation meeting connects the present to the past. 
As we have explored in earlier chapters, legal status (passports; work per-
mits) and pre-departure training rest on behaviouralist notions of respon-
sibilisation (Rose 1992) coupled with a politics of entitlement and eligibility 
(e.g. how legal status enables migrants to seek compensation). Although the 
migrants in the negotiation meeting had a strong case against the employer 
(misleading work description coupled with no overtime), the migrants’ pres-
ent circumstances become intertwined with their past actions. The Chair 
of the meeting questions whether the migrants “really listened” when they 
signed the contract during the pre-departure training, thereby transposing 
blame away from recruitment agencies and labour officials onto the migrant. 
In effect, safe migration training (in the form of pre-departure training) 
makes migrants blameable. The MOU migrants’ alleged culpability is rein-
forced by the mere fact that they sought assistance from an informal (unli-
censed) migrant assistance group – MAM – which underscores the unstable 
nature of informal modes of assistance. And the fact that the migrants 
have failed to understand the differences between migrant categories (they 
misunderstood the difference between MOU workers and other migrants) 
severely compromise the four MOU workers’ leverage against the employer. 
The result becomes an awkward compromise where overtime is promised 
coupled with an offer of re-recruitment into the MOU system without extra 
fees. The migrant infrastructure comprising MOU contracts, pre-departure 
training, and other assistance mechanisms entangles migrants into a com-
plex assemblage of informal (and highly uneven) compromises, mediations 
and workarounds. Within this maze, distinctions between the formal and 
informal; the legal and illegal; and safety and danger, collapse into one. 
The meeting produces brokered safety.
So, where does all this leave us? The reader may think that safe migra-
tion is ultimately an instrument of subjugation. Yet, to read this book as a 
denunciation of safe migration discourse and practice is to misread my argu-
ment. Although safe migration comprises a range of counter-intentional 
effects, subjugating practices, and aporias, it would be too easy to brush 
this away as yet another example of either nefarious migration policy or 
“bad aid.” As I have detailed throughout the chapters, safe migration does 
open up a wide, flexible space where an impressive amount of programme 
activities unfolds. In many cases, this results in meaningful assistance for 
migrants. Yet, at the same time, one must also attend to the complexities 
and conundrums that come with this form of aid praxis which ultimately 
take place within a wider context of highly uneven relations between poor 
labour migrants, employers, state officials, and aid agencies. Safe migration 
pushes and pulls in different directions. Focusing on how UN agencies, 
NGOs, government bodies, and migrant groups operationalise their activ-
ities shows how informal practices underpin safe migration programmes. 
As such, safe migration praxis brings us to ethnography; how situated 
co-presence and sustained, experiential knowledge production is the key 
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to understanding contemporaneous, situated practices. And perhaps, this 
is the quality that safe migration encapsulates so well. Investigating safety 
in migration allows us to understand how migration is governed through 
brokered practices.
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